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What can be called the conventional view concerning the 
operation of family, kinship and other ascriptive ties 
during social change in non-Western countries is subjected 
to an extensive critique. The conventional view typically 
characterizes social organization in non-industrial areas as 
primarily subject to ascriptive principles. Social values 
are conceptualized as "tradition," "primitive," or 
"custom-bound," and it is asserted that an emphasis on 
family ties and ascription is part of an integrated set of 
phenomena found in non-industrial areas. 
With respect to industrial societies, the conventional 
view asserts that ascriptive principles do not operate to 
any important degree. These societies are described by 
concepts such as "modern," "civilized" or "individualistic," 
and it is argued that an emphasis on individual achievement 
and competition are part of an integrated set of phenomena 
found in more developed societies. The conventional view 
stresses the interrelatedness of ~11 parts of society and 
. ,· ...... 
therefore societies at different levels of development must 
• 
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have different social structures and social values. In 
this view, social change becomes a shift from phenomena 
which characterize the "traditional" society to phenomena 
which characterize the "modern" society. Since these two 
societies are in opposition at so many points it is asserted 
that the shift is generally sudden and dramatic. 
This dissertation criticizes the conventional view for 
its assertion that societies can be divided into these two 
types and that social change generally can be conceived of 
as a transition between these types. Societies with dif-
ferent levels of technology may in fact have similarities in 
their social organization. Social relationships are regular 
and recurrent but the same regularity may be found at dif-
ferent technological levels. In addition to offering a 
unique theoretical synthesis, the dissertation offers 
empirical data on the existence of achievement orientations 
among tribal peoples. 
A total of 1330 workers were sampled at four rubber 
plantations in Liberia, West Africa. The majority can be 
described as achievement oriented. Variables reflecting 
the conventional view, e.g. "modernization," "industriali-
zation," and "urbanization" were used in an attempt to 
explain these findings. Specifically studied were educa-
tion, work experience, "adaption to wage-labor," self-
conception and urban experience. Achievement orientation 
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was not positively related to any of these variables. In-
stead, this dissertation accounts for the existence of an 
achievement orientation among tribal people by showing that 
the amount of achievement orientation varied by tribe. Two 
factor analyses and a cluster analysis show that although a 
basic similarity existed among the tribes, i.e. all stress 
achievement, men from three Kwa-speaking tribes in our 
sample, the Kru, Krahn, and Grebo, were more achievement 
oriented than men from the other seven tribes. 
This variation by language group suggested that an 
explanation for the existence of achievement responses 
should be sought in the social structure of the tribes. 
Historical and ethnographic data showed that the Kwa-
speaking group have a distinctive history of occupying 
coastal jungle areas and governing themselves through de-
centralized political authority. They did not have secret 
societies nor did they congregate in dense populations. The 
Mande and West Atlantic-speaking peoples had been pushed to-
ward the coast by expansionary pressures from the interior. 
These latter peoples were relatively more stratified, had 
secret societies, were more likely to have farmed, and had 
a centralized political authority. The existence of 
centralized authority and secret societies probably weakened 
individual achievement emphases. This evidence shows the 
existence of achievement orientations among tribal peoples 
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and provides an explanation for it that contrary to expec-
tations of the conventional view does not make reference 
to modernization. 
r-
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to review orthodox socio-
logical conceptions of social change in non-industrial 
areas, cite the evidence which shows the necessity for their 
modification and offer suggestions as to what this modifi-
cation entails. The following chapters should be read as 
steps of an argument. Each chapter is part of a systematic 
repudiation of an entire intellectual perspective. 
Chapter One offers a description of existing, orthodox, 
theoretical thought. This thought is called "the conven-
tional view." A full intuitive understanding of it is dif-
ficult to convey since no detailed point-by-point descrip-
tion of it exists. Few descriptions of any complex per-
spective fully exhaust its assumptions, propositions and 
implications, or demonstrate its conceptual integrity. This 
chapter is a composite description of existing social 
change conceptions. The composite is taken from intro-
ductory books primarily, but also relies upon specialized 
writings. The reader should be especially careful to note 
the repeated assertion that an emphasis on achievement and 
social mobility is characteristic of the division of labor 
in industrial societies and an emphasis on kinship, sex and 
other relatively unchangeable ascriptive properties is 
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characteristic of smaller, "primitive," non-industrial 
societies. This assertion, and by implication the assump-
tions which generate it, is the theoretical "hypothesis" 
which the dissertation "tests." 
Chapter Two examines an assertion of the conventional 
view that has already been disproven. It is still occa-
sionally repeated today that industrialization transforms 
existing extended family patterns into nuclear family pat-
terns, i.e., extended families "break down" under the 
impact of industrialization and are replaced by forms, like 
the nuclear family, which are more compatible with a modern 
economic system. This is a familiar assertion in American 
sociology. It existed for as long as it did because it was 
integrated with other ideas asserting compatible processes. 
The empirical repudiation of any one part of an integrated 
perspective must inevitably tend to question the empirical 
adequacy of other ideas in that perspective. The empirical 
repudiation of customary assertions about the operation of 
family patterns within processes of industrialization and 
urbanization is related to an examination of achievement, 
ascription and kinship. Family ties are one kind of fixed, 
ascriptive social relationships, and to assert that they 
operate differently than has been customarily thought is to 
affect analysis of kinship and achievement. 
Chapter Three reviews the responses of so-called 
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"traditional" peoples to western economic situations. "The 
conventional view, 11 as exemplified in the work of Wilbert E. 
Moore, is shown to provide an inadequate empirical under-
standing of non-industrial social structures and processes 
of change within them. A substantial number of empirical 
findings are reviewed. Their topics include labor and 
economics in 11 traditional" societies, labor commitment, 
history of labor migration, and contemporary labor migra-
tion. The cumulative effect of these findings is to show 
the necessity for building better conceptions of social 
change. 
Chapter Four reviews the evidence on achievement, 
showing how the "conventional view" analyzes it, the lack 
of evidence supporting that analysis, and the evidence 
contradicting it. Enough doubt exists to seriously question 
the assertion that industrial societies emphasize achieve-
ment and "traditional" societies do not. 
Chapter Five reports the statistical findings of 
interviews with 1300 rubber tappers in West Africa and 
shows, across a number of questions, that a majority of the 
respondents give achievement responses. This tendency is 
not associated with "urbanization," "modernization" or 
"industrialization." The proof for this is found in 
Appendix A. Statistical evaluation finds that responses 
vary by tribe, i.e., the traditional social structure is 
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the source of these responses. 
Chapter Six pursues the findings of the previous 
chapter by looking at the historical development of West 
Africa and ethnographies of the tribes represented in the 
sample. Historical records and cultural ethnographies 
substantiate the statistical conclusions. All tribes in 
the area emphasize achievement, but non-agricultural tribes 
with decentralized political control and minimal social 
class differences stress achievement more. These results 
are corroborated by separate lines of analysis and veri-
fied by at least one other independent study. However, 
they are not compatible with the conventional view. 
Chapter Seven summarizes the preceding chapters, re-
views theoretical critiques of "the conventional view'' and 
offers general suggestions as to how it should be modi-
fied. Any modification must account for existing empirical 
findings, be created from a wider base of knowledge and 
achieve a better appreciation of what "urbanization" and 
"industrialization'' actually entail. 
CHAPTER ONE 
DESCRIPTION OF CONVENTIONAL VIEW 
Introduction to Conventional View 
This chapter describes conventionally accepted socio-
logical beliefs on social change in "underdeveloped coun-
tries." The prevailing images are summarized in concepts 
like "modernization" and "industrialization" and reflected 
in introductory textbooks. A standardized format exists in 
the introductory text. It presents the world view of Ameri-
can sociologists and until now high agreement existed on the 
topics and concepts that should be introduced to beginning 
students. Topics associated with social change in overseas 
countries, e.g., economic development, the procedures and 
quality of cross-national studies, comparative sociology, 
and distinctions between "traditional" and "modern" 
societies are not generally included in the introductory 
format. If present at all they are tacked on in the closing 
chapters. 
This sociological ethnocentrism and its seeming lack of 
concern with other countries seems primarily due to the fact 
that sociology as we know it today is largely constructed of 
data collected in the United States. Brown and Gilmarten 
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say "Substantive research in our journals is today even 
more culture bound and time bound than in 1940-41 
sociologists are tied to provincialism .•. they do not 
always study the topics (for example, social change) that 
they verbally pronounce to be important. 111 Approximately 
ten per cent of all doctoral dissertations are written on 
data collected outside of the United States. A number of 
plausible factors, such as language deficiency, funding 
problems, and pressure to finish a degree quickly can be 
suggested to account for this situation. Concomitantly, 
sociologists have relied on other social sciences for cross-
information. For example, Marsh's Comparative Sociology 2 
shows that of the 143 journals cited in his 1146 item 
bibliography only 28 of them contain the words social or 
sociology in their title. A look at the relative frequency 
of articles in the two major sociological journals, the 
American Sociological Review and the American Journal of 
Sociology, that use data from non-industrial countries sup-
ports the observation. The result is that American 
sociology is primarily based on empirical knowledge of the 
United States' patterns and secondarily on Western European 
1Julia Brown and Brian Gilmarten, "Sociology Today: 
Lacunae Emphases and Surfeit," The American Sociologist, 
4 (November, 1969), p. 287. 
2Robert M. Marsh, Comparative Sociology, New York: 
Harcourt Brace & World, 1967. 
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patterns. Most sociologists neither have training in over-
seas research nor have they analyzed the potential rele-
vance of comparative information to their own interests. 
Introductory textbooks reflect this bias. 
The introductory textbook is important for two reasons: 
first, it is the usual means through which strangers-
inexperienced strangers, are introduced to the body of con-
cepts and information called sociology. Secondly, a com-
parative reading of several books reveals the assumptions 
and perspectives they use to analyze phenomena. What fol-
lows is a series of quotes from introductory books. They 
are given in order that the reader might understand what the 
prevailing view is about the phenomena that concerns this 
thesis. Later chapters will focus down to one specific 
proposition within this conventional view. Broadly stated, 
what is the role of kinship in contemporary social change? 
Specifically stated, are industrial societies primarily 
achievement minded and non-industrial societies non-
achievement minded, i.e., do the former use a person's 
achievement in evaluating and judging him and the latter use 
other factors, like kinship and fixed characteristics? This 
thesis moves from a series of general comments to an empiri-
cal contribution examining this issue in West African tribal 
societies. 
In one of the most popular introductory texts, Broom 
and Selznick, we find the following 
Achieved status. Under feudalism a person's 
occupation and station in life were ascribed, fixed 
by tradition and inheritance. The son of a serf 
was also a serf, and the son of a blacksmith in a 
feudal village was trained to become a blacksmith. 
In a system of free labor, ascription gave way to 
individual choice and achievement. 
Division of labor on an achieved rather than 
inherited basis is congenial to the development 
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and expansion of industrial capitalism for the 
following reasons: (a) Achievement is better 
adapted to specialization, which is a charac-
teristic feature of industrial capitalism. When 
occupations are inherited and training takes place 
within the family, the number of possible speciali-
zations is limited. (b) With technological advance, 
job requirements change and new jobs are created. 
It is unlikely that the technological advances that 
have played a major role in the expansion of 
industrial capitalism could have developed to such 
an extent without an emphasis on achieved status 
and its accompanying ideals of initiative and 
acquisition. 
Preindustrial man does not want to accumulate 
wealth for its own sake. Employees often work hard 
to satisfy an immediate need but cannot be spurred 
to further effort once that need is satisfied. In 
industrial societies higher pay usually holds down 
the rate of labor turnover. Preindustrial workers 
tend to leave the job when their requirements are 
satisfied, and higher pay may, therefore, result in 
increased labor turnover. 
In nonindustrial societies kinship systems are also 
economic systems, and the marked change in a man's 
economic role when he enters the industrial labor 
force disrupts his accustomed social relations. The 
social penalties of this disruption may keep him 
home even if he has economic incentives for working. 
Furthermore, peasants and artisans often dislike or 
think they would dislike the rigid time schedule 
and discipline of the factory. 
The first industrial recruits are usually the 
landless, the hungry, the politically powerless, 
and the socially disaffected, who are pushed 
rather than pulled into industrial employment. 
The push is often provided by the beginning of 
industrialization itself.3 
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Ascription and achievement are extensively considered 
later in this thesis. Let us not define them for the moment 
but simply note that one of the more frequently stressed 
ideas in this part of Broom and Selznick is that ascription 
characterizes non-industrial peoples and achievement the 
industrial society. In the second paragraph they say pre-
industrial man is not interested in accumulation per se and 
describe a backward bending supply of labor curve. Their 
last quotes describe how kinship interferes with economic 
growth by constraining participation in "modern" economic 
systems. 
But social change is also occurring in other areas, 
to which we refer (somewhat disdainfully) as "under-
developed" countries. Changes in these societies 
are caused by such varied factors as Western tech-
nology, industrial methods, modern medicine, adequate 
sanitation, and mass communications. These elements, 
furthermore, are being introduced to societies whose 
culture and social structure have heretofore re-
mained virtually unchanged for a thousand years. The 
marriage customs, family systems, sexual roles, class 
relationships, moral norms, cultural values, and per-
sonal aspirations of many underdeveloped peoples are 
3Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, Sociology: A Text 
with Adapted Readings (4th ed.), New York: Harper & Row, 
1968, pp. 463-468. 
( 
virtually the same as they were at the time of the 
Crusades. 
In their efforts to eliminate, or at least 
alleviate, the problems of underdeveloped coun-
tries, the Western nations have encountered a 
variety of difficulties, ranging from apathetic 
ignorance to outright hostility. A pervasive 
fallacy of these well-meaning Western efforts is 
the idea that the above problems are wholly (or 
at least largely) economic in origin, and that the 
underdeveloped countries merely require large and 
continued injections of Western technology and 
capital. The problems are more complicated, how-
ever, and social engineering calls for sociologi-
cal, as well as economic, knowledge. In other 
words, "most of the problems of 'economic develop-
ment' facin~ backward countries are non-economic 
in nature." (underlining in italics.) 
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The first paragraph states a point of view that many 
believe, i.e., no change of any significance has ever 
occurred in non-industrial areas, and when it does occur it 
is due to outside factors. Although few writers would admit 
to such a crass generalization it nevertheless underlies the 
continued existence of ideal types and dichotomies such as 
modern-traditional and rural-urban. This existence is 
reiterated across the discipline in introductory textbooks 
and in many papers. For example, Halpern says, 
A modern society is a society marked by persistent, 
system-transforming change, whether intended or 
unintended, controlled or uncontrolled. Hence, 
whenever any society begins to experience such 
4Francis E. Merrill, 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
pp. 500-501. 
Society and Culture (3rd ed.), 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965, 
And 
change, it has thereby (however early or belated 
in history) entered the modern age.5 
A traditional society is a pre-modern system 
(1) whose relationships are dominated by 
polarities capable of dealing only with system-
maintaining change (i.e., strains); and which 
(2) in its history only rarely experienced inco-
herence, i.e., system-disintegrating change.6 
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These conceptions define a "modern society" in terms of 
change and a traditional society is one that does not change 
much. This is the gist of the definitions. The problem 
of measuring actual rates of social change in different 
contexts is not even seen to be a problem. 
Beisanz and Biesanz extensively compare "traditional" 
and "modern" societies. Since few introductory books make 
the comparison in such detail we cite extensively from 
them. 
Besides industrialization, the modernization 
process includes a demographic revolution that 
results from a sudden drop in death rates and a 
shift from rural to urban living. It also entails 
separation of the educational process from family 
and community and its formal institutionalization 
in a school system designed to train people for 
increasingly specialized and demanding occupations. 
Achieved status becomes more important than ascribed 
status. Physical and social mobility and other 
5Manfred Halpern, "Conflict, Violence, and the Dia-
lects of Modernization," a paper presented to the Panel on 
"Conflict, Violence, and Political Transformation," at the 
64th Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, 
Washington, D. c., September 6, 1968, p. 32. (Mimeographed) 
6rbid., p. 33. 
aspects of modernization affect the structure and 
function of the family, as we shall see in 
Chapter 19. Authority and administration change 
from a traditional or feudal type to a rational 
and legal bureaucracy, whether democratic or 
totalitarian. The exchange of goods and services 
becomes rational and impersonal; labor is treated 
as a commodity. Values and beliefs change in the 
direction of secularization, rationality, and 
materialism. 
Traditional society is organized on a small 
scale and in a rural setting, typified by the non-
literate tribe, the medieval manor, the peasant 
village. Therefore primary contacts are possible 
among all the members of the society. 
The extended family is the cornerstone of a tra-
ditional society. Its members share the family in-
come regardless of their contribution to it, the 
old, the ill, the disabled, and even the lazy being 
cared for by the productive members •... 
12 
In a traditional society status lines are clearly 
drawn in a rigid hierarchy and depend mostly on 
ascription. That is, a man's position depends 
mostly on things he cannot help: the status of his 
parents, his age, his sex, and perhaps some fortui-
tous circumstance such as being born with a caul. 
Everyone in a traditional society has his prescribed 
place and duty. The superior protects; the sub-
ordinate obeys. A modern society, in contrast has 
an open and mobile class structure in which status 
depends largely on achievement; that is, on indi-
vidual efforts to gain the education and skills an 
industrial society needs and rewards. The labor 
force of necessity is hierarchically organized, for 
industry needs both the managers and the managed; 
and various skills are differentially valued and 
unequally rewarded. But advancement within this 
hierarchy is far more likely to reflect achievement 
than ascribed qualities. 
In traditional society, life seems to be an inte-
grated whole; the various aspects of culture blend 
"seamlessly." Because the economy is "embedded" 
in other institutions it is hard to label one 
activity as wholly economic and another as wholly 
religious or political. Family life, religion, 
government, and the activities of getting food, 
clothing, and shelter from the environment are all 
woven together and all imbued with a sacred 
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meaning. Thus work in a folk society is often 
accompanied by songs and chants, blessed by cere-
monials, and crowned by feasts. It may also be 
considered a "beast" to which man is enslaved all 
his life for little return, but in either case it is 
seen as an integral part of the society's way of 
life. Because of the way economic activities are 
integrated with the other aspects of life, economic 
rationality is at a minimum. 
The traditional society is custom-bound. Its 
members do not consider any new and unconventional 
ways of manipulating their environment to adapt it 
better to their needs ...• 
Members of traditional society believe that to 
keep things as they are is the greatest good. This 
is true of the social order as well as the physical. 
Everyone accepts his own status as given and sacred 
and cannot conceive of himself as occupying any 
other. In the traditional society of the Middle 
Ages, for example, the belief system included the 
principle that all vocations had worth and dignity 
in God's eyes and that the goal of income was simply 
to maintain a person in the standard of living that 
was customary and just and fair for persons of his 
status. Because customary methods of production 
sufficed to maintain this station in life, it did 
not occur to medieval man to try to raise his pro-
ductivity. The true goal of life on earth was seen 
as salvation in the hereafter; earthly life was an 
unimportant incident along the way. 
The industrial society, by contrast, is a changing 
society, geared to the idea of progress and the de-
sire for increasing control, through science and 
technology, over the natural environment. It offers 
fulfillment of wants here on earth through individual 
work and effort. Problems are regarded as existing 
to be solved. . . All industrial societies, no 
matter how they are organized, value science, 
rationality, technical knowledge and skill, hard 
and efficient work, progress, modernity, education, 
mobility, and high productivity. 
To sum up, then, a traditional society is small-
scale, homogeneous, custom-bound, ascriptive, and 
dependent on subsistence agriculture. Its members 
abhor deliberate change, regard their duties and 
statuses as given and sacred, share feast and 
famine according to the whims of nature, and see 
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life as a whole, and imbued with sacred meaning. A 
modern industrial society is large-scale, hetero-
geneous, progressive (or at least changing), mobile, 
and highly productive. Its members seek change in 
the name of progress, seek higher status through 
their own efforts according to largely secular and 
rational values, and suffer want through failures 
of man-made arrangements more often than through 
natural calamities. They see life as segmented, with 
the sacred in a compartment by itself and with work 
and play being quite distinct.? 
Biesanz and Biesanz give a thorough description of 
what this writer thinks are the typical sociological cliches 
about social change in unfamiliar lands. After using five 
pages to describe these differences, the qualification is 
added that "the traditional society" here described exists 
only in a few isolated places. This tacked-on qualification 
cannot undo the images left in the readers' minds. Rather 
such a qualification is equivalent to saying, not all of 
the above is exactly true but it is mostly true so we can 
generalize about it. This book was published in 1969 and 
represents conventional sociological wisdom. It is the 
7John Biesanz and Mavis Biesanz, Introduction to 
Sociology, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 
1969, pp. 461-66. 
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prevalent orthodoxy that has been diffused throughout the 
discipline and its superficial plausibility increases the 
difficulty of modifying it. In beginning a criticism of 
it the very first point to note is that no empirical data 
have been offered in any of the above books to support those 
generalizations! 
For example, we can examine a recent (1969) doctoral 
thesis that used achievement and ascription in its theoreti-
cal explanation. Poston argued that if we examine the 
forty-eight states, we should expect to find occupational 
discrimination by sex to be correlated with the relative 
degree of industrialization within the state. That is, the 
lower the state on a measurement of industrialization the 
higher its rate of sexual discrimination in assigning occu-
pations. The theoretical rationale for this is stated in 
the following passages: 
In striving to conceptualize societies which place 
different emphases on the sexual division of labor, 
it helps to conceive of two quite different ideal 
types--the primitive society and the industrialized 
society. In the ideal primitive society, division of 
labor is based on age and sex alone. The traditions 
and historical conventions implicit in the social 
organization of this type of society prescribe that 
males and females are to be employed in different 
occupations. Ideally, therefore, ascription is the 
only criterion for job allocation. Total inequality 
by sex should obtain in all occupational categories 
in this most primitive form of social life. 
Conversely, the ideal industrialized society places 
a premium on the performance and competence of its 
workers. Its division of labor is based on achieve-
ment. Sex is no longer a criterion for job alloca-
tion. Theoretically, any person, if qualified, may 
be employed in any occupation, despite his sex (or 
age, or color). When this ideal society is 
experiencing full industrialization, productivity 
and efficiency are the sole objectives of the 
economic system. Therefore, labels of ascription 
are no longer the criteria for job allocation. It 
is recognized that these two ideal types may not 
actually exist, but they provide a basis for anti-
cipating an inverse relationship between the level 
of industrialization of a society and its degree of 
occupational differentiation by sex.8 
16 
The first chapter of Poston's thesis cites anthropolo-
gical references to "the primitive society'' but contains no 
references to empirical studies which directly prove the 
theoretical basis of the argument. It has no discussion of 
differentiation within a single society, either modern or 
primitive, no justification for assuming that individual 
states within the United States can be compared to the small 
pre-literate tribal societies that anthropologists reflect 
when they say "primitive," and in short, the theoretical 
rationale is disjointed from the actual data collected. The 
hypothesis studied may be correct but its rationale is 
dubious. 
The contemporary view, as an intellectual set of ideas, 
is compatible with either establishment or anti-
establishment writings. Apologists of imperialism as well 
8Dudley Louis Poston, Jr., "Industrialization and Occu-
pational Differentiation by Sex: United States, 1950-1960." 
Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Oregon, 
1968, pp. 194-5. 
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as its critics have found the conventional view useful. The 
belief that industrial man is distinctly different from 
tribal man and that industrialization and urbanization have 
a disintegrating effect on rural social structure is double-
edged. It can be used to show the inadequacies of non-
Western areas and the continual need for economic investment 
by Western companies, as it can be used to show the harmful 
and destructive effects of Western influences upon unsuspec-
ting non-technological peoples. The image of a tribal 
society is also involved as a mythological-ideological 
justification by American cultural dropouts which contrast 
the presumably self-sufficient, warm, close, rural group to 
the urban cities of our nation. For a leftist example, 
Irving Horowitz, a sociologist well known for his critical 
attacks on policies of the federal government, writes: 
Since primitive societies neither retrogress nor 
progress, they maintain a belief in the fixity of 
social relations. Thus, while what we term under-
developed societies change slowly, traditional 
societies lack not only the fact but the very idea 
of human development; that is, they do not 
possess a plan, a direction, or a goal •.•. 
The traditional society is characterized by little 
change from generation to generation; a behavioral 
pattern governed almost exclusively by custom; 
status determined almost entirely by inheritance 
(ascriptive); low economic productivity; and a 
social organization and life style grounded on the 
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principle of hierarchical command. 9 
Or again, "In the sphere of social processes, one finds 
a parent-oriented society, with movement determined by age 
and sex, no less than class and caste. Veneration based on 
age is a characteristic of underdeveloped or traditional 
societies such as 'feudal' China." 10 Such views are com-
patible with different political policies and this compati-
bility contributes to the continued usage of the views. 
Thoughts on the Origin of the Conventional View 
The origins of this view are obscure, although some 
historical developments in society are easier to reconstruct 
than others. Historically, sociologists have never gone 
overseas in large numbers and consequently never built a 
comparative sociology. However, the need to use cross-
cultural information has always been recognized. Weber and 
Durkheim did extensive library research on comparative 
materials. Nor have sociologists a tradition of implicit 
expectation about field work. For example, in anthropology 
field work has literally become a rite de pas sage and as a 
profession the psychology and personal meaning of the 
experience are passed on informally. The psychological 
9rrving L. Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 61 . 
lOrbid., pp. 440-41. 
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feelings of secret superiority that successful field work 
often invoke are labeled "the bush syndrome," and the 
mechanics of it are understood. Sociologists do not have a 
comparable body of tradition and informal knowledge. 
The conflict between a recognition of the need for 
cross-cultural data and the lack of a tradition in getting 
it results in a reliance upon others, especially anthropolo-
gists and economists, for basic information about non-
Western societies. This writer has closely collaborated 
with American anthropologists in two countries and has spent 
numerous hours discussing field techniques and philosophical 
assumptions. After much thinking about the historical in-
fluence of anthropology on sociological conceptions of 
other countries, he has come to believe that the origin of 
the contemporary view is closely related to classic 
anthropological field technique. That is, generally put, 
the methods used to collect the information affect the nature 
of the results. 
Anthropologists have typically lived for a year in a 
small village as the major requirement for membership in 
that occupation. The large accumulation of single village 
studies heavily influenced social change conceptions in the 
1940's since they (a) corroborated a prevalent sociological 
suspicion about the merits of urban areas, e.g., Wirth's 
much reprinted essay on urbanism as a way of life, (b) fit 
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into a typological thinking about rural-urban differences 
that goes back to the founding fathers, and (c) were a 
source of empirical information which sociologists recog-
nized that they needed but did not have. 
However, these reports of single village living carried 
a set of implicit assumptions which were also absorbed. 
Abetted by a desire for abstraction, the study of social 
change in non-industrial countries became synonymous with 
the study of change at the village level and kinship became 
synonymous with social structure. Theorists relied on what 
information they had at hand and what they had was a proto-
typical primitive village which had roughly the same 
general characteristics across all primitive societies. 
Understanding of society may be gained through 
construction of an ideal type of primitive or folk 
society as contrasted with modern urbanized society. 
Such a society is small, isolated, nonliterate, and 
homogeneous, with a strong sense of group solidarity. 
The ways of living are conventionalized into that 
coherent system which we call "a culture.'' Be-
havior is traditional, spontaneous, uncritical, and 
personal; there is no legislation or habit of experi-
ment and reflection for intellectual ends. Kinship, 
its relationships and institutions, are the type 
categories of experience and the familial group is 
the unit of action. The sacred prevails over the 
secular; the economy is one of status rather than of 
the market. These and related characterizations may 
be restated in terms of "folk mentality." In 
studying societies comparatively, or one society in 
the course of change, with the aid of these con-
ceptions, problems arise and are, in part, solved as 
to the necessary or probable interrelations of some 
of the elements of the ideal folk society with others. 
One such relationship is that between disorganization 
of culture and secularization. 11 
Kuper writes: 
Sociological theories of the city stem mainly from 
the conspicuous contrast between modern complex 
urban societies and rural nonindustrialized 
societies. Studies of urbanization in modern 
Africa are directly or indirectly influenced by the 
classical works of Durkheim, Maine, Tennies, and 
Weber, transmitted in part through Wirth and Red-
field. It is in this broad tradition that Profes-
sors Schwab and Miner frame their contributions. 
The focus is on typology and causality. "Urban" 
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and "folk" are conceptualized as contrasted ideal 
types, each viewed as an integrated social structure 
or mechanism with its own forms of equilibrium and 
its own social (largely demographic) and psy-
chological attributes. Until fairly recently more 
thought was directed to examining and refining 
characteristics of heterogeneity, density, per-
manence, isolation, secularization, individuali-
zation, and literacy than to analyzing structural 
process.12 
Anthropologists generalized from the village to the 
tribe and at times the two are discussed interchangeably. 
That is, it is assumed that the village studied is typical 
of most villages in the area and that behavior observed in 
it is representative of behavior found in the tribe as a 
llRobert Redfield, "The Folk Society," The American 
Journa l o'f Sociology, 52 (January, 1947). Redfield 1 s 
article is reprinted in Ronald Freedman et al., Principle of 
Soc i o l o gy (rev. ed.), New York: Holt Rinehart & Wilson, 
1956; Thomas Lasswell, et al., Life in Society, Chicago: 
Scott Foreman & Co., 1965;and Logan Wi lson and William 
Kolb, Sociological Analy sis, New York: Harcourt Brace & 
World, 1949. It is also reprinted in the Bobbs-Merrill 
Series. 
12Hilda Kuper, Urbanization and Migration in West 
Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, 
p. 11. 
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whole. Phenomena that a sociologist would be apt to study 
such as migration within a group of villages, or coalition 
formation in tribal politics, are not typically considered 
by anthropologists. For example, David Morris writes: 
It is true that mobility of population in India has 
been historically limited. My point is that it is 
entirely inappropriate to deduce from this the pro-
position that social structure was responsible for 
the phenomenon. Village studies cannot be used to 
prove a purported relationship between social struc-
ture and limited mobility because until very 
recently anthropologists were not interested in the 
kinds of materials needed to furnish answers to the 
problem. However, certain characteristics of the 
Indian economy will suggest economic reasons for 
restricted mobility.13 
Morris goes on to argue that demand for labor was low and 
until it increased no population shifts occurred. However, 
after 1834 when demand did rise, mobility was not a problem. 
This is a subtle bias since the single village study is 
still the most widely used methodology in anthropology. The 
single village study is a reliable and proven method of 
obtaining solid social information and to believe it has 
serious limitations is, emotionally and analytically, a dif-
ficult admission. 
Two major anthropological field problems are where to 
begin field study, i.e., the best location, and then how to 
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generalize from that locale to the larger tribe. Both of 
these are sampling problems. A concern with sampling, a 
concern felt more deeply by sociologists than anthropolo-
gists, arises when studies of small groups are made and the 
researcher wishes to generalize to a larger population or 
say that his results are applicable beyond the people he 
immediately encountered. If a locale is selected for op-
portunistic reasons such as an "in" which facilitates admis-
sion, then no guarantee exists that the site is typical of 
anything but itself. Concomitantly, without empirical 
justifications it is inappropriate to make the assumptions 
that the village studied is part of a homogeneous culture 
and therefore the culture can be discussed using village 
examples. These problems are compounded since systematic 
re-study is the exception rather than the rule. Oscar 
Le·wis' re-study of Tepotzlan is a case in point. Using a 
different theoretical perspective he found instances of 
assaults and murder which Redfield had not been aware of. 14 
Usually the assumption is made that generalization is pos-
sible. The specific conditions affecting what can and 
14Goldkind restudied Chan Korn, where Redfield did his 
first field work and also concluded that Redfield provided 
a very inaccurate description of village life, a descrip-
tion that consistently ignored all aspects of its social 
stratification into classes and its ideological faction-
alism. Victor Goldkind, "Social Stratification in the 
Peasant Community: Redfield's Chan Korn Reinterpreted," 
American Anthropolo·gist, 67 (August, 1965), pp. 863-84. 
cannot be generalized have not been scrutinized closely 
enough. 
The Contribution of Marion Levy 
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The impact of anthropological conceptions is most 
noticeable in the now defunct "school of structural func-
tionalism." Desiring abstraction although not preferring 
simplicity, Parsons devised a series of general dichotomies 
describing all social relationships, the pattern variables. 
When attacked by critics for an inability to study change, 
these dichotomies were applied to non-industrial areas and 
change was analyzed as a shift from one set of concepts to 
their opposites. Historically, the growth of radical socio-
logy, or the radicalization of sociology, has justified 
criticisms that Parsons' schema would not analyze social 
change. 
The pattern variables were originally developed to de-
scribe all possible social relationships, but a question of 
level exists. The ways two people initiate and respond are 
different from how two villages or two countries affect one 
another. Parsons' dichotomies were used to describe "the 
traditional society" and later generalized to "the under-
developed country. 1115 Levels of analysis became confused. 
This description of social change was influential and has 
15Bert F. Hoselitz's articles are an example. 
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existed longer than the amount of empirical evidence sus-
taining it should have permitted. This situation will con-
tinue to persist as long as prestige and influence rests 
with prominent theorists who seem to be doing little, if 
any, actual research. 
The last major work published by a theorist associated 
with these dichotomies has been Modernization and the 
Structure of Societies by Marion Levy. Fourteen years in 
writing, it is 855 pages of abstract conceptualization about 
social structure. His analyses of the differences between 
modern and traditional societies is summarized in Table 1. 
TABLE 116 
X y 
1. Cognitive aspects Rational Traditional 
2. Membership criteria Universalistic Particularistic 
aspects 
3. Substantive defini- Functionally Functionally 
tion aspects specific diffuse 
4. Affective aspects Avoidant Intimate 
5. Goal orientation Individualistic Responsible 
aspects 
6. Stratification Hierarchical Nonhierarchical 
aspects 
16Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure 
of Societies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 
p. 153. 
A partial feeling for the tenor of the book may be 
obtained from the commentary on these concepts. 
In Part I, above, one of the major distinctions 
between relatively modernized and relatively non-
modernized societies was the different emphases in 
different spheres that the members of those 
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societies placed on the X and Y forms of the rela-
tionship aspects. Throughout this work, there is a 
great deal of hypothesizing that the role of changing 
emphases on different clusters of the relationship 
aspects is of the first importance in the transition 
from relatively nonmodernized to relatively modernized 
societies. Many problems of the transitions can be 
understood in these terms. The exploration of just 
how these relationship aspects tend to cluster and 
under what conditions these and other clusterings 
take place, has only recently begun in social 
science. The two major clustering effects illustrated 
in Table 2 may be rather confidently relied upon. For 
any relationship in which there is a switch in 
emphasis from a Y to an X category in any of the first 
three aspects, one should expect a shift from an 
emphasis on a Y category to an X category in the 
other two as well. There would also be a switch to-
ward X4 if the emphasis was previously on Y4. If 
such a switch does not take place, or if one finds 
an emphasis on an X in any one of the first three 
aspects and not in the other of the first four, he 
can draw one of two possible inferences: (1) the 
relationship concerned will prove to be highly un-
stable, or (2) it will be fitted into and buttressed 
by other relationships in a peculiar fashion. 
There is another general avenue for theory forma-
tion in these terms. Certain emphases on relation-
ship aspects are characteristic not only of dif-
ferent societies but more importantly of their various 
subsystems. This has many implications for general 
theories of social change. One of the major reasons 
that the structures of relatively modernized societies 
are in fact a sort of universal social solvent of the 
social structures of other societies is that forcer-
tain structures likely to be initiated intentionally 
or unintentionally, the members of relatively moderni-
zed societies emphasize X qualities in the first four 
as ects whereas members of most of the relative! non-
modernized soci eties emp asize Y qualities in at least 
the first three aspects. Moreover, the disintegrative 
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impact of the importation of such structures is never 
confined to the minimal departures from emphasis on 
the Y categories necessary to establish firmly an 
emphasis on the X categories for altogether new rela-
tionships. The disintegration may go quite far even 
though the emphases on the X category are not at all 
firmly established.17 
The closing comments on disintegration are another way 
of talking about the rapid impact that Western countries 
have had and the presumed destruction of traditional social 
structure that has resulted from it. This is a theme that 
Levy continually stresses throughout the book. Levy's 
Table 1 and the quote above should be recognized as a more 
abstract way of presenting the same ideas we encountered in 
Biesanz and Biesanz or Broom and Selznick. Levy goes on to 
say 
The distinction between achieved and ascribed is 
now one of ancient tradition as the field of social 
analysis goes. This distinction is close to, if 
not identical with, the distinction already used in 
another context under the heading of universalism 
and particularism •.• substitute predominantly 
universalistic for achieved and predominantly 
particularistic for ascribed.18 
As soon as specific examples are given to clarify the ab-
stractions, we arrive at statements similar to those found 
in the introductory books. As this thesis attempts to show, 
neither Biesanz and Biesanz's clear assertions nor Levy's 
abstract pronouncements may be "rather confidently relied 
17 rbid., pp. 170-71. Underlining mine. 
18 rbid. 
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upon." 
Levy's opus has not been treated kindly by critics. 19 
Smelser, Horowitz and Wheeler all pointedly comment on its 
absolute lack of empirical documentation and the overly ab-
stract language that is repeatedly used. None of these ob-
jections would be serious were Levy an unknown or obscure 
writer. Instead he is a "Professor of Sociology and Inter-
national Affairs at Princeton University and a faculty 
associate in the Center of International Studies." A 
rhetorical question might well be asked: is there a rela-
tionship between the ideas that Levy expresses and the 
social class of the students who attend Princeton Univer-
sity? For example, in a section on "mob action" he writes 
... In Iran under the leadership of Mossadegh, 
the mass demonstrations incited and executed 
against the properties, policies and personnel 
associated with an oil company as the hated symbol 
of imperialism were certainly examples of mob 
action in the sense intended here.20 
That Prime Minister Mossadegh was overthrown by a Central 
Intelligence Agency coup in 1953 is not mentioned by Levy. 
The coup resulted in a new government which was favorable to 
American oil interests, notably Standard and Gulf. The CIA 
19Neil J. Smelser and Irving L. Horowitz, "Review Sym-
posium," American Sociological Review, 31 (December, 1966), 
pp. 857-81. See also Wayne Wheeler, "Social Change and 
Modernization: The Problem of Open vs. Closed Models," 
Sociological Quarterly, 9 (Spring, 1968), pp. 158-69. 
20Levy, ~- cit., p. 324. 
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agent in charge of the operation, Kermit Roosevelt, became 
in 1960 a vice-president of Gulf. Levy's book includes 
only six passing references to imperialism, one of them in 
the above quote, only five references to the United Nations, 
none to major economic spokesmen for third world countries 
such as UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Dis-
armament), none to the World Bank, the International Mone-
tary Fund, Central Intelligence Agency or GATT (General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), and six references to 
Marxism, i.e., the book explicitly avoids "economic" ques-
tions, as if a definitive 855 page work could be written on 
"modernization" without examining international economies 
and the foreign policies of the major industrial countries. 
Levy's description of the traditional society is taken 
directly from Parsons' pattern variables. 21 Hoselitz and 
Moore, prominent among sociological theorists on social 
change, also used the pattern variables as a theoretical 
schema. 
Three of the five pairs of pattern alternatives 
stated by Parsons are more immediately applicable 
to our problem. These are the choice between 
modalities of the social object (achievement vs. 
ascription); the choice between types of value 
orientation standard (universalism vs. particularism); 
21Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shilo (eds.), Toward a 
General Theory of Action, Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 1951. P. 77 contains mostly the same contents as 
Levy's Table One. See also pp. 76 ff. On p. 134 of his 
opus Levy acknowledged his debt to Parsons. 
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and the definition of scope of interest in the object 
(specifity vs. diffuseness). In applying these three 
pattern variables to the distinctions between 
industrialized and predominantly non-industrial 
societies, we find that the former are characterized 
by the preponderance of achievement standards in the 
distribution of economic roles and objects; that they 
also employ universalistic criteria in this distribu-
tion process; and that economic roles in these 
societies are typically functionally specific. Pri-
mitive and other non-industrial societies, on the 
other hand, exhibit predominantly features of ascrip-
tion, particularism, and functional diffus~~ess in 
the corresponding fields of social action. 
In summary, this chapter has introduced the conven-
tional view of social change in non-industrial countries as 
it appears in both introductory and more specialized works. 
Other examples could be cited to what "the conventional 
view" consists of and how it has been used. It should be 
stressed that this view is not a fixed one, two, three list 
of propositions. Rather it operates as a paradigm as de-
scribed by Kuhn, 23 a set of implicit assumptions and overt 
propositions, not always publicly articulated, which define, 
guide and interpret research in a scientific field. All 
such views like this, especially in the absence of long re-
search traditions, are reconstructions of reality. The 
specifics of any analysis speculating or describing such a 
paradigm are open to debate. The writer's purpose here is 
22Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, Industriali-
zation and Society, UNESCO Monitor, 1963, p. 16. 
23Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
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to provide a rounded understanding of what it entails. This 
thesis will later describe the accumulation of contrary 
empirical evidence which implies necessary revisions that 
must be made in this view. The evidence presented here on 
West African societies is intended as a contribution to our 
understanding of kinship as a social pattern. This under-
standing involves a way of thinking about kinship that is 
different from the conventional view. Chapter Two reviews 
evidence on the extended and nuclear family and "indus-
trialization." The chapter opens a more specific introduc-
tion to the contributions of this thesis. 
CHAPTER TWO 
FAMILY PATTERNS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 
Having introduced the conventional wisdom in Chapter 
One this section continues a critique of it so that the 
theoretical contribution of this thesis may be put into 
proper perspective. This critique will build into and 
introduce the . thesis's specific empirical contribution on 
the role of achievement principles in social change. 
The "conventional view" is a set of loosely integrated 
but mutually supporting ideas. By the classic conception 
of theory as a set of related ideas, or by Kuhn's conception 
of a paradigm, these ideas do form a theory even though they 
are not typically labeled as such. The ideas have also been 
used as implicit assumptions which may or may not be overtly 
proclaimed. This lack of sustained systematization allows 
an analyst to study separate propositions within the set, 
entirely aside from whether or not the conclusions of that 
study affect other propositions. The result of this lack of 
integration is that differing amounts of information have 
been collected for each proposition. We begin this criti-
cism by reviewing the evidence for a proposition whose 
empirical adequacy has been generally discredited. Since 
this thesis will focus on a proposition whose adequacy is 
33 
not clearly doubtful, it is instructive to examine a pro-
position that has been empirically falsified. 
Until the early 1960's it was commonly asserted that 
pre-industrial countries basically had an extended family 
pattern and that processes of social change, urbanization 
and industrialization, as part of their encompassing effect 
on society, replaced the extended family with a nuclear 
family pattern. 1 This assertion closely dovetailed with the 
importance supposedly placed on kinship in "the primitive 
society" and how industrialization is essentially disruptive 
and antagonistic of traditional social structure. 
Furstenberg, in denying the applicability of this, 
presents it in detail: 
The proposition that industrialization destroys 
traditional family structures has long been 
accepted by sociologists and laymen alike. In 
industrial societies a new kind of family, the 
"isolated nuclear family," has been recognized1 
in societies presently industrializing, the older 
family systems are thought to be under great 
strain. Analysts of the American family have both 
assumed and asserted that the transition from an 
agricultural to an industrial economy is ac-
companied by the weakening of a family system 
characterized by such traits as low social and 
geographical mobility, high parental authority 
over children, marital harmony and stability, 
dominance of husband over wife, and close ties 
within the extended family. It is similarly 
assumed that the modern family possesses few of 
lFor example of this in the economic literature see 
Peter T. Bauer and Basil S. Yamey, The Economics of Under-
developed Countries, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, pp. 66-67. 
the characteristics of the pre-industrial family. 
Just as the older family pattern served the 
needs of a farming economy, it is frequently 
said that the modern family serves the needs of 
an industrial economy.2 
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Greenfield criticized statements like this in 1961.3 
He reviewed evidence by Johnson on Japan which said the 
Japanese stem family was sufficiently generalized in nature 
to adapt to Japanese technological growth and that no basic 
change of its structure had occurred despite industriali-
zation. He cited: Garigue, who reported extensive kinship 
networks among urbanized industrialized French-Canadians 
that existed historically and will probably continue to 
exist; Wagley, who studied kinship in seven Brazilian com-
munities and found kinship ties operative in both rural and 
urban areas; and Firth, Young, Shaw, and Townsend's London 
studies which also found operative extended family ties. 
Greenfield went on to describe kinship on the island of 
Barbados in the Caribbean Sea and implied his analysis could 
be generalized to other islands in the West Indies. It had 
a densely populated society, without a peasantry or an 
industrial labor force, yet it has always had an almost 
2Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., "Industrialization and the 
American Family: A Look Backward, 11 Ame•rican Sociological 
Review, 31 (June, 1966), pp. 326-37. 
3sidney M. Greenfield, "Industrialization and the 
Family in Sociological Theory," American Journal of 
Sociology, 67 (November, 1961), pp. 312-22. 
classic nuclear family pattern. 
On the tiny sugar-growing island of Barbados, 
then, we find the same small nuclear family, 
articulated with the larger society in pre-
cisely the same way as we find in industralized 
Western society, but without urbanization and 
industrialization. The industrial revolution, 
in fact, has not yet come to the island.4 
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He goes on to say the nuclear family is native to Northern 
Europe and possibly antedates the Vikings. It certainly 
antedates the industrial revolution in England and the 
United States. Greenfield says it was with the acquisition 
of great wealth that we find the development of the extended 
family since only then could one generation support several 
generations simultaneously and that subnuclear matrifocal 
families arise at a subsistence level since everybody must 
work and conjugal bonds are weakened. This is the opposite 
of what the conventional view implies, but it does account 
for empirical data which shows the proliferation of family 
aid among wealthier parts of the population. 
Greenfield's historical claims were independently 
tested by Furstenberg and Lantz, et al. 5 and supported. 
Furstenberg studied accounts of European travelers in the 
first half of the 1800's, prior to American industrializa-
4Ibid., p. 320. 
5Herman R. Lantz, et al., "Pre-Industrial Patterns in 
the Colonial Family in America: A Content Analysis of 
Colonial Magazines," American Sociological Review, 33 (June, 
19 6 8) , pp. 413- 2 6 • 
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tion and found their description of the American family had 
"striking similarities" to contemporary descriptions--
tensions such as: the voluntary choice of mates, the loss 
of freedom for women at marriage, women's discontent with 
total domesticity, lack of discipline of American children 
and the inferior positions of women in society. All three 
were noted prior to industrialization. Some of them such 
as the lack of parental restrictions on children and desire 
of women to improve their situations may have facilitated 
the growth of the industrial system. Lantz, et al. did a 
content analysis of fifteen colonial magazines published be-
tween 1741-1794. Studying "selected" aspects of the family 
they found that some aspects of the American family struc-
ture, such as an emphasis on romantic love and personal 
happiness, usually attributed to the affects of industriali-
zation, were emphasized in colonial magazines. Limited 
contradictory evidence exists, and an acceptable conclusion 
to be drawn from Greenfield, Furstenberg and Lantz et al. is 
that the American family pattern has remained approximately 
similar despite industrialization. Only the rate of 
divorce seems to have noticeably increased. 
Goode writes 
Like most stereotypes, that of the classical family 
of Western nostalgia leads us astray. When we 
penetrate the confusing mists of recent history we 
find few examples of this "classical" family. 
Grandma's farm was not economically self-sufficient. 
Few families stayed together as large aggregations 
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of kinfolk. Most houses were small, not large. We 
now see more large old houses than small ones; they 
survived longer because they were likely to have 
been better constructed. The one-room cabins rot-
ted away. True enough, divorce was rare, but we 
have no evidence that families were generally happy. 
Indeed, we find, as in so many other pictures of the 
glowing past, that in each past generation people 
write of a period still more remote, their grand-
parents' generation, when things really were much 
better.6 
Sussman and Burchinal in a heavily documented review 
of the family literature concluded 
There exists an American kin-family system with 
complicated matrices of aid and service activities 
which link together the component units into a 
functioning network. The network identified by 
Litwak as extended family relations is composed of 
nuclear units related by blood and affinal ties. 
Relations extend along generational lines and bi-
laterally where structures take the form of sibling 
bonds and ambilineages, that is, the family circle 
or cousin club .... 
Understanding of the family as a functioning social 
system interrelated with other social systems in 
society is possible only by rejection of the isolated 
nuclear family concept. Accepting the isolated 
nuclear family as the most functional type today 
has led to erroneous conclusions concerning the 
goals and functions of these other social systems. 7 
They begin their review article with a brief historical note 
pointing out that Durkheim, Simrnel, Toennies, and Mannheim 
6william J. Goode, World Revolution and Family Pat-
terns, Glenco, Illinois: The Free Press, p. 7. 
?Marvin B. Sussman and Lee G. Burchinal, "Kin Family 
Network: Unheralded Structure in Current Conceptualizations 
of Family Functioning," in Kinship and Family Organization, 
Bernard Paiser (ed.), London: John Wiley & Sons, 1966, 
pp. 131-32. 
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stressed the isolation of the small family in urban society 
and Linton, Wirth, and Parsons supported this position. 
Without well documented evidence, the nuclear family 
emphasis and the supposed effect of industrialization on it 
have largely prevailed in many textbooks. 
The textbooks are written by family sociologists. 
Few among them, either texts on the sociology of 
the family or those written for marriage and 
family preparation course, give theoretical or 
empirical treatment to the maintenance of the 
family system by the mutual assistance activities 
of the kin group. Among the texts examined, only 
one considers in any detail financial arrange-
ments among kin members.8 
Sussman and Burchinal are pointing out a situation in 
their particular area that exists across many topics in the 
field of social change. Older views have come down to us, 
without sound empirical documentation, and been repeated and 
repeated like bad cliches. They also point out that little 
research was done until the 1950's. This article was writ-
ten in 1966, and the subsequent evidence they cite took a 
generation to accumulate. Enough studies have been done in 
the period 1950-1966 to establish the existence of mutual 
aid and social activities among nuclear families belonging 
to the same kin group. Their review of the research cites 
approximately forty studies substantiating the evidence of 
kin network. These are not large extended families wherein 
8rbid., p. 124. 
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eight or ten adults spanning several generations form the 
same kin group live together in one dwelling. Rather, they 
tend to be small extended families or "stem" families. This 
is not a criticism of Sussman and Burchinal since many 
primitive societies do not have large extended families 
living in the same house. 
This research on American data is corroborated by 
findings from urban areas in non-industrial countries. 
Aldous 9 reviewed evidence on the West African cities of 
Brassaville, Leopoldville, Stanleyville, Dakar, and Lagos. 
She found clear evidence of the continued existence of ex-
tended family organization. Leslie's work on Dar es 
Salaam10 found the same 
The basic unit in town is the kinship group of 
cousins, uncles and nephews; it is on relatives 
of this degree of nearness that a stranger to 
town depends until he can fend for himself. Very 
few come to Dar es Salaam without a relative to 
go to, and most, particularly of the more numerous 
communities, have a positive web of kinship ties 
criss-crossing the town. 
Bruner11 in his study of kinship patterns in the 
9Joan Aldous, "Urbanization, the Extended Family, and 
Kinship Ties in West Africa," Social Forces, 41 (October, 
19 6 2 ) , pp . 6-12 • 
10J. A. K. Leslie, A survey of Dar es Salaam, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 3. 
11Edward M. Bruner, "Medan: The Role of Kinship in an 
Indonesian City," in Kinship and Family Organization, 
Bernard Paber (ed.), London: John Wiley & Sons, 1966, 
p. 424. 
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Indonesian city of Medan concluded that for the people he 
studied kinship has not been superseded or lost in an urban 
environment. His data supported these propositions: 
1. The urban Batak form a single kinship 
community, and the sense of ethnic identity is 
stronger among Toba Batak in the city than in 
the village. 
2. The range of the kinship system has been 
extended more widely in the city to encompass a 
larger number of more distantly related persons. 
3. Social relationships among urban kinsmen 
are generally less personal, intimate, and 
familial than in the village. 
4. The minimal lineage, which includes some 
members who reside in the village and others who 
live in the city, continues to be a meaningful, 
cooperative, cooperate group. 
5. The urban Batak form clan associations, a 
corporate unit intermediate in size between the 
lineage and the community, which serve many social 
and ceremonial functions not performed by the 
village clan system. 
6. The nuclear family is more important in 
the city than in the village. 
Wilkinson in his essay on Japanese Industrialization12 
pointed out the contributions of traditional family organi-
zation to industrial growth. The emergence of an industrial 
elite was not so much an achievement minded hustling by 
individual entrepreneurs as it was the result of coopera-
tive family effort. Today almost one-third of the Japanese 
12Thomas o. Wilkinson, "Family Structure and 
Industrialization in Japan," American Sociological Review, 
27 (October, 1962, pp. 678-82. 
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labor force is employed in small family owned businesses, 
versus only 2.5 per cent of the American labor force. He 
concludes by reiterating that theories of social change and 
development were created by Western writers who were 
unfamiliar with non-Western urban-industrial traditions and 
therefore built into their theories social events which are 
not necessarily valid for non-Western peoples. 
The United Nations' 1955 study of urbanization in five 
Asian cities concluded that migration and the urban indus-
trial worker are not associated with family disorgani-
zation.13 
Orenstein, 14 studying Kingsley Davis' assertions that 
"Westernization'' weakens traditional family patterns, did a 
study of family size data from the census of India. He 
came to the conservative conclusion that the extended family 
in India has not weakened but might have even become 
stronger. He did not find a decrease in family size with 
increasing urbanization. In coming to his rejection of the 
conventional view of the family he complained about the 
vagueness of the hypotheses that Kingsley Davis originally 
13uN~SCO~ The S?cial Im~lic~tion~ of Industrialization 
and Urbanization: Five Studie~ in Asia. Calcutta, 1965. 
14Henry Orenstein, "The Recent History of the Extended 
Family in India," Social Problems, 8 (Spring, 1961), 
pp. 341-50. 
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promulgated and had harsh comments about a peculiarly 
Western conception of progress that invokes individualism 
as the terminus for all theories of history. 
One of the early empirical tests of the hypothesis that 
the extended family breaks down under the impact of indus-
trial and city growth was done by Oscar Lewis in 1952. 15 
First he studied the rural village of Tepoztlan then he 
studied one hundred families from Tepoztlan who were living 
in Mexico City. He found family unity and extended family 
ties had increased in the city. There were fewer incidents 
of separation and divorce, and ties to Tepoztlan remained 
strong. Tepoztlan families in Mexico City were aided by an 
association composed of people from the Tepoztlan area. 
(This is a common social structure in urban areas of non-
Western countries.) 
Stepan criticized the same hypothesis as Lewis and 
cites Wagley, Leeds and Morse as other Latin American re-
searchers who found data contradicting the conventional 
view. 16 Morse has a long research review on the historical 
and contemporary Latin American city17 and after examining 
15oscar Lewis, "Urbanization without Breakdown: A Case 
Study," Scientific Monthly, 75 (July, 1952), pp. 31-41. 
16Alfred Stepan, "Political Development Theory: The 
Latin American Experience," Journal of International 
Affairs , 29 (1966), pp. 223-34. 
17Richard M. Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of 
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a series of studies concluded that the disorganization that 
presumably characterized American migrants to American 
cities has not generally occurred. He flatly says Burgess' 
study of Chicago is not the typical experience for all other 
urban locations. Stepan's later point is well taken 
especially since many American textbooks invariably mention 
Burgess (or Hoyt) in describing typical patterns of urban 
growth. 
In the Burmingham, et al., review of aspects of social 
structure in contemporary Ghana, 18 they make the point that 
free unions or urban common law marriages cannot be con-
sidered as deviation from expected behavior but rather are 
an integral part of traditional marriages. The existence 
of such marriages is not evidence for the breakdown of tra-
ditional social institutions. 
No discussion of the forms of marriage in Ghana 
can be complete without mentioning a form of 
union which, although not constituting legally 
valid marriage, nevertheless appears to be an 
important form of marital union. This is co-
habitation of persons of opposite sex without 
the formality of marriage. In the Post Enumera-
tion Survey sample 4 per cent of the males and 
5.6 per cent of the females were living in this 
sort of union. An interesting feature of these 
Function and Structure," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 4 (July, 1962), pp. 473-93. 
18walter Birmingham, I. Neustadt, E. N. Omaboe, 
A Study of Contemporary Ghana, Vol. II, Some Aspects 
Social Structure, Evanston: Northwestern University 
1967. 
(ed. ) , 
of 
Press, 
unions is that they are not more important in the 
larger urban centres than in the rural areas. 
One may conclude that these unions are not neces-
sarily the result of urbanization. The explana-
tion is to be sought in the indigenous social 
arrangements of the various ethnic groups. In 
many of these groups a period of cohabitation may 
precede the marriage proper. Among the Ashantis, 
for example, Fortes has pointed out that "a 
marriage may begin with a period of cohabitation 
approved by the parents of the couple and accepted 
as proper marriage for all practical purposes. 11 
In such cases the husband does not have exclusive 
sexual rights in the wife. This means that he 
cannot claim damages if his wife commits adultery 
with another man and he cannot claim paternity 
of a child conceived by his wife with another 
man.19 
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Imoagene, in discussing the ways in which migrants as-
similate into urban areas, found that 11 urban adjustment" was 
strongly affected by membership in a tribal/clan/village 
association. That is, members of such associations tend to 
be more 11 adjusted" than non-members and this effect stood 
up even when length of time was controlled for. This is 
not a startling result since Banton, Little, Abu-Lughod, 
Lewis, Gutkind, and others have pointed out the ways asso-
ciations based on ascriptive criteria like ethnicity, 
lineage, language or area of origin, help to facilitate a 
migrant's stay in a non-Western city. Ascription becomes a 
positive factor in the creation of adaptive social 
19Ibid., p. 208. 
groupings. 
Schwab, in an otherwise conventional description of 
Oshogbo, a Yoruba city, writes 
Because kinship was the central institution in 
traditional Oshogbo and provided the predominant 
structure for ordering relationships, the trans-
formation in kinship relationships which has 
accompanied Westernization is central to the social 
system of modern Oshogbo. For many years anthro-
pologists and sociologists asserted that Westerni-
zation undermined and destroyed extended kinship 
systems. More recently, this assertion has been 
questioned, and there is a growing realization that 
extended kinship systems may be very resilient even 
under unusual transitional stress. In Oshogbo 
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there has certainly been a reduction in the scope of 
kinship rights and obligations. At the same time, 
kinship claims and loyalties persist and, although 
modified, the lineage system remains a primary focus 
of cohesion and source of stability and control. 2 0 
And Colson writes 
Changes in the organization of family units now 
going ·on in contemporary Africa are tied to other 
economic and social changes. Casual observers have 
assumed that the trend is either towards a 
strengthening of patrilineal ties or the emergence 
of the independent conjugal nuclear family. The 
evidence seems to indicate that the reverse is true. 
In many areas, both rural and urban, contemporary 
conditions work to the strengthening of matri-
lateral ties uniting domestic units at the expense 
of patrilineal ties. Equally significant is the 
new independence given in many areas to the nuclear 
family, but this is one based on a woman and her 
20william B. Schwab, "Oshogbo--An Urban Community?" in 
Urbanization and Mi ratiort in West Africa, Hilda Kuper 
(ed. , Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1965, p. 99. 
46 
children rather than on the conjugal tie. 21 
And Liebenow in his book Liberia: The Evolution of 
Privilege says "The basic building block of tribal society 
has been the nuclear family, consisting of a man, his wife 
or wives, and his offspring." 22 
The concept of "network," developed by British social 
anthropologists from their studies in East and Central 
Africa, is partly defined in terms of ascriptive ties of 
family and tribe. The concept of "network" is one starting 
point in the analysis of African urbanization. It stresses 
the fact that rural migrants are closely tied to tradi-
tional kin networks as well as non-kin associational net-
works. These latter may or may not be based on ethnic 
identity or linguistic similarity. Rural migrants are not 
amonic, confused and suffering from "social disorgani-
zation.1123 
21E. Colson, "Family Change in Contemporary Africa," 
Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 96 (January 20, 
1962) , pp. 641-52. 
22J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia The Evolution of Privilege , 
Ithaca and London: Cornell Universit y Press. 
23For an explication of "network" and its utility in 
analyzing African urbanization see Max Gluckman, "Anthro-
pological Problems Arising from the African Industrial Re-
volution," in Social Change in Modern Africa, A. Southall 
(ed.), London: Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 67-82; 
J. Clyde Mitchell, The Kalela Dance, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1958; A. L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban 
African Community, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1958; and Peter C. W. Gutkind, "African Urbanism, Mobility 
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The claim we have examined above is that industriali-
zation and urbanization seriously disrupt family patterns. 
This claim stems from basic assumptions the "conventional 
view" has made about social change, i.e., the proposition of 
family disruption is a specific example of a general assump-
tion. It has been typically assumed that social change, 
sometimes conveniently labeled "industrialization" or 
"urbanization," leads to the destruction of traditional 
social structure. The whole assumption is exemplified by 
the demise of the extended family. In short, change is 
destructive. This assumption finds embodiment in other 
forms while never being stated in a bold or blunt manner. 
The "modern" and the "traditional" are in conflict with one 
another and the traditional disintegrates under the rapid 
and extensive impact of western technology. 
So much evidence on the extended family has accumulated 
in the last fifteen years that the burden of proof is now 
on those who would continue to uphold the conventional 
view. For example, the collection of research reports in 
Piddington's Kinship and Geographical Mobility ends with a 
comment by Christopher that "the evidence is not all in, but 
the way 'returns' are going it looks like our thinking on 
and the Social Network," in Kinship and Geographical 
Mobility, Ralph Piddington (ed.), Leiden : E . J . Brill, 
1965, pp. 48-60. 
) 
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the extended family may be in for some drastic revision." 24 
This is a much studied area and the writer makes no claims 
to have even reviewed a major part of it. However, the 
studies we have looked at make two major points: nuclear 
family patterns existed prior to industrialization and 
extended family patterns continue to exist after indus-
trialization, i.e., there is no one family organization that 
is the most optimal or compatible with a machine technology 
and densely populated urban areas. As Goode says, 
It seems impossible to cut down the size of the 
effective conjugal family to its nuclear core 
only, either in the West or in any other society, 
without some type of political or coercive force. 
The additional kin who are included are there 
because of a direct emotional tie with some 
members of the nuclear core, a ties supported by 
the institutional structure. 25 
This has been a relatively easy proposition to evaluate 
since so much research has been done on it in the last 
generation that it is now reasonably clear what this evi-
dence implies. The next chapter will continue the examina-
tion of the conventional view by tracing the theoretical 
evolution of Wilbert Moore, a theorist of social change, 
whose reputation was closely identified with conventional 
assumptions. 
24rbid., p. 184. 
25Goode, £E.• cit., p. 371. 
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER Department of Sociology 
University Park, Denver, Colorado 80210 COLORADO SEMINARY 
Miss Leslie Hendrickson 
Department of Sociology 
University of Oregon 
Eugene, Oregon 97403 
Dear Miss Hendrickson: 
August 13, 1970 
Your name and handwriting lead me to believe that I'm 
addressing you correctly, but if I've made a mistake, I 
apologize. 
I went through the entire dissertation (surely there 
wasn't more?) with profound interest. I think that your 
treatment of my theoretical migrations in your Chapter 
Three is absolutely fair. You did not, I think, pick up 
later amendments, such as those in my small books The Impact 
of Industry and Social Change. But that would not have 
affected your diagnosis much. 
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us an extreme, or adversary, position. All right; fair 
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economy, or urbanization have!!£ social consequences is 
also not a tenable position. The evidence is entirely on 
my side of that controversy, if we define the issues that 
sharply. I think that I have been riearly as self-critical 
as you have been suitably critical of the "conventional" 
view, and I believe you have recognized that. 
I enclose a paper of mine that you probably have not 
seen. It was prepared for some symposium or other, and 
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Wilbert E. Moore 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE REACTION OF NON-INDUSTRIAL PEOPLES TO 
INDUSTRIAL WORK 
Wilbert Moore's Industrialization and Labor 
Having introduced the conventional view and reviewed a 
change in the understanding of a specific proposition, this 
section is a description of how the perspective as a whole 
has changed. Given the goal of describing how an entire 
gestalt has changed, the most thorough method of description 
would be to catalogue its parts and view all the evidence 
for each part. This is the clearest and least ambiguous 
proof. However, it is also a boring procedure and limited 
by the restrictions of time and space. It is never possible 
to review all of the evidence for all parts of a complex 
perspective. Therefore a compromise is typically adopted in 
which some of the evidence is reviewed for some of the 
parts. 
twofold: 
This section is also a compromise. Its purposes are 
first, to trace the changes in "the conventional 
view" through an analysis of the theoretical history of 
Wilbert E. Moore's writings on social change in non-Western 
countries. Secondly, this review of Moore's work is also a 
review of the evidence which must be explained by any theory 
of actual historical social change as we know it in this 
century. 
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Wilbert E. Moore of Princeton University is an in-
fluential sociologist who has extensively written on indus-
trial sociology and social change. The first purpose of 
this section is to trace the evolution of his ideas over a 
twenty-year period. In other words, we examine the evolu-
tion of the conventional view by tracing the evolution of a 
prominent theorist who has been closely identified with it. 
This is an arbitrary selection, made because it renders the 
problem of analyzing the paradigm more manageable, and be-
cause Moore has published for over twenty years, thus a 
reasonable selection of his writings can be found. This 
tracing purports to document the following points: (a) In 
1950, at the beginning of the twenty-year period, his views 
were ''conventional." That is, what he believed is sub-
stantially the same as the views described in Chapter One, 
(b) in the beginning his views were not an adequate guide to 
the empirical world as we know it through fact and figures, 
and (c) his views gradually changed and are now sub-
stantially different. 
In 1951, Moore published a fine and ultimately in-
fluential analysis of labor migration called Industriali-
zation and Labor. Its stated purpose was: to consider 
"The problem of labor supply in its full social and psy-
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chological significance is, therefore, the core of our 
inquiry. Specifically, what are the cultural, institu-
tional, sociopsychological factors that induce or impede 
the transition from non-industrial to industrial employ-
ment?111 The book has a tripart organization. The first is 
a thorough review of empirical studies on "barriers and 
antipathies," "pull" and "push" determinants, morale and 
efficiency of workers, problems of using comparative evi-
dence, the classical theory of wages and general comments 
on industrialization. The second part is a report of field 
research in Mexico and the third part ±s a concluding 
chapter. 
Industrialization and Labor has to be evaluated care-
fully since a disjunction appears to exist between its 
theoretical presentation and the empirical documentation 
offered to substantiate it. A concise theoretical state-
ment is made in several places. The following passage is 
found in Chapter Two and repeated in the Conclusion. 
Any society has some degree of resistance to 
change, whether the source of the change be 
internal or external. That resistance arises 
from the nature of society itself. As a complex 
organization of interrelated human activities, 
oriented to certain goals and fulfilling certain 
functions necessary to its own survival, a society 
provides more or less adequate answers to the 
common problems of human existence. To the degree 
1wilbert E. Moore, Industrialization and Labor, 
Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1951, p. 5. 
that a particular society approximates the model 
of perfect integration, the established and 
normatively sanctioned patterns--for example, 
socialization, assignment of status, maintenance 
of order, and production and distribution of goods 
and services--are internally consistent and self-
perpetuating. It follows that an innovation in 
the organization of production and the means of 
gaining a livelihood will initially encounter 
resistance approximately proportional to the 
integration of the established structure.2 
After this segment Moore writes, 
This fundamental principle has numerous implica-
tions and applications. Among the common barriers 
identified in the comparative survey, the following 
are of special importance: ignorance of alterna-
tives and of the skills for their adoption; the 
security system, both emotional and economic, pro-
vided by the social structure of nonindustrial 
societies; the status-system of nonindustrial 
societies, which generally depends largely upon 
inherited position, rewards the performance of 
duties according to traditional expectations, and 
minimizes impersonal, functionally specific types 
of economic relations and division of labor; the 
"freedom" and socially recognized skill of the 
independent producer in primitive and peasant 
societies. 3 
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The above quotes are a summary statement of his 
thinking on social change in 1951. From the assumption that 
"traditional" or "primitive'' society "approximates the model 
of perfect integration," it follows that they are therefore 
resistent to change since all parts of these societies 
presumably reinforce one another. Implicit here is the 
assumption that "social change" is the consequence of out-
side variables which are inevitably destructive. Open 
2Ibid., p. 302. 3Ibid., p. 302. 
expression of this appears throughout the book~ 
Any and every contact with a cash economy was 
bound to have a disruptive effect not only on 
the subsistence economy but also on the whole 
structure of society of which the economic 
foundation was subsistence production; this 
effect was all the more drastic since the 
changes resulted not from development from with-
in, or from within a similar society, but from 
the requirements of a vastly different society. 
The sheerly disruptive effects of cultural 
contact may be subject to condemnation on general 
humanitarian grounds, and especially criticized by 
enthusiasts for the "noble savage" and for what 
might be called "cultural equilitarianism." What-
ever merits these views have in the abstract, they 
have little hope of prevailing against the cultural 
imperialism of modern industrial societies. In any 
event, disruption of tightly integrated patterns 
is exactly called for if rapid economic transition 
is to take place. It is, perhaps, an overly nice 
regard for the sensibilities of unspoiled primi-
tives, abetted by an unwillingness to grant their 
equality in Western patterns of economic and social 
organization, that has accounted for part of the 
slow and limited economic development in major 
areas of the world, and especially in those under 
colonial administration. 4 
53 
The claim that a lack of economic development is 
directly traceable to a colonial reluctance to interfere 
with native customs is unusual even though it is immediately 
qualified. Most economic theorists point to variables such 
as capital accumulation, infant industries, imperialism, 
tariffs or other factors to account for a lack of economic 
progress. Moore also notes that "the native worker not yet 
integrated into industrial traditions may prefer the 
4Ibid., p. 192. 
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'leisure' that allows him to re-establish his relations in 
his native community after the achievement of a very 
limited monetary objective. 115 These conceptions of the 
primitive society, economic development, and labor migration 
will undergo considerable revision in the next twenty years. 
At the end of this early work he raises a key ques-
tion and answers it. 
What is the most general explanation that may be 
given the pervasive strength of the industrial 
system in subverting social systems and sur-
mounting or penetrating the natural barriers that 
a balanced nonindustrial system possesses? The 
findings of this study do not provide a definitive 
answer, even to the more limited aspect of that 
question to which it is addressed. But a tenta-
tive generalization may be hazarded; it is the 
positive, institutionally sanctioned, and struc-
turally necessary prescription of mobilit¥ that 
is at once the source of productive e f fi c i ency 
of the industrial system and the source of dis-
ruption of nonindustrial systems. 6 
Given a conception of non-industrial societies as rigid, 
isolated and well-integrated any sizeable amount of labor 
mobility would truly be a key factor in causing its disrup-
tion. That is, any behavior involving social movement of 
any substantial kind is erosive of customs and authority 
based on repeated, unanalyzed, adherence. 
Since this thesis comes to a focus in the analysis of 
the importance of achievement versus fixed ascriptive 
characteristics it is worthwhile to quote one additional 
5 rbid., p. 163. 6rbid., p. 311. 
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passage. This is a proto-typical theoretical statement de-
scribing the conventional view. It could have been cited 
in Chapter One of this thesis. This writer believes that 
"most sociologists" would still hold it to be substantially 
correct. 
It is typical of the industrial way of life that 
in a large measure the participant's position in the 
system, and his daily contacts with other persons, 
are related to what he does rather than who he is. 
Individual mobility, transitory relations, rewards 
by merit, are emphasized in extreme degree. The ob-
verse of the attitude of escape from the rigor of 
customary controls is the positive orientation to-
ward the industrial mode of status-fixing and the 
patterning of social relations. 
5. Aspirations for individual mobility. In 
most primitive and peasant societies the idea and 
significance of change are strictly limited. In the 
most general sense, the societies are conservative. 
This means that the notion of progress, or of 
orderly development, is not commonly encountered. 
For the group as a whole, the emphasis is upon pre-
servation of the established structure. When 
shortcomings are recognized, they are likely to be 
interpreted as departures from received norms, often 
viewed as having been more honored in past genera-
tions. Improvement then consists of going backward. 
This difference in general cultural orientation, 
stated here as a difference in kind, is actually one 
of degree. The degree is often so great, however, 
as to mark a fact of fundamental importance in the 
spread of industrial patterns. 
Expressed in terms of the position of the indivi-
dual in the social structure, and the socially 
engendered goals toward which he directs his efforts, 
the contrast is equally sharp. In a social structure 
that is fairly rigid, and changing so slowly as to 
appear immobile, the individual's adult status is 
likely to be largely fixed at birth, by "status 
ascription." The differentiating characteristics 
most commonly used as a basis for fixing adult roles 
are those of sex, age, and kinship relations. These 
serve to provide a minimum division of labor, and 
may account for most kinds of specialization 
embodied in the social structure. 
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Even in these circumstances, the individual's 
statuses and roles change, but largely as an orderly 
process determined in advance on common principles, 
such as moving through standard age grades, and 
assuming the kinship roles appropriate to one's age, 
sex, and kinship position. 
The status-system embodied in the specialization 
characteristic of industrial production assumes, 
and must assume, much greater flexibility than can 
be afforded by status ascription.? 
The views cited above are pretty familiar, and are not 
too different from those introduced in Chapter One. It is 
reasonable to infer that in 1951 Moore held to the con-
ventional view. As mentioned above, Industrialization and 
Labor is difficult to evaluate since a gap exists between 
his theoretical views and the empirical documentations he 
offers. The book is a first-rate work, it has a fine re-
view of the pre-1950 literature on social change in non-
industrial countries and an excellent bibliography. Never-
theless, it still has problems. Having become acquainted 
with its theory we turn to the data offered to support the 
theory. 
The first chapter is entitled "Barriers and Anti-
pathies" [to labor migration] and the first barrier is 
called "ignorance." This is a forerunner of later arguments 
made by "communication theorists." Ignorance is a result of 
?Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
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a lack of communication and therefore it is claimed that 
improved literacy and better communication is one of the key 
stimulents to economic development. Stated abstractly it is 
difficult to disagree with other than to point out that a 
stress on this factor fits with the theoretical assumption 
that primitive societies are isolated and ignorant of what 
goes on around them. 
The second barrier cited by Moore is "loss of tradi-
tional forms." 
Perhaps the most pervasive attitude of withdrawal 
from the industrial pattern, or of only limited, 
temporary, and reluctant adherence to it, arises 
from loss of traditional forms that give security. 
It is typical especially of the first impact of 
new economic patterns that they threaten or dis-
rupt the previous social relationships, while not 
immediately supplying new security devices in 
their place.8 
The first empirical evidence offered is Forte's study of the 
Tale in the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Moore writes, 
For example, the labor migrant among the Tale 
people of the northern territories of the Gold 
Coast enjoys urban goods and services, and indeed 
the urban way of life as a whole, but does not 
break tribal contacts. When he returns to his 
home village, he conforms to tribal patterns, for 
it is only within these patterns that any stable 
marriage and familial system has been worked out. 
The work at the labor centers becomes then a 
youthful adventure, and possibly an economic aid 
to the establishment of a family, but is more 
nearly a matter of ''sowing wild oats" than a 
full acceptance of the new work opportunities. 9 
8rbid., p. 21. 9rbid., pp. 21-22. 
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This does not prove the theoretical point. The existence of 
a stable labor migration streams is not evidence proving 
that industrial patterns "threaten or disrupt the previous 
social relationships from loss of traditional forms that 
give security." This was one of the points mentioned in 
the opening quote of this section. The rest of the evidence 
that Moore cites in this section (by Wilson, Read, Boecke, 
Broeh, Firth, Thompson, Troncoso, Leonard, Raman, Buchanan, 
Broughton, Tawney, Vinacke, Elkin, Hubbard, and Shih) makes 
no comments about the destructive effects of social change, 
rather they are a series of studies showing that industrial 
values in almost all non-industrialized areas have a con-
tinued and strong relation to the rural area. What has 
resulted is a stable half rural-half urban adjustment. 
One form of this adjustment is a system of migratory 
labor. Moore clearly dislikes it without offering empiri-
cal evidence to show it actually is "wasteful and inef-
ficient. 11 
Whether the result of deliberate policy in segre-
gating native territories while using native workers 
in mines, plantation agriculture, and factories, as 
in parts of Africa, or the result of opportunistic 
measures for recruitment of laborers only negatively 
or halfheartedly interested in new forms of economic 
activity, the wasteful and inefficient system has 
received a remarkable series of trials. So long as 
the worker's reluctance to commit himself permanently 
to the new types of employment persists, or so long 
as full participation is withheld from him, these 
compromise forms will continue. 10 
This bias is undocumented. 
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The main import of the studies cited by Moore is to 
show that a settled urban labor force does not exist. The 
studies do not show that traditional forms provide suffi-
cient security for people with them, that mobility did not 
exist before western contact, and that "industrial pat-
terns" threaten or disrupt traditional patterns. 
The third barrier to "labor recruitment and industrial 
tradition" is "lack of appreciation of new status system." 
"Appreciation" is not well defined and the evidence offered 
on this does not directly refer to a lack of appreciation 
per se. The studies cited to prove this point are hetero-
genous as might be expected with a label like "appreciation" 
and are related only in that they refer to prestige in 
"traditional" or "modern" societies. They point out that 
where employment opportunities are better in a local area 
workers will not migrate from it, that exten?ive labor 
mobility exists, that new types of employment may attract 
workers from particular segments of the existing social 
order such as youth, that caste labor turnover is high, that 
existing cultures may stress leisure instead of work (Moore 
cites China as an example), and people may prefer clerical 
lOrbid., pp. 29-30. 
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work to manual labor. None of which really clarifies what 
"a lack of appreciation of new status style" is or how it 
would differ from a rational economic decision not to enter 
an urban job because a higher real income is attainable in 
a rural area. 
The last three barriers are hastily crammed together: 
They are "qualitative differences in income and occupa-
tion," "loss of freedom as an independent producer," and 
"loss of socially recognized skills." Again the evidence 
offered is varied in its content and is not always per-
tinent. For example, on the fifth barrier, a "loss of 
freedom as an independent producer," Moore cites studies by 
the International Labor Office 
In Indo-China, indentured workers on long-term 
contracts have been known to revolt against harsh 
discipline, and show great resentment against 
lying recruiters who secured their services with 
false promises. In other areas the tales of re-
turning workers concerning their treatment have 
made subsequent recruiting more difficult. The 
confinement of workers to labor camps in Peru is 
apparently one tictor in their anxiety to return 
to their homes. 
These studies do not describe protests against industrial 
wage work, urban living or so-called factory discipline per 
se. Rather, they sound like natural reactions of men every-
where to conditions of enforced servitude. Again the evi-
dence is not always relevant to the theoretical idea. 
llibid., p. 45. 
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In general, a reading of Chapter Two gives the impres-
sion that Moore has a distinct theoretical position but 
that the evidence he accumulated did not substantiate it. 
Chapter III is entitled "Economic Change as a Choice Among 
Evils." The chapter is a description of what these evils 
are. For example, the first one is "pressure of population 
on developed resources." The literature on this point is 
voluminous and easily documented. Population pressures on 
agricultural areas can be intensive. His second evil is 
"loss of markets for craft skills and products." The evi-
dence to support this point is less than compelling. He 
cites Levy and Lee on Chinese handicraft industries, the 
International Labor Office on Indo-China, Hughes on French 
Canada, and Broughton on handicraft work in India. At the 
same time he notes that this evil has not happened in many 
parts of Latin America and that qualifications have to be 
put on its occurrence in other areas. It is not generally 
demonstrated that the description of skilled or semi-
skilled craft work is a factor in pushing people from agri-
cultural areas. The third evil is "impairment of trade and 
similar employments" and he writes of this, 
This, however, constitutes more of a logical pos-
sibility than it does a frequently reported occur-
rence. With the exception of a few important areas 
like India and China, preindustrial economies are 
not characterized by wide development of commercial 
markets. Typically the outside traders do not damage 
substantially the employment opportunities in the 
areas they enter, if they bring the market mode of 
exchange with them. Thus the Chinese in Southeast 
Asia, the Arabs and East Indians on the east coast 
of Africa, the Americans in frontier outposts in 
Indian territory, or British traders in the South 
Pacific or West Africa have not notably disrupted 
local employment opportunities.12 
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His fourth evil begins political factors. The fourth 
is "direct coercion of workers." For example, 
Forced labor, in various forms and degrees, has been 
more common in world economic development than has 
free contract labor. 
Direct chattel slavery was of considerable 
importance in the economic development of the New 
World, and, it is claimed, in the process of capital 
accumulation in the Old World as well. The resistance 
of the indigenous populations of the West Indies and 
North American continent to both material inducements 
and force and the availability by purchase of Negroes 
enslaved by West African chieftains provided the 
rationale for a system of forced labor in American 
commercial agriculture.13 
The evidence Moore offers to prove this point is suf-
ficient. He goes on to cite sources from the Dutch Indies, 
Southeast Asia, French West Africa, Spain, Portugal and 
Latin America. Liberia, the country where the data of this 
thesis was collected, has had numerous charges of forced 
labor brought against it, and critics of Firestone, whose 
one hundred thousand acre rubber plantation at Harbel, 
Liberia, is one of the world's largest, say that forced 
labor was used there until 1960. A large literature on 
12 Ibid., p. 58. 13Ibid., p. 59. 
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colonial practices and imperialism substantiate Moore's 
point. It should be pointed out that force or military con-
quest is not generally used as an independent variable in 
sociological analyses. That a large amount of change in 
"traditional societies" has been induced by technological 
mastery of destructive weapons is not proof that "tradi-
tional social structure" is inherently incompatible with 
industrial requirements. The evidence offered for this 
point, while it does prove the point, does not add to the 
validity of Moore's theoretical presentation. 
If by social change we mean armed force to subject a 
local population for economic reasons then social change is 
disruptive of traditional social patterns. Or if by social 
change we mean population increase against scarce resources 
then it too is disruptive. These two points and how their 
mechanisms work are well documented, but the rest of 
Moore's points are not. 
The fifth and sixth evils are ''indirect coercion 
through taxes" and "a avoidance of military draft.'' These 
are analytically separate forms of forced labor, but in 
practice they too are compulsory and the evidence for them 
is also extensive. Taxes have been one of the classic ways 
to force local population to work for foreign dominated 
economies. Moore cites work in British Africa by Moore, 
Hunter, Noon, Van der Hast and Weischoff. For example, 
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Schapera in the Bechuanaland Protectorate found that forty 
per cent of the migrants gave taxes as the reason for 
working and another twenty-eight per cent mentioned a com-
bination of taxes and desire to purchase consumer goods. 
The French colonies had a system of "prestation" in which 
forced labor was mandatory unless commutated by a money 
payment. 
It is appropriate here to mention that the "backward 
bending supply of labor curve'' has classically been used as 
a justification for both taxation and low wages. The argu-
ment has been that tribal people prefer a tribal life and 
will not work for money unless forced to through taxation. 
Moreover, if you paid them higher wages they would simply 
return to their tribal area at a faster rate. That is, 
labor turnover is due to some kind of massive rural inertia 
and it can only be overcome by taxation and low wages which 
ensure that tribal people will continue to work in Western 
economic occupations. These arguments were repeated to the 
writer on the plantations he visited by Dutch rubber 
planters to justify paying their rubber tappers eight cents 
an hour. 
Evils seven and eight are "social factors labeled eva-
sion of religous and magical controls" and "evasion of 
familial and other obligations." Moore is aware that 
primitive societies are not "completely integrated and 
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unchanging" and he says this in his discussion of empirical 
evidence. This is a different emphasis than in his theo-
retical discussion. There the emphasis is on integration 
and not its absence. The role of witchcraft and magical 
practices in labor migration is difficult to evaluate. 
Cases do exist where workers left an area to escape witches. 
Almost all researchers have examples of this and my own 
work is no exception. One of my questions was whether or 
not the worker thought people had more respect for him on 
the job or at home. A worker I talked to told me he was at 
home and the people there poisoned five of his children so 
he took his remaining child and fled. This does go on but 
how important it is cannot be evaluated. Moore says it is 
of minor importance. However, Moore is caught in a small 
dilemma here. If you say that fear of witchcraft and 
avoidance of family obligations are factors that push people 
from rural areas then this implies that rural social struc-
ture is not relatively placid, isolated and mostly un-
changing. Moore maintains his theoretical assumptions by 
denying the importance of these pushes. That is, Moore 
thinks it is not the case that ''the traditional society" has 
built in conflicts and problems which will inevitably change 
it independently of outside stimulation. These pushes are 
in direct opposition to the notion that the major barriers 
to labor mobility is the loss of security from traditional 
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forms. These two chapters do not provide a firm empirical 
base for the theoretical exposition that opened this dis-
cussion of Moore. Specifically the evidence cited does not 
show that industrialization or urbanization seriously dis-
rupt existing cultures so that they no longer operate in a 
reasonable manner. 
Rather this pre-1950 evidence strongly supports four 
points: First, ignorance is a factor but there is no evi-
dence that so-called traditional societies prefer to be 
innocent. Secondly, having been exposed to its possi-
bilities, traditional cultures have made a recurrent and 
seemingly stable adaption to wage labor. Thirdly, the early 
stages of historical contact of Western nations with other 
cultures was often through military conquest and this sub-
jugation undoubtedly had disruptive consequences. And 
fourthly, population pressure, technological skill at food 
production, and wage levels are probably more important 
determinants of labor mobility than a theoretical loss of 
security, status differences between industrial and non-
industrial work or the "socially recognized skill of the 
independent producer." 
Chapter IV of Industrialization and Labor is called 
"The Search for New Opportunities" and is a series of points 
with the evidence for them. This chapter lists so-called 
"pull" factors. The previous two chapters stressed "push" 
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factors and were linked with theoretical statements. How-
ever, this chapter is different since it describes "pull'' 
factors and is not reflected in the theoretical perspec-
tive. The conventional view and Moore's 1950 perspective 
de-emphasize, minimize pull factors since discussion of 
them are not congruent with the dramatics of describing the 
rapid and penetrating shock of industrial proliferation. 
First we examine Moore's pre-1950 evidence, then we 
will introduce post-1950 evidence on "pull" factors. The 
first pull factor mentione~ is "Wages and the demand for 
goods and services." In the opening paragraph of this sec-
tion Moore says 
And here one encounters the pervasive doctrine that 
primitives and peasants are commonly contented with 
their lot, and only mildly, if at all, interested 
in working for wages. Some of the evidence that 
gives this theory moderate support in certain cul-
tures has been reviewed [in Chapter II, the second 
and third barriers] .14 
When he described the evidence in Chapter II he indicated a 
belief in it, a belief repeated in his summary chapter. 
This immediate quote indicates, at the minimum, an implicit 
contradiction. Now he reviews the evidence showing a desire 
for wages and a willingness to respond to economic incen-
tives. 
In the Bantu societies of Southern and Eastern Africa 
14 Ibid., p. 78. 
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cattle were the standard of wealth but the wide development 
of money wages has led to variety of compromises, if not 
outright commitment to a monetary economy. Among the 
Bemba of Northern Rhodesia money was transmuted into 
material goods which were used to increase social power in 
the tribal hierarchy. Coulter reported that other groups in 
Northern Rhodesia were extensively using a monetary system. 
The Baganda of Uganda had a politically advanced kingdom 
prior to the European and money expenditures for the hiring 
of agricultural wage laborers was an old practice. Culwich, 
in Tanganyika, found money was a general standard of value 
and was not limited to specific purposes. Read found the 
same true for the Ngoni of Nyasaland. In general, through-
out East Africa by the 1930's money had become both a 
symbol of prestige in local communities and a means for 
upward social mobility. The same is generally true in 
South Africa. 
The evidence is substantial that natives have 
taken up urban ways, and have eagerly sought not 
only manufactured goods but also services and 
types of recreation available on a commercial 
basis. Some investigators have, therefore, been 
led to conclude that the supposed "fixed demand" 
of native laborers for money, or for the goods 
obtainable with money, is more than likely an 
erroneous inference drawn from the prevailing 
"fixed supply" of money represented in low wages 
and the cheap-labor policy.15 
15rbid., p. 82. 
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Greaves denies the colonial notion that natives have 
an inelastic demand schedule and says rather the provision 
of consumer goods to native populations has not been part 
of colonial economic planning. He says, 
... no metropolitan power [of a tropical colony] 
has relied on the spread of commodity wants to 
stimulate a native labor supply." In denying that 
the people of undeveloped areas have fixed wants, 
or an inelastic demand schedule, Greaves suggests 
rather that the goods have not in fact been 
offered, and that insufficient attention has been 
paid to qualitative differences in demand, in-
cluding living conditions. That the demand scale 
will be different, and not necessarily in con-
formity with European ideas of what is good for 
the native, does not make it worse, and certainly 
does not make the demand inoperative. (Brackets 
not mine.)16 
So far Moore reviewed evidence from tribal British East 
Africa primarily. His next evidence is an "old, peasant 
civilization" where he says "some degree of monetary ex-
change has long been built into customary practices. 1117 He 
reviews evidence from India, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
China showing a familiarity with wages and market conditions. 
For example, 
The experience in Japan indicates that even 
very low wages were adequate to induce peasants to 
enter the factories as long as agricultural areas 
were depressed, but that when the worker had some 
option in his economic activity, higher wages had to 
be offered. As this is certainly in conformity with 
ordinary economic calculation, its significance for 
present purposes may be minor. It does, however, 
suggest that wages increase in importance as an 
16 Ibid., p. 83. 17Ibid., p. 84. 
incentive precisely in those circumstances that 
offer the potential worker some choice.18 
It is not clear what Moore means when he says "its sig-
nificance for present purposes may be minor." 
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In summary of this section, a point by point compari-
son of Moore's 1951 theoretical views with the empirical 
evidence he offered to substantiate them shows a disjunc-
tion between the two. The theoretical views, which are 
closely similar to the conventional views are generally 
either unrelated to or contradicted by the pre-1950 infor-
mation. It should be noted that the information does not 
need to be re-evaluated or re-collected. It can be accepted 
as given. Proof of this is found in an analysis of the 
post-1950 evidence, which corroborates the general findings 
of earlier studies. The following look at this evidence 
does not claim to be exhaustive and has a regional bias 
since the field work of this thesis was done in Africa. 
However, enough literature is examined to put the burden of 
proof on those who would maintain that "traditional" and 
industrial social structures are unique and different and 
that a change from one to the other involves the substitu-
tion of a drastically different set of social ideas and 
practices. 
18 Ibi'd., 86 87 pp. - . 
Post-1950 Evidence on Industrialization 
and Migrant Labor 
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Elliot Berg wrote his doctoral dissertation on labor 
migration in West Africa and authored numerous articles 
about it. If any one "best expert" on the topic exists he 
is a likely candidate for the title. He opens a discussion 
of the backward bending supply of labor curve with the 
following paragraph. 
Few discussions of labor supply in under-
developed countries fail to bring up the backward-
sloping labor supply function. Wage-earners in 
newly-developing countries are alleged to have 
relatively low want schedules or high preference 
for leisure as against income, so that they work 
less at higher wage rates and more at lower ones. 
In the underdeveloped world, and notably in Africa, 
this has been the almost universal opinion of 
foreign employers of native labor, an opinion 
shared by outside observers.l It was no less common 
a view in eighteenth century England, where a typical 
complaint was that "If a person can get sufficient 
in four days to support himself for seven days, he 
will keep holiday the other three; that is, he will 
live in riot and debauchery."19 
The first footnote in Berg's paragraph cites Moore's 
Industrialization and Labor as an example of an "outside 
observer." Berg goes on to say, 
The widespread conviction that labor supply 
functions in countries in early stages of develop-
ment tend to be backward-sloping is no mere intel-
lectual curiosity. It is one of those ideas in 
19Elliot J. Berg, "Backward-Sloping Labor Supply 
Functions in Dual Economies--The Africa Case," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 75 (August, 1961), p. 468. 
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history which has had genuine impact on the practi-
cal world of affairs. It has served as a rationale 
for wage and labor policies which influenced the 
course of economic and political development not 
only in Africa but elsewhere as well. It has also 
been brought into the arena of methodological debate 
to serve as part of the underpinning of theories 
which claim that the analytic tools of "Western" 
economic theory are inapplicable to "dual" societies. 
Given its popularity and its influence it is sur-
prising that this hoary concept of the backward-
sloping labor supply surve has been exposed to so 
little systematic analysis, particularly since there 
runs through most discussions of the matter a con-
siderable confusion over fundamentals. The sources 
of this confusion are twofold. First, many writers 
tend to mix the present with the past; they write of 
contemporary -nonindustrial societies as ideal types 
of pre-industrial societies untouched by contact 
with the market economy. Most contemporary non-
industrial societies, however, even in Africa's 
isolated corners, are societies in varying degrees 
of transition. They have been in contact, however 
sporadic and tangential, with the goods and ideas 
of the outside world for two or three generations 
at least. They have consequently undergone changes 
which have made them responsive to the money economy 
outside the villages. Discussions of labor supply 
which heavily underscore the immobilities of labor 
in underdeveloped countries, the unwillingness of 
villagers to enter wage employment, the indifference 
to monetary incentives are concerned more often with 
the past than the present.20 
The first source of confusion that Berg cites is 
common. This tendency appears in Levy's writings and in the 
quotes from Moore cited earlier. Contemporary anthropolo-
gical techniques are not generally adequate to distinguish 
among societal characteristics that have always existed, and 
thus are "traditional" in some meaningful sense, versus 
20Ibid., pp. 469-70. 
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those that are relatively recent, i.e., only fifty to a 
hundred years old. Moreover, the lag time in the construc-
tion, publication and dissemination of social change 
theories may create a situation in which by the time the 
theory has become accepted it has also become outdated. 
Continuing Berg, in West Africa around five per cent 
of the population is in paid employment during any part of 
the year. (In Liberia it is approximately seven to nine per 
cent.) In the rest of the continent the figure is between 
five and ten per cent, except in South Africa where it 
reaches a high of twenty-five per cent. Thus, out of 
approximately 170 to 180 million people in sub-Saharan 
Africa possibly eight million work at paid labor during any 
part of the year. All areas produce crops for export, 
although only West Africa, Uganda and parts of Tanganyika 
produce on a substantial scale. Thus, literally all areas 
have been touched by a market economy in some way and any 
theories of social change that make reference to the iso-
lated homogeneous "primitive society" are simply talking 
about a world that does not exist any more, if it ever did. 
Labor recruitment, as a "problem" of moving raw manpower, 
i.e., bodies, out of agricultural sectors arose and was 
"solved" between 1880 and 1930. By 1930, before indus-
trialization made any substantial headway, a wage labor 
recruitment problem did not exist. Most adult Africans 
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have had some contact with wage work and a money economy. 
Berg explicitly rejects the view that classical econo-
mic theory is not applicable to labor migration analyses. 21 
What are the factors that determine whether and for 
how long an individual African villager will offer 
his labor for paid employment in the exchange 
sector? In general terms, they are the same factors 
that determine how much labor an individual in any 
market economy will offer for hire: the nature of 
the individual's preference between income and 
leisure, the level of his non-wage income, the rate 
of wages. 22 
He also denies the concept of the "target worker." The con-
cept may have once been applicable but "wants" now are not 
rigidly defined. The idea that an individual's labor be-
havior is characterized by a search for fixed, limited 
definite wants is not adequate to characterize individual 
supply curves. Individual wants do not seem to be charac-
terized by clear and limited objectives. A general desire 
to improve economic well being is also functioning in a 
noticeable manner and affects labor supply curves. 
Berg goes on to say that aggregate economic behavior 
21The applicability of Western economic analysis to 
"primitive" economic systems has been frequently debated. 
The formal-substantive controversy is an example of this 
debate. See D. Kaplan, "The Formal-Substantive Controversy 
in Economic Anthropology: Reflections on the Wider Impli-
cations," South-West Journal of Anthropology, 24 (1968), 
pp. 228-51; E. Le Clair, "Economic Theory and Economic 
Anthropology," American Anthropologist, 64 (1962), pp. 1179-
1203; and G. Dalton, "Economic Theory and Primitive 
Society," American Anthropologist, 63 (1961), pp. 1-25. 
22Berg, ~- cit., pp. 472-73. 
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is related to local conditions. 
The level of income derived from village sources, 
and changes in the level of this income are major 
influences on the supply of labor presenting itself 
for employment in the exchange sector .•.. First, 
at any moment of time, differences in the average 
per capita village income between areas are closely 
associated with differences in the rate of emigra-
tion. Within a given country or region, those areas 
where village incomes are relatively high tend to 
have relatively low emigration rates. Evidence of 
this tendency is plentiful, and can be found in all 
parts of Africa.23 
Enough information has been collected over a seventy-
year period to show that labor migration is directly related 
to harvest productivity, most dramatically so in times of 
crop failure. Labor migration is closely tied with market 
prices for agricultural products. A decline in price for 
peanuts, groundnuts, cotton, tobacco, rice, etc. brings 
migrants out of rural areas to work for money. The supply 
of migrant labor is sensitive to even small changes in mar-
ket price. Berg gives conventional views some benefit of 
the doubt in saying that labor supply might have been in-
elastic with respect to wage increases, but still, classical 
economic analysis is applicable for early labor conditions. 
In both 1902 in the South African gold mining industry and 
1903 in Ghana's mining industry, the 'idea of a target worker 
and the backward sloping supply of labor curve were used to 
justify wage cuts. Both industries experienced severe labor 
23Berg, op. cit., p. 480. 
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shortages which were directly related to industry's labor 
policies rather than to "ignorance" or a desire by local 
people to retain the security "traditional forms" allegedly 
gives them. 
Thus both on an individual and aggregate level, Berg 
rejects conventional views on the reaction of "primitive" 
tribal groups to "industrialization," as exemplified by wage 
work. Berg's economic analysis of the backward sloping 
supply curve is supported by Rottenberg, both generally and 
specifically on Antiguan data. 24 Vatter rejects it both for 
the United States and "underdeveloped " countries. 25 
Kannappan 26 rejects it pointing out the economic rationality 
of so-called "labor turnover" and says that if you pay low 
wages "low" relative to real income alternatives, then you 
should expect high labor turnover. 
24 simon Rottenberg, "Income and Leisure in an Under-
developed Economy," The Journal of Political- Economy, 55 
(April, 1952), pp. 95-1 01 ; Simon Rottenberg, "On Choice in 
Labor Markets," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 9 
(January, 1956), pp. 183-99. 
25earold G. Vatter, "On the Folklore of the Backward-
Sloping Supply Curve," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 14 (July, 1961), pp. 578-86. 
26 subbiah Kannappan, "The Economics of Structuring an 
Industrial Labour Force: Some Reflections on the Commit-
ment Problem," British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
4 (November, 1966), pp. 379-404. 
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Byland White, in a 1966 article27 entitled "The End 
of Backward-Sloping Labor Supply Functions in Dual Econo-
mies," deny the utility of the idea and think it should be 
eliminated from economic analysis. 
Byl writes in another article: 
In 1955, the average population density in French-
speaking West Africa was very low (4 per sq. mile) 
and, in addition, the geographical distribution of 
this population did not correlate with the loci of 
new economic opportunities. This produced serious 
labor shortages in the latter areas and spurred the 
movement of migrant workers that persists until today. 
Nevertheless, recruitment of a labor force in French-
speaking West Africa presented less serious obstacles 
than in the rest of the continent--mainly for three 
reasons: the demand for labor outside the villages 
was less important, relative to population, than in 
most other African countries; the people had been 
exposed longer than elsewhere to trade markets and 
money; and, finally, west African economic development 
rested on peasant agriculture that used hired labor, 
the labor force was thus led into a modern wage-
earning life, not directly in mines and factories, 
but through the intermediary stage of working for 
African farmers.28 
The Mossi, a West African tribe of over two million, were 
especially important. Byl says that they were well aware 
of economic coalitions and the wages they could expect. 
They went to Ghana instead of the Ivory Coast because wages 
were higher in Ghana and they tended to come in smaller 
27Adhemal Byland Joseph White, "The End of Backward-
Sloping Labor Supply Functions in Dual Economies," Cahiers 
Economiques et Sociaux, 4 (March, 1966), pp. 33-42. 
28Adhemal Byl, "History of the Labor Market in French-
Speaking West Africa," Cahiers Economiques et Sociaux, 5 
(June, 1967), pp. 167-188. 
numbers when the wages were lower. Byl goes on to cite 
data from the early 1960's showing 
... absenteeism and labour turnover were proving 
to be quantitatively less important, at any rate in 
urban areas, than had generally been supposed •.. 
With some exceptions the verified rates prove to be 
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not dissimilar to those experienced in technologically-
advanced countries .... 2~ 
He raises another point which is unusual in a general 
theoretical environment which stresses the dangers of over-
population. Reiterating an observation of Lord Hailey, who 
wrote one of the first African Labor Surveys, and Berg, 
Byl says that Africa is a case of economic development with 
a limited supply of labor. Labor was and is in short supply 
thus theories stressing disguised unemployment in agricul-
ture are not generally relevant to Africa. This is also 
true for Liberia specifically. This writer has yet to see 
a study of birth rates in Liberia that mention less than a 
fifty per cent infant mortality rate for all animals, human 
and otherwise. Reported rates have been as high as sixty-
five per cent. No studies have mentioned land scarcity even 
though the predominant agriculture pattern is that of 
shifting rice cultivation. This situation will remain un-
changed in the foreseeable future since no increase in the 
quality of health care is anticipated. 
The difficulty of reconstructing empirically what 
2 91b1d., p. 170. 
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actually was going on before Europeans came is enormous. 
It is evident that this writer is not satisfied with con-
ventional views on the subject. The basis of this dis-
satisfaction is the belief that pre-European social condi-
tions have not received adequate empirical documentation. 
After pointing out underpopulation and consequent low labor 
supply, Byl says 
Africans who wished money could not only hire out 
to Europeans, or work for an African farmer, but could 
also grow cocoa and coffee for their own account. 
When the government and European firms required labor 
for public works or private enterprise, labor was 
difficult to get, although the demand was small. As 
a result forced labor was introduced. This found 
three main forms (37): prestations or labor taxes, 
labor battalions (deuxieme portion), and a system of 
officially sponsored forced recruitment for private 
employers called authorized recruitment.30 
This is an absolutely crucial point and we should be clear 
on what it implies. A free market economy was already 
allocating scarce labor supplies in a rational manner. 
Forced labor was governmental interference in the operations 
of a free labor market. Forced labor was not a means of 
prying ignorant custom-bound farmers from their traditional 
social order. Rather it was a redistribution of the labor 
supply which probably benefited larger European companies. 
This has obvious implications for our understanding of what 
the "primitive society" is theoretically like and what 
30rbid., p. 179. 
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effect "modernization" and "industrialization" presumably 
have on it. This writer has searched for other evidence but 
this historical period happened eighty to ninety years ago 
and evidence of what these tribal societies were like then 
is terribly difficult to come by, especially if an analyst 
is skeptical of anthropological reconstructions. Modern 
anthropology is a post-1900 activity. 
Myers 31 in his work on India found that the development 
of a "stable committed" industrial labor force is more re-
lated to managerial policy than rural poverty. This view 
is emphasized by Lambert, 32 and also M. D. Morris.3 3 In 
describing the old view Morris writes in 1965, 
Whatever the specific line of causation accepted 
by scholars, the general conclusion is that workers 
retained their rural links to an extent which 
limited the supply of labor for industrial develop-
ment. As a consequence, disciplined urban-
industrial (i.e., proletarian) types of behavior did 
not develop. The failure of a proletarian outlook 
to appear was accompanied by the purported high 
rates of absenteeism and labor turnover and the 
3lcharles A. Myers, "India," in Walter Galenson (ed.), 
Labor and Economic Development, New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1959. 
32Richard D. Lambert, Workers, Factories and Social 
Change in India, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963. 
33Morris David Morris, "The Recruitment of an Indus-
trial Labor Force in India, with British and American Com-
parisons," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2 
(April, 1960), pp. 305-28; and, Morris David Morris, The 
Emergence of an Industrial Labor Force in India: A Study 
of the Bomba¥ Cottoh Mills, 1854-1947, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University o f California Press, 1965. 
slow growth of trade unions in Indian industry. 34 
Then he says, 
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Interestingly enough, neither of these hypotheses 
nor the conclusions drawn from them have been tested 
by any substantial exploration of the historical 
material. Generally, what has been written is either 
tautological in character or deficient in analysis. 
Much of the literature tends to base interpretation 
on hypothetical psychological and sociological pro-
positions which themselves are highly suspect. More-
over, the methodology is questionable. The histori-
cal argument typically rests on scattered fragments 
of evidence taken indiscriminately from all areas of 
the country and from all sorts of industry, seasonal 
and perennial, large-scale and small-scale; it re-
lates to all kinds of labor, casual and permanent, 
unskilled and skilled. It is impossible to generate 
a satisfactory analysis from this sort of melange, 
particularly during a period when modern industry was 
making only its first timid mark on the economy and 
there was no national market for labor.35 
This writer came to the same conclusion independently 
of Morris and his data is revealing. He found no labor 
supply problems because the Indian population historically 
has been as mobile as, for example, European populations at 
equivalent stages of economic development. The rapid move-
ment of people into Bombay was directly related to the rapid 
expansion of textile industries in the city. The Indian 
rural areas were over-populated and when urban economic 
alternatives became available people in rural areas re-
sponded to them. 
34Morris, The Emergence of an Industrial Labor Force in 
India,~- cit., p. 3. 
35rbid., pp. 3-4. 
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Morris' description of factory operation is certainly 
nowhere near the image sociologists have in mind when they 
speak of "rationalization'' of factory discipline. For 
example, 
The time schedule during the day was also not 
fixed. Most mills claimed to stop work for half 
an hour during the middle of the day. Actually, 
if the typical mill stopped work at all during the 
day, it did so for no more than fifteen or twenty 
minutes. And there was no fixed time for the 
break to occur. The time of closing was equally 
uncertain. Workers had no time pieces and there 
were no clocks in the mills. The worker knew that 
his day had ended only when the machinery began to 
slow down. 36 
Morris believes that management policy was the key factor 
affecting rates of labor turnover. 
There is no question that employers could have 
initiated a tighter and more precise system of 
labor utilization and discipline had they so wished. 
But such an approach would have required more 
expensive supervision than could be obtained from 
the jobbers without producing any obvious immediate 
benefits to the enterprises. Given the particular 
competitive advantages which the Bombay mills pos-
sessed, it is unlikely that a more elaborate and 
exact system of labor recruitment and supervision 
would haJ, contributed to the enhancement of 
profits. 
As long as the mills made money, and they made high profits, 
then there was really no economic incentive to rationalize 
labor relations or work conditions. 
In an earlier article (April 1960) comparing labor 
recruitment in textile industries in India, Britain, and 
36 Ibid., p. 102. 37 Ibid., p. 203. 
America, Morris says, 
[there is a] tendency to argue that the cotton 
mills in each of the three countries faced a 
general shortage of labor which inhibited growth 
in the early stage, a careful reading of the 
evidence shows that with some minor exceptions 
in rural mills in Britain and New England the 
supply of raw untrained labor was quite ade-
quate.38 
In each of the countries employer policy was a more in-
fluential determinant of labor turnover than worker psy-
chology. The Luddite mentality is overestimated. 
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Powesland in 1957 reported that the Baganda by 1900 had 
developed a considerable readiness to work for money. 39 
Ardener et al. in their study in the Cameroons found that 
the amount of migration was directly correlated with local 
economic conditions and that when plantations had labor 
recruitment problems it was because they under-estimated the 
economic alternatives open to workers and paid wages which 
were too low to effect a sufficient supply. 40 
Elkan's book Migrants and Proletarians, a study of 
38Morris David Morris, "The Recruitment of an Indus-
trial Labor Force in India, with British and American Com-
parisons," Com arative Studies in Societ and Histor , 2 
(April, 1960 , pp. 305-28. Quote from p. 326. 
3 9P. G. Powesland, Economic Policy and Labor, Kampala, 
Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 1957. 
40Edwin Ardener, et al., Plantation and Villa e in the 
Cameroons (Some Economic and Social Studies , published f or 
the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research by 
t~e Oxford University Press, 1960. 
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urban labor in Uganda, goes into the economic rationality 
and historical roots of the alternating pattern of wage 
work with rural work. He came to the conclusion that the 
pattern of alternating migration maximized individual real 
income since the worker, usually a male, would gain income 
from both his own wage work and the rural work done by his 
wife(s). In other words, a high degree of economic 
rationality underlies this pattern. Elkan found no simple 
correspondence between local economic conditions and rate 
of migration from his locality, however, "the correspondence 
is probably close enough to cast doubt on some new economic 
explanations of labour migration. 1141 He also rejects the 
concept of a target worker and relates urban work to rural 
social position. 
If we define targets not in terms of particular 
objects like bicycles or particular sums of money, 
but more generally, as means to attaining a per-
manently higher standard of life, the concept is 
still useful and can indeed serve to throw light 
on the reasons why people engage in employment only 
temporarily. Their purpose, or target, in seeking 
employment is not to enjoy an immediate increase in 
their standard of life, but rather to save as much 
money as possible in a more or less given time with 
which to increase the productivity of their farms.42 
41walter Elkan, Migrants and Proletarians (Urban 
Labour in the Economic Development of Uganda), published on 
behalf of the East African Institute of Social Research, 
London, New York, Lairobi: Oxford University Press, 1960, 
p. 40. 
42 Ibid., p. 131. 
Elkan goes on to discuss underlying reasons for the 
continued existence of migratory labor. 
If the future income of a farm, however small, can-
not be capitalized the farm must exercise a strong 
pull. So long as a man cannot obtain compensation 
for vacating his land, and on the other hand cannot 
normally maintain his right to it unless he or his 
family are in actual occupation, he has no induce-
ment to vacate it and he is therefore bound to 
regard employment as in some sense temporary. 43 
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This writer is not familiar with the literature on African 
land tenure, other than knowing the topic is both large and 
complex. Land tenure patterns operate as a factor, but it 
is difficult to estimate their relative effect, especially 
when contrasted, for example, with the effect of a lack of 
housing in urban areas, which would also inhibit permanent 
residency in urban areas. 
Herskovits, in a commentary on Elkan, makes comments 
that this writer considers most important, especially since 
Herskovits is one of the first American anthropologists into 
Africa. 
I find his [Elkan's] analysis of the concept of 
the target worker especially penetrating. As one 
who has been concerned for some time with the study 
of various aspects of change in African life, I 
find that intellectual ground-clearing operations 
of this sort make up a considerable component of 
any attempt at scientific analysis. The amount of 
misconception, based on the repetition of ideas 
never tested by reference to the facts, seems to be 
especially large in the discussion of problems of 
this sort. Of these misconceptions, the idea that 
43rbid., p. 136. 
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the target of the African worker must be immediate 
rather than long run goes deep. It sterns, I imagine, 
from the concept of the African as a man incapable 
of long-term planning, who lives for the moment, this 
idea in turn being the intellectual descendant, in 
perhaps a more sophisticated form, of the earlier 
conception of the lovable but improvident savage. 
It is analogous, in the skew it gives any approach 
that incorporates it, to assumptions that underlie 
studies of the national income of African countries, 
whereby the factor of internal trade is overlooked 
because of the application of models derived from 
the non-African scene to the analysis of African 
economies. As Elkan shows, it is of the greatest 
importance, in considering the questions of indus-
trialization and urbanization in Africa, to keep the 
role of the rural kinship group fully in the picture, 
and to understand that in its institutional role it 
is more than just a sociological phenomenon, but is 
to be compared to various systems of social security 
among ourselves. That is, in this case the transfer 
of the rural-urban dichotomy of Europe and America 
to the African scene distorts the picture and lessens 
clarity of thought.44 
First, Herskovits agrees with Elkan's critique of the 
"target worker." Secondly, this "intellectual ground-
clearing" is indispensable. This thesis itself is a 
ground-clearing effort. It attempts to state, as precisely 
as possible, the conventional view's treatment of major 
topics in social change and "underdevelopment" and then 
present, as thoroughly as possible, the actual empirical 
evidence on the topics. This writer agrees with Herskovits. 
There is a large amount of misconception and the miscon-
ception is "based on a repetition of ideas never tested by 
44Melville Herskovits, "Comment on Walter Elkan's 
'Migrant Labor in Africa: An Economist's Approach,'" 
American Economic Review, 49 (May, 1959), pp. 200-202. 
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research." In my considered judgment, Levy's work, cited 
earlier, is an outstanding example of this repetition. 
Thirdly, the role of the extended family and the existence 
of non-Western social orderings such as clan, lineage and 
tribe should be emphasized and observed more closely. 
Family structure is closely tied to migratory patterns. 
Finally, the dichotomy between rural-urban, modern-
traditional and the variations on this needs to be re-
thought. This dichotomy and all of its implications has 
literally become a set of blinders, a device that implicitly 
channels analysis into an automatic habit of thinking. 
Sociologists have had this habit so long that any set of 
ideas which is incompatible with it provokes theoretical 
withdrawal symptoms. This point will be returned to in 
the final chapter of the dissertation. 
Reynolds and Gregory in their work Wages, Productivity, 
and Industrialization in Puerto Rico45 agree with the 
general direction of the evaluations cited in this section. 
They found little resistance or confusion on the part of 
workers when initially introduced to industrial work and 
that labor turnover rates differed considerably across 
plants and were related more to managerial policy than 
45Lloyd G. Reynolds and Peter Gregory, Wages, Produc-
tivity , and Industrialization in Puerto Rico, Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965. 
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worker psychology. Rural Puerto Ricans who came to the 
factory did not complain about routine, supervision or 
machinery, and had a sound knowledge of the job market and 
alternative options open to them. 
All in all, these workers' adaptation to the 
industrial way of life impressed us as surprisingly 
complete and rapid, a matter of a year or two rather 
than 10 or 20 years. They seemed also to have gained 
in satisfaction. Eighty percent of the sample said 
they liked factory work very much, 17 percent liked 
it moderately well, and only 3 percent gave a nega-
tive verdict. These results run counter to the 
hypothesis that industrialization, while it raises 
the worker's consumption level, may reduce his 
satisfaction as a producer and a human being.46 
Reynolds and Gregory also make an emphatic rejection of the 
"backward bending supply of labor curve." 
The Puerto Rican evidence, then, runs strongly 
against the hypothesis of fixed income aspirations 
and a backward-bending labor supply curve. We 
suspect that this hypothesis applies to few groups 
of workers anywhere in the underdeveloped world. 
This makes one wonder why it has been so frequently 
advanced, and often uncritically accepted. One 
possibility is that in the absence of firm evidence 
social scientists have been unduly impressed by 
casual employer opinions.4 7 
Hill has published a well known work on The Migrant 
Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural 
Capitalism. 48 As the title indicates ''capitalism," as a 
description of economic behavior, was the best term that 
46rbid., p. 299. 47 rbid., pp. 301-302. 
48Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern 
Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism, Cambridge: University 
Press, 1963. 
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Hill found to describe the actions of the farmers that took 
advantage of the opening of the cocoa market. She points 
out that the "traditional family" was a major capital 
source in the acquisition of farm land and that economic 
development is closely associated with organized planned 
migration. The "traditional" societies in this area already 
had institutions of sale, mortgage, credit and non-kinship 
based corporate land holdings before a "modern" market 
economy existed, and the shift to "modern" production was 
simply a continuation of previous patterns. The expansion 
of migrant farms was rapid due both to the continual re-
investment of proceeds from previous cocoa sales and to the 
high economic rationality hard work and thrift exhibited by 
the farmers. 
Meyer Fortes, in commenting on Hill's work makes the 
following points about kinship: 
In the course of this analysis she examines and 
refutes some of the most time-honoured cliches 
about such issues as communal land-tenure, the 
miscalled "extended family," and the alleged 
lack of foresight and thrift among tropical 
peasants. 
What does emerge clearly is that we have in the 
"company" a form of communal enterprise rooted in 
traditional family patterns but based on a kind of 
contract, and not on kinship status (to use Maine's 
well-known formula). We can describe it, perhaps, 
as a non-corporate collective. There are experts 
who maintain that contract relationships are incom-
patible with the traditional African 'extended 
family' organization and that individual land-
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ownership is not consistent with communal principles 
of tenure. We can see from Miss Hill's observa-
tions (which are amply confirmed by anthropologi-
cal studies in many parts of Africa) why this thesis 
is unacceptable.49 
These comments were made in 1963 and that is still recent. 
Harbison, writing about Egypt noted5 0 that interviews 
with managers pointed to the inability to discharge as the 
biggest labor problem rather than the commitment and re-
cruitment of workers. 
Chaplin's work on The Peruvian Industrial Labor 
Force,5 1 theoretically, is a broad debunking of conven-
tional views. He found no nostalgia for the rur.al way of 
life from 1900 on, the Lima mills did not have much labor 
turnover and that management is responsible for much of 
what instability there was. And a general, recruitment of 
industrial workers simply did not proceed according to con-
ventional expectation. 
49Meyer Fortes, in his "Forward" to Polly Hill's The 
Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural 
Capitalism, Cambridge: University Press, 1963, pp. vi, 
viii. 
SOFrederick Harbison, "Egypt," in Walter Galenson's 
Labor and Economic Development, New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1956. 
51David Chaplin, A Discussion of Major Issues Arising 
in the Recruitment of Industrial Labor in Peru, Madison, 
Wisconsin: University o f Wisconsin. (Mimeographed.) See 
also David Chaplin, The Peruvian Industrial Labor Force, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 
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Barber, in a study of African economic behavior in 
Rhodesia 52 opened his article with an explicit focus on the 
actual characteristics of the labor force. With data from 
1941 on he found the number of migrants from an area was 
closely tied to existing economic opportunities. Those 
areas where alternative ways existed to make money, e.g., 
cash cropping, also had lower rates of migrancy. He con-
cluded that labor migration will continue to exist since it 
is an economically rational means to maximize real income. 
Until real wages rise sharply, any permanent "commitment" 
to a life of urban-based wage labor will result in a loss 
of income from rural sources. Except for the upward 
mobility, living in a city is neither socially nor economi-
cally preferable to rural life. 
Velsen's study of labor migration among the Tonga of 
Rhodesia5 3 found that thinking about this process as if it 
were part of a conflict between old and new was not fruit-
ful. A "compartmentalization" or "segregation" of behavior 
has occurred. The Tonga go to urban areas, work there, form 
associations, etc. Sooner or later they return to the rural 
52william J. Barber, "Economic Rationality and Behavior 
Patterns in an Underdeveloped Area: A Case Study of Afri-
can Economic Behavior in the Rhodesians," Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Change, 3 (April, 1960), pp. 237-51. 
53J. Van Velsen, "Labor Migration as a Positive Factor 
in the Continuity of Tonga Tribal Society," Economic De-
velopment and Cultural Change, 3 (April, 1960), pp. 265-78. 
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society and greater rates of "urbanization" may be simply 
that larger numbers are staying longer periods. It does 
not mean that they have become integrated or settled into a 
way of life that has broken links to the rural areas. 
"Urban" and "rural" are not separate and incompatible 
entities. 
The conventional view is not without representation in 
the post-1950 period although such representation is infre-
quent. Wells and Warington provide a conventional theoreti-
cal perspective even though some of their empirical informa-
tion is at odds with their theoretical analysis. They 
worked in West Africa in Nigeria and the Cameroons. For 
example, in their introduction they say: 
The contrast between work in the tribal economy 
and in the rationally ordered, disciplined work 
systems of industrialized communities is striking. 
In the tribal economy there is a direct relation-
ship between effort and the satisfaction of basic 
needs. Little conscious planning or foresight is 
called for, the character and sequence of activities 
being determined by the natural environment and the 
rhythm of the seasons. Sustained effort for set 
periods of time is not required. Specialization 
merely involves the allocation of duties according 
to sex and age, and is sanctioned by custom. The 
same tribal authority governs the entire way of 
life, in which there is no sharp dichotomy between 
work and other activities. 
But industrial unrest can exist quite independently 
of trade unions. It can show itself in high labour 
turnover, irregular attendance, inattention to 
work and consequent low productivity. 
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To a large extent labour turnover is to be ex-
plained as a phenomenon of the transition from the 
tribal economy to the industrialized society. Many 
of the workers involved in the movement are migrants 
leaving their tribal community for limited periods, 
and with specific ends in view.54 
They also emphasize a backward bending supply of labor 
curve and speak of native reluctance to accept factory 
discipline. However, there is the recognition that manage-
ment policy may also be influential if not critical in in-
fluencing turnover rates. As long as companies lack central 
labor offices and continue to hire by departments a higher 
rate of labor turnover will exist. This writer came to the 
same conclusion in thinking about the plantations that he 
visited. As long as each division within the plantation 
hires its own workers a high rate of turnover will exist. 
This "turnover'' is actually a shifting from division to di-
vision. Since all divisions are seeking the same labor 
skills, in effect, the result is to create a labor market 
with each division being an independent demand source. A 
situation that structurally encourages shopping around even 
though, overtly, all receive the same wages. It is probably 
the case that working conditions differ by division on a 
plantation although what these differences are may not be 
54F. A. Wells and w. A. Warington, Studies in Indus-
trialization: Nigeria and the Cameroons, published for the 
Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 5, 13, 16. 
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apparent to the European staff. 
Powesland, in his history of migration in Uganda, makes 
these points: 55 Migration began and ended in approximately 
a ten year period from 1897 to 1907. The Ganda were 
attracted to wage labor but soon found they could make more 
money selling cotton. Then the British introduced forced 
labor since the British government and the British companies 
were not willing to pay wages high enough to compete with 
the economic returns from cotton. Forced labor was then a 
device for artificially increasing the supply of labor in 
order that wages may be kept low on the demand side. The 
existence of continued low wages eventually encouraged more 
crop growing since the economic returns were greater at the 
latter and more and more exemptions were gotten from forced 
labor by crop growers. In general, the colonial government 
was not anxious to encourage the growth of an industrial 
labor force since the probability of higher wages and in-
creased costs for social services was an economic cost the 
British rulers did not wish to undertake. 
Patterson's work on the Pokot of Northern Kenya shows 
that British rule brought no benefits to the Pokot. After 
conquering them militarily in 1910, for the next fifty years 
55p. G. Powesland, "History of the Migration in 
Uganda," Chapter II of Audrey J. Richard's Economic Develop-
ment and Tribal Change, Cambridge: Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 
pp. 17-51. 
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the British taxed the Pokot, arrested those tribal people 
who protested and at independence in 1963 left them with an 
eighty per cent infant mortality rate. In turn, the Pokot 
steadfastly refused to cooperate in any way whatsoever with 
British rule. They did not work for the low wages offered 
by the British and killed collaborators. Patterson makes 
the point that this was a rational and economic reaction to 
an objectively oppressive situation. 
Gutkind, in 1968, said, 
However, change and modernisation can take many 
forms, and it is, I believe, false to assume that 
major transformations are contingent on industriali-
sation and urbanisation. Within the foreseeable 
future Africa will continue to be predominantly 
agricultural, although the non-agricultural sector 
will steadily, if slowly, increase in importance. 
What is significant for Africa, as well as Asia 
and Latin America, in the mid-1960's is that even 
without major and rapid industrialisation important 
economic, political and social changes are taking 
place. In a sense Africa is modernising without 
dramatic and extensive changes in her mode of pro-
duction and the mode of residence of her people or 
the development of a complex, non-agricultural 
way of life.56 
Gutkind defines change as a "realignment and restruc-
turing" of the social positions of people and groups. 
Change gives a vastly increased range of choices to 
the individual: the chance to sever old links and 
forge new ones, leading to new networks of per-
sonal, social, economic and political relations. 
56P. c. W. Gutkind, "African Responses to Urban Wage 
Employment," International Labour Review, 97 (February, 
1968), p. 136. 
These networks are the result of a new, as yet 
uncertain, commitment to non-agricultural activi-
ties. So far we have only some very crude indi-
cations of what this commitment implies. Some of 
the more obvious ones, however, are the increasing 
migration of Africans from the rural areas, the 
consequent increase of the urban population, the 
increasing duration of urban residence and, when 
ties with the rural areas are maintained, the fact 
that they now serve rather specialised functions 
which are rooted in change and modernisation. A 
large number of Africans move readily and con-
tinually between village and town, their return 
to the former often being a temporary break from 
urban commercial and industrial life, so that they 
are no longer totally immersed in the social, 
economic and political life of the tribe.57 
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The continued existence of supportive relationships be-
tween rural and urban areas is indicative of the slow rate 
of transformation within Africa as a whole. As pointed out 
earlier, less than ten per cent of the population lives in 
non-agricultural areas. In general, the technological base 
of these areas is not sufficient to absorb larger numbers of 
people. Living conditions in these areas are not currently 
attractive and no economic booms to better them are fore-
seeable. A small proportion of the population is, in terms 
of the conventional view, a stable, committed industrial 
labor force. No radical or drastic increases in this pro-
portion are expected since economic conditions are cur-
rently adverse to an increase. Thus only a limited number 
of individuals can take advantage of new alternatives 
57rbid., pp. 136-37. 
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offered in the urban areas. Rural areas, and the practices 
within them, will be both influenced by and intimately con-
nected with urban places. Rural areas are being changed in 
the absence of the kind of industrialization we are familiar 
with in Europe, Japan and the United States. 
Watson also emphasizes this point. 
However, the widespread use of items of European 
material culture has so far brought only superficial 
changes to tribal life. Although the Mambwe wear 
European clothes, read books, ride bicycles, and 
listen to the wireless, these changes have not yet 
seriously affected their kinship and political 
relationships. The bonds of kinship are still 
effective, even within the industrial sector, where 
kinsmen can assist one another in many ways. They 
tend to congregate in the same labour markets, and 
to take up similar work, and this association keeps 
their social ties in constant use. They value the 
money and goods that they get from wage-labour, but 
realize that at present there is no final security 
for them in urban employment, and that real security 
lies only within the tribe. They have a very shrewd 
appreciation of the relative importance to themselves 
of town and country. The kinship ties continue to 
function within the new economic system because they 
are related to the land rights, and these are more 
important to the Mambwe than casual employment for 
wages. 5 8 
Vogel in 1968 made a general review of the literature 
on labor migration in East Africa. 59 He emphasizes the 
58william Watson, Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy: 
A Study of the Mambwe Peopl e o f Northern Rhodesia, Published 
on behalf 0 £ The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Northern 
Rhodesia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958, 
p. 221. 
59william M. Vogel, Is Labor Migration of Decreasing 
Significance in the Economies of East Africa? Syracuse, 
New York: Syracuse University, Maxwell Graduate School of 
economic bases of migration. 
Thus there is a body of opinion that places a 
considerable weight upon the poverty of the tribal 
areas as the main motivation for migrancy. The 
U. N. Study suggests that: "Generally a reas with 
low farm income and few employment opportunities 
show the greatest proportion of migrants." Elkan 
corroborates this analysis by suggesting that when 
cash cropping does catch hold in an area, the inci-
dence of migrancy is significantly reduced. He 
cites two examples: in 1924 in Buganda and the 
Eastern Province of Uganada there was a rapid in-
crease in cotton production which resulted in the 
"practical elimination" of migrancy. 
Similarly, Elkan tells us of the district of 
West Nile which introduced cotton production on a 
modest scale in 1925. This had the immediate 
effect of reducing the number of people who were 
available for labor recruitment. Philip Gulliver, 
who studied the patterns of migrancy among the 
Ngoni of Tanganyika, agrees that this is a sig-
nificant factor in causing migrancy. He writes 
that: "In those parts where cash-cropping is now 
heavy very many young men no longer migrate. 11 60 
Vogel goes on to express disbelief in the concept of a 
"target worker." 
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The U. N. study, however, rejects the entire idea 
of a target worker as an inaccurate interpretation 
of the data, at least over the past decade and a 
half. The target theory is inaccurate, the u. N. 
study argues, because it neglects the very real 
possibility that wants may increase even as the 
target worker is on the job. Thus, the study has 
found that "by the time a worker has achieved a 
particular target he has already acquired new ones." 
The study postulates a feedback process in which 
Citizenship and Public Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 3/L, 
Program of Eastern African Studies, (February, 1968). 
(Mimeographed.) 
6 0 Ibid. , p. 8. 
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a dynamic relationship is established between the 
individual and his environment. A man works in the 
city, and in fact, he may have gone there to earn a 
specific amount of money. Once there, however, he 
finds that there is amost [sic] an infinite quantity 
of things which he would like. After living in the 
city for a while longer these so-called luxuries be-
come necessities, and he remains even longer to ob-
tain them. Thus, he may stay on for as long as 10 
or 20 years or more. The U. N. study suggests that 
as a worker becomes more aware of the value of money 
he becomes "more sensitive to economic incentives.••61 
And he also establishes the economic rationality under-
lying labor turnover by examining labor turnover as a func-
tion of wage level. His data was taken from the Nyanza 
textile industries for 1962. 
The table shows three things quite clearly: 
firstly, that all groups of workers have lower 
rates of turnover the higher they are in pay scale; 
secondly, that the rates for migrant workers show 
the greatest variation, contradicting the assumption 
even more clearly that workers are not responsible 
to wage incentives; and thirdly, that in the highest 
grades the migrants have the lowest rate of turnover. 
In the light of this data the U. N. study con-
cludes that wages are a significant factor in the 
creation of a stable and permanent labor force. In 
spite of all the previous evidence to the contrary, 
we must conclude that the workers "do respond to 
economic incentives. 11 62 
Vogel ends his literature review with an examination of 
migrancy rates across time. His analysis of studies done in 
East Africa shows that migrancy is actually declining. Mi-
grants stay at their jobs for longer periods of time than 
they did in the 1950's. This is due both to the growth of 
61Ib'd 14 62 Ib1.'d., 27 28 __ 1._., p. . pp. - • 
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an urban work force and to the use of labor saving devices 
by management. In Vogel's own conception, his most signifi-
cant major generalization is that labor migration in East 
Africa is rapidly decreasing and that the emergence of an 
urban proletariat is rapidly taking place. 
Some historical markers should be remembered in 
thinking about the literature just cited. Skinner, in his 
work on labor migration among the Mossi of Upper Volta,63 
reports that the Mossi have been migrating in large numbers 
since 1900 at least and will continue to do so for sound 
economic reasons. However, Skinner also goes beyond this 
to discuss migrant communities in West Africa.6 4 He points 
out that our earliest written accounts of West Africa men-
tion the existence of "foreign quarters" in all areas. For 
example 
There were permanent stranger communities in many 
West African societies even in early times. Many 
chroniclers report the presence of stranger groups 
in such population centres as Ghana, Malle, Gao, 
Djenne, and Timbuktu. European travellers in the 
western Sudan at the end of the eighteenth century 
and the beginning of the nineteenth century reported 
the existence of stranger communities in the afore-
mentioned towns as well as in Segou, Kano, Kong, 
Sokoto, Salaga, and Ouagadougou. The major exceptions 
63Elliott P. Skinner, "Labor Migration Among the Mossi 
of the Upper Volta," from Hilda Kuper's Urbanization and 
Migration in West Africa, Berkeley: University of Cali-
rornia Press, 1965. 
64Elliott ·P. Skinner, "Strangers in West African 
Societies," Africa, 33 (October, 1963), pp. 307-320. 
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appear to have been the coastal towns, whose popula-
tions seem to have been primarily local and ethni-
cally homogeneous. But even here, according to early 
Dutch travellers, there lived African merchant com-
munities from neighbouring interior countries. 
The foreign Africans or strangers in the African 
polities and societies of the pre-Colonial period 
were primarily merchants and their families, engaged 
in both local and foreign trade. These strangers 
lived in special wards (sometimes called z ongos ) 
under the control of their own chiefs or headmen , a 
pattern which Es Sadi described from Timbuktu as early 
as 1352, the time of Ibn Battuta's visit.65 
Labor migration and trade have been carried out on a 
large scale in West Africa for as far back as our written 
records exist. Some appreciation of this can be gotten from 
the works of Basil Davidson and other African historians 
that have attempted to reconstruct a realistic and factual 
account of pre-imperialistic cultures. Our general under-
standing of labor patterns has come a long way since 
colonial writings. Several generations of anthropological 
research and historical revisionism have substantially added 
to our knowledge. A sense of this coming can be gotten by 
reading colonial writings on African populations. For 
example, the following was written in 1933 by Major G. St. 
J. Orde Brown~,O.B.E. (Mil.) : 66 
65 Ibid., p. 308. 
66Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, O.B.E. (Mil.), The 
African Labou rer , published for the International Institute 
o f Afr ican Languages and Cultures, London: Humphrey Mil-
ford, Oxford University Press, 1933. 
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The primitive African was thus to a marked degree 
dependent upon, and influenced by, his companions; 
crowd psychology thus dominated behaviour, and the 
individual separated from his fellows was liable to 
great instability of conduct. This feature was 
enforced by the circumstances of tribal life where 
solitude was very rare; almost always in the company 
of friends, the African had little incentive to the 
evolution of personality, and remained an extravert; 
lack of opportunity for meditation rendered him 
practical and materialist, except in so far as his 
misconception of the relations of spiritual cause 
and natural effect made him superstitious. 
The solidarity of society naturally led the Afri-
can to rely on this to a very large degree; the 
knowledge that disaster would be accompanied by 
the ready help of friends and neighbours largely 
minimized the fear of it, and, in consequence, 
there was less need to foresee or take precautions 
against misfortune. The tribesman thus tended to 
become thriftless and improvident; he lived mainly 
for the moment, expecting the leaders of the com-
munity to make such arrangements as they might con-
sider advisable, and relying confidently on the 
success of concerted effort to meet calamity, should 
this occur. Being largely relieved of the results 
of his own foolishness or incompetence by the 
generous aid of his neighbours, he largely lost fear 
of the future.67 
In summary of this section, we see repeated examples of 
rural social structures which accommodate quite willingly to 
cash economies if adequate real income is offered. If it is 
not offered then non-industrial activities are followed. 
These examples are congruent with the pre-1950 empirical 
information that Moore presented but these examples also 
67 Ibid., p. 9. 
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contradict his theoretical emphases, in particular, and the 
emphases of the conventional view in general. 
Wilbert Moore's Later Theoretical Writings 
Moore published several articles in 1955 and these are 
noteworthy since they generally repeat the same theoretical 
emphases introduced in Industrialization and Labor. In May 
of 1955 he published ''Labor Attitudes toward Industriali-
zation in Underdeveloped Countries" in the American Economic 
Review,68 in which he says, 
The potential worker in undeveloped areas is typi-
cally required to give up traditional forms of 
organization and reciprocal obligations that have 
combined to afford him security--both material and 
affective. The kinship system in any nonindustrial 
society is likely to provide a major barrier to 
individual mobility •. 
[Also found] is the lack of appreciation of the new 
status system. This may take the form of a rela-
tively low and highly particular appeal of wages, 
often commented on with reference to "native" 
laborers, but also commented on by preclassical 
writers in economic theory with reference to workers 
in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution. 
The principle bears extension, however. New occupa-
tions simply do not fit traditional standards of 
prestige, or are valued negatively because they in-
volve manual labor and merit placement irrespective 
of age, kinship position, caste, or other forms of 
"ascribed" status. To the extent that the potential 
worker operates as an independent producer, the 
68wilbert E. Moore, "Urbanization and Industrializa-
tion of the Labor Force in a Developing Economy" "Labor 
Attitudes Toward Industrialization in Underdeveloped Coun-
tries," American Economic Review, 45 (May, 1955), pp. 156-
165. Quotes from pp. 158-159. 
... 
change to wage labor involves some loss of 
"freedom," even if it offers higher rewards. 
If wages have a limited appeal to nonindustrial 
populations and new employments are negatively 
valued, it is not surprising that workers are more 
commonly "pushed" than "pulled" into modern forms 
of economic activity. Much of the "push" is in 
fact the largely unintentional consequence of ex-
ternal intervention. The successful attempt to 
reduce mortality has the effect of deteriorating 
man-land ratios, thus increasing agricultural 
underemployment and causing the landless and im-
poverished rural dweller to seek and accept other 
means of livelihood .... 
Mobility on the basis of individual performance is 
generally not markedly present in undeveloped areas 
and does not generally form a part of the positive 
value system. Whether for the individual or for 
the system as a whole, continuity and not change 
is likely to be the major value ...• 
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The complex of ideas expressed in these 1955 quotes 
are a repetition of what Moore said in 1951, and they too 
are contrary to the empirical evidence as we know it. That 
is, at this stage in his theoretical development Moore is 
still using the conventional view, the same view, essen-
tially, that is popularized in introductory sociology text-
books (when and if these texts mention anything about the 
sociology of third world non-Western peoples). In the same 
vein, in 1955, Moore also argued that the long term result 
of "economic development" is to be a "convergence." That 
is, regardless of beginnings, countries will become basi-
cally similar as "industrialization" proceeds. This is a 
corollary of the conventional view and is compatible with 
its assumptions. If "industrialization" is a radically 
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transforming change of local conditions all over the world, 
and if this process requires a fixed, delimited set of 
ideas and behavior to operate it, then it does follow that 
as countries "industrialize" they will tend to become simi-
lar. In other words, the level of technology specifies the 
form and content of social organization. Moore describes 
some of the changes that he thinks must be made: 69 
Certain normative or institutional changes, which 
appear to relate primarily to the economy but also 
have additional functions in a society, must also be 
effected. The complexes may be referred to as pro-
perty, division of labor, and exchange. Property 
rights must be freed for traditional restraints on 
use and transfer; labor must be freed of barriers to 
new employments and allocated according to skill; 
goods and services must be allocated to production 
and consumption by some form of monetary-market 
system. All of these imply placing a positive value 
on mobility, which is a revolutionary change in 
most non-industrial societies. 
There are also concomitant changes. If economic 
development reaches the point where there is a rapid 
growth of manufacturing activity, labor must be re-
tained. The very "servitude to the clock" that is 
so central to urban-industrial societies is alien to 
the life-organization of peasants, handicrafters, or 
even traders, all of whom tend to be task-oriented. 
And again, 
Perhaps the most fundamental and disturbing 
changes are those in family and kinship organiza-
tion. For obvious reasons, the kinship unit is 
central in any society. Though the industrial system 
does not destroy family functions, it radically alters 
them. The necessity for geographical and occupational 
mobility without extended burdens of kinship position 
69wilbert E. Moore, "Creation of a Common Culture," 
Confluence, 4 (July, 1955), pp. 229-38. Quots pp. 235-36. 
and duties tends to produce radical separation of 
the generations and adult siblings. In short, the 
mobility required in a higherly industrialized 
society encourages a small-family system. Rapid 
changes in skills, chiefly developed among the 
young, often make youths undeniably but uncom-
fortably superior to their elders. 
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In 1955 Moore also published a long essay called 
Economy and Society70 which had two pages in it on indus-
trialization. He presented a fragmentary four-stage theory 
of development and briefly mentioned the points he made in 
the above two articles. In an April 1960 article, "Notes 
for a General Theory of Labor Organization, 1171 Moore pre-
sents a four-stage evaluationary scheme of development that 
agrees with the ideas presented in 1955. 
There is a substantial basis for thinking that a 
generalized sequence exists in the historical and 
contemporary evolution of labor organizations and 
their relations with employers, and thus that 
various "early" stages of such evolution can be 
identified in areas now industrializing. 
The sequence evident in "early" industrialization 
will be presented in terms of four stages, all prior 
to "advanced" industrialization and "mature" labor 
relations. 
1. "Modern" or "patronal" management, with un-
committed workers, essentially reluctant refugees 
from the preindustrial economic sector. 
2. "Modern" or "patronal" management with 
70wilbert E. Moore, Economy and Society, Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1955. 
71wilbert E. Moore, "Notes for a General Theory of 
Labor Organization," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
13 (April, 1960}, pp. 387-97. Quotes pp. 395-96. 
committed, loyal employees. 
3. Both groups "modern," but with the rise of 
independent or quasi-independent unions of 
employees ..•. 
4. The rise of status-conscious industrial 
unions, attempting a "labor monopoly," and exempli-
fying the radical disparity in wealth, power, edu-
cation, and specific skills between managers and 
workers. 
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Speculations about evolutionary sequences in social 
history existed in Ancient Greece. Theorizing on "economic 
development" has consistently resorted to stages as a means 
of unifying theoretical speculation. Hopefully, under-
standing moves from static conceptions to a knowledge of 
the dynamics. If we believe that (1) a fixed set of charac-
teristics, a cultural configuration, can be found to uni-
quely describe "the traditional society," and (2) that an-
other distinctly different set of characteristics defines 
"the modern society" and (3) the latter will cause rapid 
and extensive changes in the former (4) so that the former 
will dissolve and eventually be replaced by the latter then 
(5) we have a "convergence" theory consistent point-by-
point with the conventional view. In the above sequence 
described by Moore we find a sketchy description of western 
historical experience being passed off as an understanding 
of the contemporary relations between management and labor 
in non-industrial countries. 
In 1960, a collection of articles was edited by Moore 
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and Arnold Feldman. 72 A theory of development was impli-
citly presented as its opening chapter. The empirical ade-
quacy of the theory is difficult to evaluate since it rarely 
mentions a geographical area, an historical date, a govern-
ment, or tribe by name. It is abstract and difficult to 
falsify both because it is abstract and because no overall 
schema sufficiently co-ordinates its segments. That is, it 
cannot be listed part-by-part and then judged as to its 
adequacy. 
"Labor commitment" is the key variable. It is impli-
citly suggested that this concept is so significant that it 
can stand synonymously for the social development of poorer 
countries. Moore and Feldman define commitment as "involves 
both performance and acceptance of the behaviors appropriate 
to an industrial way of life." This approach implies that 
an "industrial way of life" in fact exists and thus a non-
industrial way of life must also exist. It is assumed that 
these ways of life are uniquely different and that "develop-
ment" is a shift in overt behavior and mental values. As a 
postulated construct this is a variant on the "traditional-
modern" dichotomy and this assertion of difference is an-
other way of expressing the conventional view. 
72wilbert E. Moore and Arnolds. Feldman, Labor Com-
mitment and Social Change in Developing Areas, New York: 
Social Science Research Council, 1960. 
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Feldman and Moore divide the rest of their essay into 
three parts; each discussing one "loci of commitment": the 
workplace, market, and society. At the end of the essay 
they describe "development" as an entire process. 
This sequence is important for any attempt to 
understand the transitional phase of commitment in 
currently industrializing societies. It emphasizes 
the sociological obstacles to development, in that 
initial exposures to the new forms are limited to 
specific contexts. Thus even when commitment to a 
specific context occurs, there is no guarantee that 
over-all commitment to an industrial social organi-
zation can be achieved more easily; the opposite may 
be true. In the easiest period of transition 
partial commitment may present fewer difficulties 
than the type of commitment characteristic of the 
later stages of transition. The transitional phase 
culminates in the involvement of the individual in 
all the loci. At this point commitment requires 
rejection of the most basic values, and a greater 
extent of substitution of new integrating principles 
than in any previous point. 
Here again we have a simple three step process: We 
begin with primitive, "underdeveloped" countries ("cur-
rently-industrializing"). Sudden and rapid changes occur 
to them ("rejection of most basic values") and then they are 
"industrialized." The theoretical perspective of this 
thesis positively implies that this conventional three step 
description distorts our understanding of what is going on 
in non-Western areas. 
Feldman and Moore's position was strongly criticized by 
the rest of the contributors to the book. In the closing 
73 Ibid., p. 65. 
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chapter Feldman and Moore recognized a basic denial to the 
idea that "labor commitment" is a major theoretical problem. 
Starting from one extreme, there seems to be some 
support for the position that commitment, as de-
fined, will rarely be problematical. Some sub-
scribe at least partially to the view that as soon 
as the opportunity for industrial labor presents 
itself, people will take advantage of it with 
reasonable promptness. The initial sections of 
Morris' chapter can be interpreted as providing 
supportive evidence for this position.74 
This thesis has already discussed the work of Morris, 
Gregory, and Elkan and Fallers and how their studies provide 
empirical data which is not congruent to Moore's theoretical 
views. Other writers in the collection also criticized the 
conventional view: Udy said that some of the tribes in his 
HRAF sample already possessed so-called "bureaucratic" 
norms as part of their social structure and that hunting and 
gathering societies were achievement oriented. Belshaw's 
description of "traditional religion" is a far cry from the 
typical cliche that religion in traditional societies is 
static, fixed, and anti-progressive. 
We can no longer assume that religious practice is 
customary in the sense of unchanging; there is now 
considerable evidence of experimental, thoughtful, 
and dramatic alteration in cults, mythology, ritual 
and the like, all of which must have repercussions 
in the culture invo17;ng modified ways of using time and other resources. 
Herskovits begins by saying Feldman and Moore do not under-
74 rbid., p. 366. 75 rbid., p. 93. 
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stand the situation and makes a strong plea for needing 
better information about non-industrial societies. We 
simply do not really know how compatible non-Western social 
structures are with an industrial factory system. And 
Singer opens his article by saying, 
Recent discussions of economic development have 
shown a commendable broadening of horizons in the 
attention given to social, cultural, and psychologi-
cal factors. In some analyses, however, the asser-
tions about the role of these factors have assumed 
a definiteness that seems premature in the present 
state of our knowledge. This is particularly true 
of analyses that stress the inconsistencies between 
the values and traditions of preindustrial societies 
and the requirements of industrial societies. Such 
analyses are usually based on certain assumptions 
about traditional societies, on case studies where 
resistance to industrialization has been found, and 
on extrapolations of the sequence of industrial 
development observed in England, the United States, 
and the other industrially advanced countries of the 
West. The anthropologists' "cultural pattern" 
theory has also begun to appear in these 
analyses.7 6 
This writer agrees with Singer's caution about the 
conventional view, for this is what Moore and Feldman have 
essentially presented and while it is more sophisticated 
than Moore's 1951 and 1955 writings it is still basically 
similar to them. Singer's next paragraph renders a 
listing of what he calls the "theory of uniform sequence." 
The general line of argument in these analyses 
of economic development may be schematized by the 
76Milton Singer, "Changing Craft Traditions," Chapter 
14 in Moore and Feldman's Labor Commitment and Social 
Change in Developing Areas,~- cit., p. 258. 
following propositions: 
1. There is a linear sequence of industrial 
development that is essentially the same wherever 
it occurs. The complete version of this sequence 
is provided by the history of industrialization in 
England. 
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2. This sequence is started, maintained, and ac-
celerated by a specific complex of values and motives 
necessary for a functionally integrated industrial 
society and its associated ''culture pattern." 
3. Most of the newly developing countries are 
deficient in the required values and motives in this 
complex and are characterized by preindustrial and 
nonindustrial value patterns, which are inconsistent 
with it. 
4. If the newly developing countries are to 
follow the sequence of industrial development, they 
will need to adopt the industrial value complex and 
get rid of their traditional value patterns.77 
Shortly thereafter he says 
Present knowledge of comparative economic develop-
ment is not sufficient to permit a definitive refuta-
tion or confirmation of this theory. The literature 
on the subject is meager and scattered and needs 
systematization and appraisa1.78 
This doctoral dissertation is part of that appraisal. 
Singer goes on to extensively criticize Moore and Feldman's 
opening essay. 
It is in this context that the paradigmatic analysis 
of industrialization and the Feldman-Moore version 
of it are most vulnerable to criticism. 
To set up requirements for industrialization that 
are highly idealized extrapolations from the most 
advanced industrial societies as measures for indus-
77Ibid., pp. 258-59. 78 Ibid., p. 259. 
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trialization in newly developing countries is surely 
to put the process on too remote a pedestal. Where 
in the older industrialized societies are the inte-
gration and total commitment that this construct 
projects? Many peoples have learned to live with 
machinery of different kinds, but only in the theo-
retical analyses of professional ideologues has this 
many-sided fact been generalized into an "industrial 
system." 
The incompatibility of such a "system" with pre-
industrial societies is further exaggerated when it 
is compared not with existing situations in these 
societies but with a hypothetical and idealized con-
struct of "traditional society" and "traditional 
values," which are never supposed to change. 
Specific failures of industrialization in these 
societies are, immediately referred to some feature 
of this hypothetical traditional system; and the 
diverse, concrete resistances are generalized into a 
monolithic conservative force of "traditionalism." 
The battle between this force and "industrialism" 
is a clash of hypothetical constructs, which does 
not realistically reflect obstacles to economic 
development.79 
This is heavy criticism and in an August 1961 paper 
Moore and Feldman modify their description of industriali-
zation.BO They open their 1961 paper by asking "Are 
Industrial Societies Becoming Alike?" and then say "To many 
sociologists the answer to our titular question is so 
clearly affirmative that one might simply say 'Yes' and let 
us proceed with suitable dispatch to the next paper. 1181 
79Ibid., pp. 262-63. 
80Arnold S. Feldman and Wilbert E. Moore, Are Indus-
trial Societies Becoming Alike? A paper presented at 
Meeting of American Sociological Association, Saint Louis, 
August, 1961. 
81Ibid., p. 1. 
However, in this paper Feldman and Moore answer "Yes and 
No." Now the issue is treated problematically. First 
they recount their earlier reasoning which led them to a 
convergence belief. 
Much of the support for the common structural 
characteristics of industrial societies derives in 
fact from analysis of the industrialization pro-
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cess, particularly in the contemporary context. The 
analytical studies typically ask, What are the social 
changes that can be expected to accompany and follow 
successful industrialization? Implicitly or expli-
citly, some salient structural features of industrial 
societies are identified as the terminus of a path of 
progress, and resistances, tensions, and strains in 
the transformation of the pre-industrial social order 
to an industrial one are then identified and appraised. 
The degree of functional determinism, that is, the 
extent of the requiredness of elements in an indus-
trial social structure, differs from one interpreter 
to another. However, virtually no one rejects the 
notion that industrial societies share a core set 
of social structures that together provide a kind of 
extended operational definition of industrialism 
itself. This core would include the factory system 
of production, a stratification system based on a 
complex and extensive division of labor and hierarchy 
of skills, an extensive commercialization of goods 
and services and their transfer through the market, 
and an educational system capable of filling the 
various niches in the occupational and stratifica-
tion system. If one goes much beyond this list of 
degree of requiredness or variability becomes dis-
tinctly controversial. 
Now we do not reject this mode of interpretation, 
and have ourselves recently indulged in it in our 
chapters in the volume on Labor Commitment and Social 
Change in Developing Areas. However, there are two 
major difficulties in extending this analysis to all 
elements and features of social systems and to a 
prediction of a growing and enduring convergence 
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among industrial societies.82 
While "industrialization" is still assumed as an 
inevitability, societies are now recognized to be different 
in their starting positions; and different in their "tra-
jectories" or possible future historical development. Most 
importantly of all they make a major modification in their 
concept of the industrial society. 
Now this finally brings us to the question of the 
increasing similarity of industrial societies. Here 
our basic theoretical position, with readily manifest 
empirical grounding, has far-reaching interpretive 
consequences. Stated baldly, the crucial fact is 
that there is no stable and enduring terminus to the 
industrialization process. In general, the rate of 
change increases at an accelerating rate. This casts 
in doubt, to put it mildly, all the conventional 
notions that the similarities of all industrial 
societies, and all industrializing ones, will become 
virtually complete, if, like mystical Marxists or 
millenialist Christians, we are content to wait.83 
They say "We are essentially forced back to a more 
minimal picture." They now allow for greater variability in 
the means through which industrialization may be achieved 
and greater variability among end results. While still 
stressing the dangers of a "complete relativism," the con-
cept of "labor commitment" is no longer referred to. By 
admitting "industrialization" might be achieved in different 
ways, a theorist now has to specify the reasons for the 
existence of these different ways. If a theoretical 
82Ibid., pp. 1-2. 83Ibid., p. 8. 
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position admits of some variability it leaves the door ajar 
for the admission that so much variability might exist as 
to be a serious theoretical problem. If there are no com-
monly encountered social forms or social beliefs in non-
industrial areas then the utility of a concept such as "the 
traditional society" is minimal. Little justification 
exists either for using it or assuming it has a meaningful 
referent. Feldman and Moore end their article by saying, 
We have not retreated to the womb of relativistic 
particularity, for both structural and dynamic 
generalization is possible. But we do think the 
leverage provided us by comparative statics is 
rather less than had been hoped, because the place 
to stand turns out to be moving at high speed and 
very shaky in transit. It is not simply our 
deepened understanding that makes the world complex. 
It really is.84 
A year later Feldman and Moore go beyond these comments 
and make a fuller criticism of the "conventional view." 
The following is in sharp contrast to Moore's writings in 
the early 1950's and the model he and Feldman collaborated 
on in 1960. 
The essential character of the assumptions under-
lying most of the discussion of industrialization 
may be summarized by three interrelated but analyti-
cally separable positions. 
1. Economic transformation is viewed as the 
intermediate phase of a three-stage model of social 
transformation: (a) a static, pre-industrial stage, 
(b) a dynamic, transitional stage, and (c) a static 
stage following the "industrial revolution." 
84 Ibid., p. 10. 
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2. During transition, industrialism is viewed as 
an externally induced system that has a problematic 
impact on the presumably static and resistant tradi-
tional structure. Structural analysis is used to 
trace through the consequences of the new set of 
social elements, but only rarely is attention given 
to the interaction of structures in juxtaposition, 
and the resulting modification of the structure of 
industrialism. 
3. Although antecedent cultures are conceded to 
be widely diverse the process of industrialization 
is viewed as leading to a common destination. When 
the transition is complete, the required structural 
changes in social systems will have been made, the 
boxes will be "filled in," and the post-industrial 
societies, implicitly static, are explicitly 
alike .. 
When more searching questions are raised regarding 
rate and sequence of change or interaction among 
components in the course of alteration, the 
weaknesses of the three-stage model are revealed. 85 
This rejection of the conventional view is accompanied 
by a statement of general theoretical caution about con-
ceiving of society as an integrated whole. 
The chief feature of the model of society that 
most sociologists and anthropologists use is its 
emphasis on system and the strict interrelations 
of social events . This functional approach 
emphasizes the continuities, which are real and 
essential elements of social systems, and it pro-
vides a kind of check list for tracing out the con-
sequences of g iven changes. Its chief errors are 
that it tends t o obscure tensions and strains, and 
to pay relatively minor attention to the variable 
probabilities of change occurring within the 
system, and especially the growing element of 
85A. s. Feldman and w. E. Moore, Industrialization and 
Industrial i s m Conver gence and Differentiation. Reprint of 
Transaction s o f the Fifth World Congress o f Soc iology, 
Washington, D. C., 2 (September 2-8, 1962), pp. 152-53. 
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deliberate change in social systems. 86 
Having rejected stage theories and an emphasis on "func-
tional integration," it is difficult to figure out what 
Feldman and Moore are replacing their earlier views with. 
They now make continual reference to strains and tensions. 
For example, 
The effects of sequence, rates, and timing of 
change upon the trajectory of a society in the 
course of industrialization share some fundamental 
characteristics. For each of these forms of change 
are potential sources of strain and conflict to the 
extent that they violate some "natural" trajectory 
towards industrialism.87 
However, the article does not take a clear position on 
whether or not a "natural" course does in fact exist. The 
rest of the article is difficult to evaluate since no 
coherent replacement is offered for the rejected view. 
Society is said to be a "tension management" system since 
change is internal and self-perpetrating. Change was close 
to being defined as a strain or tension and industrializa-
tion is seen as a continual strain. The article has no 
conclusion and no strong theoretical assertions emerge from 
it. 
In a 1963 article, 88 Moore, writing alone, extensively 
86Ibid., p. 152. 8?Ibid., p. 159. 
88wilbert E. Moore, "Introduction: Social Change and 
Comparative Studies," International Social Science Journal, 
15 (April, 1963), pp. 519-27. 
119 
critiques stage theories and dichotomies, continues his 
post-1960 emphasis on variability among industrial societies 
and verges close to denying the existence of "industrial 
norms," i.e., there may not be a set of ideas and be-
haviors which are uniquely associated with industrializa-
tion. 
In a 1964 article that appeared in Chapter 23 in the 
Handbook of Modern Sociology, Moore takes a middle position. 
He repeats his criticism of the conventional view and goes 
through the major middle level generalizations about "de-
velopment." He talks about Clark's hypothesis of a shift 
from primary to tertiary services, Engel's law of consump-
tion, Matthews on population, the relation between urbani-
zation and industrialization, the effects of migration on 
city growth and the role of kinship. Earlier in this thesis 
evidence on the compatibility of kinship and industriali-
zation was reviewed. Moore's comments on this latter point 
are illustrative of his middle position. He shows that he 
knows what the evidence is and then takes a middle position 
seeking to reconcile the conventional view with more recent 
empirical findings. In general, this compromise is retained 
throughout the article. 
Though reliable evidence is lacking, it appears 
proper to speculate that the initial impact of 
modernization on extended kinship structures is much 
more severe than the long-range effect. The develop-
ment of easy transportation and communication may 
reduce the significance of geographical separation 
of nuclear units, and the kinship system itself may 
accommodate to the social inequality of its single 
familial units. This is clearly the case in the 
contemporary United States.89 
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Moore's 1964 article on "The Adaptation of African 
Labor Systems to Social Change" is not as abstract as pre-
vious writings in the late 1950's and early 1960's. It is 
a decent review of empirical studies of African social 
change. Moore again adopts a half-way position. He still 
works within the conventional view but no longer exclusively 
believes in it. For example, he recognizes that "The 
migrant labor system appears as the most economic choice 
which the African can make. 
lowing this he says, 
1190 Yet immediately fol-
A reasoned guess, however, is that the seeming 
stability of this structured compromise between 
divergent economic systems is spurious. 11 If this 
system provides a sort of statistical equilibrium 
it does not follow that it produces anything like 
a stable social equilibrium. Native labor migra-
tion serves as a bridge between rigid and other-
wise incompatible types of social restraint .. 
The restraints ... appear to be subject to 
pressure that may lead to their collapse. 11 91 
89wilbert E. Moore, 11 Social Aspects of Economic De-
velopment,11 Chapter 23 of Robert E. L. Faris' Handbook of 
Modern Sociology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, pp. 882-
911. Quote p. 904. 
90wilbert E. Moore, "The Adaptation of African Labor 
Systems to Social Change, 11 Chapter 13 of Melville J. 
Hershovits and Mitchell Harwitz, Economic Transition in 
Africa, Great Britain: Northwestern University Press, 
1964, p. 284. 
9lrbid., p. 284. 
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He footnotes his own writings from 1946 as support for this 
view. That is, he quotes himself from eighteen years ago. 
Factually he recognizes and is aware of the economic 
rationality underlying migrant labor systems, but still does 
not believe the rationality conceptually. Another example 
is, 
By implication, all or most forms of economic 
organization and labor systems not in conformity 
with the norms and patterns of the older industrial 
economies are "transitional." This is a view that 
some scholars concerned with Africa would reject. 
They argue that the viable strength of indigenous 
social systems is such that the future forms of 
African economies will represent a mutual adapta-
tion between the demands of the commercial-
industrial system and the variable social systems 
found in pre-modern and contemporary African 
societies. 
The position may have both theoretical and factual 
support. It seems quite clear that the literature of 
economic development has fairly consistently under-
played the organizational flexibility and adaptability 
of the commercial-industrial system. At the same 
time, at least some students of contemporary Africa 
argue that such systems as that of migratory labor 
represent stable adaptations between divergent 
systems. The very considerable development of wage-
labor patterns, whether seasonal or settled, in the 
commercialized agricultural undertakings established 
by native farmers lends some further support to the 
view that the "stabilized sector" may not only in-
clude agriculture, but include it in ways somewhat 
alien to "Western" conceptions. It remains true that 
there is a labor market more or less corresponding 
to industrial economic patterns. Its exact dimen-
sions are difficult to assess, and the significance of 
the deviations and their stability are disputed.92 
92Ibid., p. 287. 
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To speak in terms of "transitional" patterns is another 
way of talking about a shift from traditional to modern. 
Yet Moore also clearly recognizes that in the African 
literature a strong body of evidence has accumulated to deny 
that these societies are "traditional" in conventional terms 
or that industrialization when or if it comes will be 
similar to Western experiences. 
Aside from a few factual errors such as the repeated 
comment that rural areas are over-populated and suffer 
under-employment, the article is good and raises important 
questions. Moore responds to the evidence as it comes in. 
The central questions become focused: What is the varia-
bility among pre-industrial societies? What are the ranges 
of ideas and behavior compatible with rationalized produc-
tion methods? And how many changes will non-Western coun-
tries have to make to become industrial? We have reached a 
point in American sociology where these questions have be-
come problematical and we search for new answers since older 
ones are discredited. 
In a 1968 article on "Developmental Changes in Urban 
Industrial Societies" Moore writes 
It is only proper to note here that the dynamic 
appraisal of societies was never abandoned by those 
social scientists who were heirs to the Marxist 
tradition, and that tradition has been revived, re-
vised, and refined in such recent works as those of 
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Coser (1956) and Dahrendorf (1959) • 93 
After complimenting what is informally called the "conflict 
school" in sociology, he goes on to say 
The incorporation of social development into the 
main body of social theory has involved several 
related changes in assumptions and conceptual 
models. 
The first necessary change is the rejection, as 
the exclusive model for social analysis, of the 
conception of society as a self-equilibrating 
system. Interdependence and persistence of pat-
terns are indeed demonstrable, and examples of 
restoration of prior order, after disturbances, 
can be identified. Yet this conceptual model must 
treat change as extrinsic and exceptional, and 
even internal deviance or dysfunctions are diffi-
cult to countenance.94 
This is a critique of functionalism that its critics 
have been making for many years. It is significant that 
Moore has come to use the same formulas. In this article 
he again reiterates the proposal that society is best viewed 
as a tension management system. Instead of using the con-
cept of "modernization" he now uses the words "developmental 
change." 
This commentary on Moore is not intended as an analysis 
of his writings per se. Rather, the focus here is on "the 
93wilbert E. Moore, "Developmental Change in Urban 
Industrial Societies," in Perspectives in Developmental 
Change, Art Gallaher, Jr. (ed.), Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1968, pp. 201-05. Quote from pp. 202-03. 
94Ibid., pp. 203-04. 
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·conventional view," the evidence denying it and how opinions 
on it have changed over time. This writer believes that its 
rejection is still too recent to be fully appreciated by 
sociologists and other concerned parties. In Moore 1 s 
writings we can cite 1960 as a turning point. We can even 
see specific evidence, e.g., Udy 1 s finding of bureaucratic-
rationalistic norms among his "traditional societies," that 
impressed Moore and that he mentions in later articles. 
Moore now seems to be in a middle position, recognizing 
that an older perspective has been discredited, but still 
using it since nothing has replaced it. Any impartial ob-
server reading through the evidence presented here and then 
looking at theoretical claims of the conventional paradigm 
would probably agree (a) that Moore has changed his views 
over time and (b) the older paradigm has not been robust 
enough to account for empirical evidence as we know it. 
y 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ACHIEVEMENT AND ASCRIPTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to narrow the theoreti-
cal discussion and explain why a particular hypothesis was 
chosen to research. The "conventional view" comes close to 
being a theory in the usual sense of a delimited set of 
concepts bound in a coordinated way; but a better descrip-
tion of it is to label it a paradigm in Kuhn's terminology. 
It has been a pervasive idea system which permeated the 
literature on social change. No single author has listed 
its contents or given a short capsule summary, and, almost 
by definition, its contents are not capable of being 
exhaustively listed. A large amount of experience in the 
philosophy of science concludes that an amorphous paradigm 
cannot be decisively refuted using the "critical experi-
ment." However, the customary format for dissertations is 
modeled on this type of refutation. That is, a single 
hypothesis is taken as representative of a theoretical per-
spective and the evaluation of that perspective is dependent 
upon the outcome of the hypotheses's test; This disserta-
tion follows that mode of argument since it is comfortable 
and familiar to the social sciences and since it is a sound 
logical procedure. The theoretical perspective is the 
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conventional view and the major hypothesis tested in this 
dissertation is the statement that achievement charac-
terizes industrial peoples and ascription characterizes 
non-industrial peoples. 
The first step in hypothesis testing is to show that 
the hypothesis is derivative from the theoretical perspec-
tive. We have already seen this in Chapter One and in 
Moore's writings. Another example is from Ali. 1 
Having made these three general points, I should 
try to summarize what I think are the traditional 
attitudes of workers and then compare them with the 
attitudes found in highly industrialized societies. 
I want to draw attention to three characteristics of 
traditional societies in South-East Asia. Firstly, 
the status of a person is an ascribed status, not 
an achievement one. In other words the norms of a 
traditional society are ascription norms. The second 
characteristic, to use the terms popularised by 
Talcott Parsons, is particularism, and the third, 
diffuseness. I will try to explain what I mean by 
these three terms. 
The words "achievement" and "ascription" are fre-
quently used in discussions on social change. It is 
important . to realize the issues that underlie their at times 
awkward sounding usage. All groups of men place restric-
tions on who can do what behavior. For example, not every-
body is allowed to be a police chief. The persons who 
occupy that job are selected because they have particular 
1Aamir Ali, "Economic Development and the Traditional 
Attitudes of Workers," International Institute of Labour 
Studies, Reprint Series No. 4, Geneva: 1964, p. 81. 
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properties which most people in the general population do 
not have. And so it is with all jobs, including unskilled 
manual labor. Society ,places many restrictions on indivi-
dual behavior. Each job can be viewed as the possession of 
a set of social behavior, i.e., the legal ability to per-
form a certain set of behaviors. Since many of these be-
haviors influence the lives of other people a close scrutiny 
is usually kept by the affected people on who is given 
access to influence. Criteria become established to decide 
which persons shall have which job. The concepts of 
"ascription" and "achievement" represent a long established 
way of describing these criteria in general terms. The 
distinction between the two is hazy at the middle but 
basically it is dichotomy between what a person is and what 
he does. The "is" includes age, sex, birth order, height, 
family background, college attended, and other social facts 
which are not readily changeable by the individual. Cri-
teria requiring these events are usually called "ascribed." 
That is, they are ascribed to the individual and he does not 
have the legal or biological ability to change them. The 
"does" includes work experience, educational attainment, 
regional location, friends and other events which the indi-
vidual has more control over and can presumably alter. 
Criteria requiring events of these kind for access to a 
social position are usually called "achieved." 
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This distinction is important since it enables a 
theorist to describe how a society is organized and what 
life experiences its members will have. Repeated through-
out the conventional view is the assertion that achieved 
criteria are emphasized in industrial societies and ascribed 
criteria are emphasized in non-industrial societies. 
The distinction is usually credited to the anthro-
pologist Ralph Linton. In his 1936 book, The Study of Man, 
he spent a chapter describing an "ascribed status." 
Ascribed statuses are those which are assigned to 
individuals without reference to their innate 
differences or abilities. They can be predicted 
and trained for from the moment of birth .... 
The majority of the statuses in all social systems 
are of the ascribed type and those which take 
care of the ordinary day-to-day business of living 
are practically always of this type. 2 
As a basic distinction it is intuitively clear. This 
clarity is one reason why there has been so little theoreti-
cal3 or empirical examination of it. The series of quotes 
cited in the first chapter of this thesis are familiar to 
sociologists since they or their facsimiles are commonly 
2Ralph Linton, The Study of Man, New York: D. 
Appleton-Century Co., 1936, p. 115. 
3Theoretical controversy on "ascription" is almost 
nonexistent. For example, see the discussion between Leo F. 
Schnore, "Social Mobility in Demographic Perspective," 
American Sociological Review, 26 (June, 1961), pp. 411-14, 
and Irving S. Foladaire, "A Clarification of 'Ascribed 
Status' and 'Achieved Status,'" Sociological Quarterly, 
10 (Winter, 1969), pp. 53-61. 
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encountered. As those quotes indicate, "ascription" has a 
broad meaning. It is used as a synonym for kinship and 
family ties, and it is also used to characterize a fixed, 
or rigid social structure in which no substantial indivi-
dual social mobility occurs. The traditional society is 
said to be ascriptive. By this is meant, it has a division 
of labor based primarily on sex and age, a social organi-
zation in which the family role is the most important social 
role, and a rigid, hierarchial political authority. In 
contrast, the individual society is presumably organized on 
achievement criteria because its highly specialized division 
of labor requires technical knowledge and its emphasis on 
occupational mobility requires a mobile population willing 
to disrupt family ties and geographical loyalty. It has 
been customary to say that achievement orientations are 
necessary to industrial society, i.e., achievement motiva-
tions exist at higher levels of technological development. 
For example, it is commonly believed that family obli-
gations hinder small businessmen in African countries be-
cause they are a drain on his economic resources and prevent 
rational utilization of his capital. The person in this 
example is usually called an "entrepreneur" or "innovator" 
to indicate his behavior is unusual or different for his 
culture. Family obligations are seen as "ascriptive" ties 
which retard economic development. Much theoretical specu-
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lation exists about the person's unusual or peculiar psy-
chological motivations. 
This is an image familiar to most readers of books on 
social change and economic development. The image is easy 
to understand and fits the implicit assumptions prevalent 
in the discipline about urban-industrial societies and rural 
non-industrial societies. Because the image is familiar to 
us, because it is repeated by our peers in books and con-
versations, because it fits the assumptions of our disci-
pline and the foreign policies of our government, we believe 
it and accept it as fact. To critically examine this image 
and to evaluate its empirical adequacy is thus not simply 
the examination of an idea but rather it becomes an effort 
to change our understanding of reality. 
Examine the following quotes carefully since the views 
they represent are what this thesis purports to empiri-
cally test. 
As I have shown elsewhere, we may characterize 
societies at different levels of economic develop-
ment by describing them in terms of contrasting 
pairs of pattern variables as these were defined 
by Talcott Parsons. Economic development may then 
be considered as being associated with a trans-
formation of social behavior from a form which in 
its economically relevant aspects it is oriented 
towards ascription, particularism and functional 
diffuseness to a form of social behavior oriented 
towards achievement, universalism, and functional 
specificity. In somewhat different terms this 
may be stated by saying that a society on a low 
level of economic development is characterized in 
the main by the following features: Economic roles 
are distributed on the basis of what status a per-
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son has rather than whether he has shown the neces-
sary competence to fill the role; and economic 
relations in general, for example, exchanges of 
goods and services, are based often on traditionally 
prescribed and sanctioned acts and performances 
rather than on attempts to arrive at a balancing of 
values through bargaining or the use of a price 
mechanism. (An example of the principle of 
ascription in the realm of a system of exchanges is 
the medieval doctrine of just price.) But in the 
little advanced country the attainment of and 
selection for certain economic roles is based 
merely on ascription rather than achievement; the 
overall pattern of distribution of roles between 
classes of the society is particularistic rather 
than universalistic. Mobility is difficult or, 
in extreme cases, absent, both between social 
groups, different professions, and often also 
between different localities.4 
Hoselitz repeats these same views in 1963. 
Let us now return to the pattern variables. The 
achievement-ascription dichotomy is closely related 
to, though not identical with, the contrast between 
status-oriented and contract oriented societies. 
If we apply this dichotomy to economic objects, we 
find that, in a society in which ascription is the 
norm, economic roles are distributed ideally on the 
basis of who a person is rather than of what he can 
do. A practical example of a society based on 
ascription would be an "ideal" caste system, in 
which each caste is in full control of a certain 
occupation--that is, where only members of a 
specific caste are admitted to that occupation. Now 
the caste system--though it may have come close to 
this ideal in some localities, at certain times--has 
never, as a whole, exhibited fully ascriptive 
features. But it is quite clear, from the example 
given, that, in a society in which economic roles 
are assigned on the basis of status or ascription, 
social mobility is made difficult, and social 
4Bert F. Hoselitz, "A Sociological Approach to Economic 
Development," reprinted from Bert F. Hoselitz, "A Sociologi-
cal Approach to Economic Development," Atti del Congresso 
Internazionale di Studio sul Problema dell Aree Arretrate, 
Milan, 1955. 
change, to the extent to which it depends upon 
mobility, is severely impeded. 
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However, the transitions from allocating economic 
roles according to a system of ascription to 
assigning them on a basis of achievement, and the 
replacement of functionally diffuse by functuionally 
specific norms for the definition of economic tasks, 
appear to have occurred in all cases of successful 
modernization. 
We may conceive of the little community as a set of 
institutionalized relationships, among persons, 
based primarily on ascriptive characteristics. The 
cohesion and compactness of the small community 
are enhanced because economic roles are tied to 
ascriptive status, and because, even where there 
is a considerable degree of specificity in dif-
ferent economic roles (as, for example, in the 
Indian village), ascriptive norms provide a stability 
and internal rigidity that render change from within 
exceedingly difficult. Only the breakup of the small 
community, or its infiltration from the outside, 
tends to reduce the significance of ascription in 
the distribution of economic (and other, e.g., 
political or deference) roles.5 
Psychological Study of Achievement 
The above statements contain the same lack of empirical 
documentation that characterize most expositions of con-
ventional ideas. In general, the empirical evidence 
directly referring to the concepts of ascription and 
5Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, Industriali-
zation and' Society, North American Conference on the Social 
Implications of Industrialization and Technological Change. 
Chicago, 1960, pp. 17-19. 
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achievement is not extensive. This distinction was one of 
Parsons' and Levy's pattern variables and a small literature 
exists on possible ways of measuring the pattern vari-
ables.6 This literature is less than impressive. When 
measured adequately, the variables were not uni-dimensional. 
For example, Williams was not able to measure universalism-
particularism and achievement-ascription, and Scarr pulled 
ten different factors out of a set of scales purporting to 
measure universalism-particularism. Measurement procedures 
in this area have not progressed beyond Stouffer's original 
suggestions in 1949, and a field worker literally must begin 
from scratch. 
Another, and larger body of literature exists on 
6samuel A. Stouffer, "An Analysis of Conflicting Social 
Norms," American Sociological Review, 14 (December, 1949), 
pp. 707-17. Jerome Laulicht, "Ro l e Conflict, The Pattern 
Variable Theory, and Scalogram Analysis," Social Forces, 
33 (March, 1955), pp. 250-54. Elliot G. Mishler, "Per-
sonality Characteristics and the Resolution of Role Con-
flicts," Public Opinion Quarterly, 17 (Spring, 1953), pp. 
115-35. Robin M. Williams, Jr., "Friendship and Social 
Values in a Suburban Community: An Exploratory Study," 
The Pacific Sociological Review, 2 (Spring, 1959), pp. 3-10. 
Louis R. Dean, "The Pattern Variables: Some Empirical 
Operation," American Sociological Review, 26 (February, 
1961), pp. 80-90. Allen D. Grimshaw, "Specification of 
Boundaries of Constructed Types through Use of the Pattern 
Variable," Sociological Quarterly, 3 (July, 1962), pp. 179-
94. Harry A. Scarr, "Measures o f Particularism," 
Sociometry, 27 (December, 1964), pp. 413-32. Peter Park, 
"Measurement of the Pattern Variables," Sociometry, 30 
(June, 1967), pp. 187-98. 
134 
achievement as a psychological motivation. McClelland's 
The Achieving Society7 is a major work in this latter body 
and its importance warrants extended comment. It opens in 
general terms with grand theories of social change, e.g., 
Toynbee and Spengler, lacks a sustained examination of 
contemporary conditions in non-Western countries and does 
not justify the pertinence of a psychological emphasis on 
economic motivation. The contrast between Myrdal's Asian 
Drama8 and McClelland's opening chapter makes clear what 
this writer means by "lacks a sustained examination of con-
temporary conditions." The opening chapter has neither a 
general examination of economic growth nor a critique of 
"achievement" as a psychological need. The book is a long 
series of empirical studies which purport to substantiate 
McClelland's thesis that peoples with high need achievement 
have been and will be more economically advanced. 
However, these claims are difficult to believe. For 
example, this writer simply does not believe that a coun-
try's economic growth can be predicted from a content 
analysis of twenty-one children's books. No evidence is 
presented as to who reads the books or how much influence 
7oavid C. McClelland, The Achieving Society, New York: 
The Free Press, 1961. 
8Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama--An Inquiry into the 
Poverty of Nations, New York: Random House, 1968. 
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such books have on later behavior. The connection is too 
tenuous, especially when the relationship is posited for all 
geographical areas throughout all historical periods. The 
book ends by suggesting "A General Plan for Accelerating 
Economic Growth" which essentially says that the problem of 
increasing economic development can be solved by subcon-
tracting to American private enterprise since it has high 
entrepreneurial motivations. The Arabian-American 
Company's (ARAMCO) oil operation in Saudi Arabia is cited 
as an example. McClelland's suggestion is so utterly out of 
touch with the factual situation that it cannot be taken 
seriously, except as it reflects the relationship between 
Harvard University and American capitalism. A reading of 
Myrdal's Asian Drama, documents of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 9 any of the 
United Nations World Economic Surveys, 10 or the growing 
literature on imperialism present the reality of interna-
tional economic growth as serious analysts debate its 
9For example see Raul Prebisch, Towards a New Trade 
Policy for Development: Report by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
New York: United Nations, 1964. 
10see The Capital Development Needs of the Less De-
veloped Countries, New York: United Nations, 1962. 
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. 11 issues. 
This critical view of McClelland is emphasized despite 
the fact that his evidence supports the specific theoreti-
cal hypothesis that this thesis tests. McClelland tested 
for the relationship between achievement-ascription and 
economic growth. He writes, 
All sociological theorists agree that achieved 
status distinctions should be more frequent in 
rapidly growing economies, whereas ascribed 
status distinctions should be more common in 
slowly developing societies. However, the re-
sults do not strongly confirm the prediction: at 
both time periods achieved status distinctions 
were more common in stories from the rapidly 
developing economies. 
But what about ascribed status? Is it mentioned 
less often in the mor e rapidly developing econo-
mies? It has the advantage of not being positively 
or negatively associated either with n Achievement 
scores or with the achieved status category. Un-
fortunately it shows no relationship with economic 
development either. In 1925 it appeared slightly 
less often in stories from the more rapidly de-
veloping economies, as predicted, but in 1950 it 
showed just the reverse trend. 
These results are rather puzzling in the light 
of the widespread agreement among sociologists as 
to the importance of these two changes in social 
structure for the "modernization" of society. 
. .. . . . 
The countries can be reclassified in terms of level 
11For example, see Paul A. Baran's The Political 
Economy of Growth, Monthly Review Inc., 1957, for a classic 
analysis of the effect of foreign private enterprise. 
Baran is not cited in The Achieving Society. 
of economic development rather than in terms of 
rate of gain. Do the wealthy industrialized 
countries in 1950 show more instances of achieved 
status and fewer instances of ascribed status in 
their readers than the backward underdeveloped 
countries? The answer is a clear "no"~ if any-
thing, the nonindustrialized countries show a 
slightly higher emphasis on achieved status. The 
same comparison made also in 1925 reveals no 
difference.12 
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And again, 
In examining the results of the value analysis 
as a whole, one gets the impression that a number 
of well-known and eminently reasonable theories 
about economic development did not come off par-
ticularly well. Thus the more successful countries 
economically speaking did not stress ascribed 
status less, affective neutrality more, man's 
ability to conquer nature more, the importance of 
satisfying material needs, or perhaps even economic 
rationality or planning. In all of these cases, as 
in the case of ascribed status, there is no evidence 
that the factor accompanies rather than precedes 
economic development and not much comfort in the 
thought that the readers must not be measuring the 
variable in question very we11.13 
In the same psychological tradition, studies using the 
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a cartoon projective test, 
to measure achievement motivation have frequently been 
attempted. This literature is marked by internal debate. 14 
12McClelland, The Achieving Society, 
~-
cit., 
pp. 183-84. 
13McClelland, The Achieving Society, 
~-
cit., 
pp. 190-91. 
14John Scanzoni, "Socialization, n Achievement, and 
Achievement Values," American Sociolog1cal Review, 32 (June, 
1967). Joseph A. Kahl, "Some Measurements of Achievement 
Orientation," The American Journal of Sociology, 70 (May, 
1965). 
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For example, the April 1968 issue of the American Sociologi-
cal Review15 contains critiques of Scanzoni's article by 
Loh, Crockett and Nun. The issues involve the dimen-
sionality of~ Achievement, and its relation to socializa-
tion, occupational values, and economic development. To the 
uninitiated the debate is confusing since it goes beyond 
factual problems and hinges on "what did McClelland really 
mean" kind of questions. 
In addition to internal debate, this literature also 
lacks definitive research findings. 16 That is, theoretical 
work on achievement motivation does not satisfactorily 
account for results contrary to expected findings. The 
phenomena is probably too complex for the set of concepts 
used. To illustrate, here is Crockett's abstract. 
This study examines the influence of strength of 
achievement motive on intergenerational occupa-
tional mobility in the United States. Atkinson's 
theory of achievement motivation, shown to be rele-
vant to the study of occupational mobility, predicts 
that strength of achievement motive--among persons 
sharing equal opportunity--will be positively asso-
ciated with upward occupational mobility and nega-
tively associated with downward occupational mobility. 
In the national sample studied, the expected results 
are clearly obtained with regard to upward mobility 
among persons reared in the lower social strata, but 
15American Sociological Review, 33 (April, 1968), 
pp. 284-91. 
16see also s. Lipset and R. Bendix's critique of the 
achievement literature in their book Social Mobility in 
Industrial Society, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1964, pp. 236 ff. 
predicted relationships are not found among persons 
reared in the middle and upper social strata. The 
hypothesis concerning strength of achievement 
motive and downward mobility is not supported. The 
results indicate the fruitfulness of considering 
personality variables in conjunction with social 
structural variables in the study of occupational 
mobility.17 
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An interaction effect exists among need achievement, 
mobility and social class origin, but the details of this 
effect are obscure. Another illustration is from Rosen who 
found that an achievement motive per se is not a sufficient 
cause of upward mobility. 
The relationship of four demographic factors--family 
size, ordinal position, mother's age, and social 
class--to the socialization process and their impact 
upon the development of achievement motivation is 
examined in a study of two independent samples of 
young boys and their mothers. The data were ob-
tained by means of a projective test, personal inter-
views, and group administered questionnaires. An 
analysis of the data indicates that these demographic 
variables are relevant to the development of achieve-
ment motivation, but their effects are complex, 
intricately interconnected with one another, and 
difficult to assess individually.18 
Cohen writes, 
Objective records of behavior are required so that 
known high achievers in all tribes can be separated 
from known low achievers on some measurable scale 
other than the standard test. Indications are 
17Harry J. Crockett, Jr., "The Achievement Motive and 
Differential Occupational Mobility in the United States," 
American Sociological Review, 27 (April, 1962), pp. 191-204. 
18Bernard C. Rosen, "Family Structure and Achievement 
Motivation," American Sociological Review, 26 (August, 
1961), pp. 574-85. 
already available that such validation procedures 
produce odd results; for instance well recognized 
progressive groups like the Chagga and Kikuyu in 
East Africa score low on need achievement.19 
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Morgan, 20 an economist, made a sympathetic review of 
the literature on achievement motivation and concluded it 
had real value although no coherent coordinated theory 
emerged from the review. Given the internal debate, its 
ambiguous research findings, a reliance on a particular 
interpretive projective test and an unclear theoretical 
link to social structure, this writer concluded that this 
would not be a suitable literature in which to carry out 
research on the empirical adequacy of the conventional view. 
The Empirical Literature on Achievement-Ascription 
In this writer's knowledge, the single best theoretical 
discussion of ascription and achievement is made by M. G. 
Smith, an anthropologist. 21 He extensively discusses the 
distinction as part of a general theoretical critique on 
19Ronald Cohen, "Research Directions in Political 
Anthropology," in Norman N. Miller (ed.), Research in Rural 
Africa, Michigan State University, African Studies Center, 
1968, p. 28. 
20James N. Morgan, "The Achievement Motive and Economic 
Behavior," Economic Development and Cultural Chane, 
12 (April, 1964 , pp. 243-67. 
21M. G. Smith, "Pre-Industrial Stratification Systems," 
in Neil J. Smelser and Seymour M. Lipset (eds.), Social 
Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, Chicago: 
Adline, 1966, pp. 141-76. 
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standard sociological assumptions about stratification. 
First he raises the question as to whether it is more im-
portant to study the empirical distribution of a stratifi-
cation system or the principles which produce it, and he 
sides with the latter study. "Achievement" and "ascription" 
are concepts tapping into important variations among 
stratification principles. Smith analyzes the assertion 
that achievement characterizes industrial social systems 
and ascription characterizes non-industrial systems, and 
treats the assertion as a theoretical by-product of basic 
assumptions about stratification. He builds two separate 
lines of evidence to deny (a) that all societies exhibit 
stratification and (b) all members of a family have the same 
status. After developing these lines of evidence he writes, 
It is clear that many societies exhibit a strati-
fication which differentiates family members as well 
as families. Thus, neither of the two general 
assumptions on which the functionalist theory of 
stratification rests are empirically valid. Neither 
is stratification universal, nor are families uni-
versally exempted from it. 
I 
If we ask why, given their inconsistency, these 
postulates of universal stratification and the un-
stratified family are combined, the answer seems to 
be that on this basis it is easy to distinguish dif-
ferent types of stratification system by reference 
to the family. The reasoning might be summarized as 
follows: (1) All societies are stratified. (2) In 
all societies, families are homogeneous units of 
status placement~ (3) Stratification systems differ 
in the ways they treat families; some restrict 
opportunities to a limited number of families, others 
distribute them to all member-families equally. 
Systems of the first type are ascriptive and parti-
cularistic, while those of the second stress achieve-
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ment and universalistic criteria. (4) Since systems 
of both types exhibit both stratification and familial 
status unity, a single general theory is applicable 
to all. 
Ethnographic data show that these assumptions, and 
the theory that seeks to justify them, are invalid. 
The "universal necessities" imposed by functional 
prerequisites are simple misapprehensions. If my 
argument holds, the critical sources of difficulty for 
this functional theory are twofold: first it seeks 
to explain structure by function, when the reverse is 
the wiser procedure. Structures are highly differen-
tiated and complex, while functions tend to be 
generalized and rather abstract. Just as Malinowski 
failed adequately to account for the known range of 
variation in the family by his very general functional 
theory of the family, so it is probably impossible to 
"explain" the known variety of social structures by a 
single functional theory of stratification. Secondly, 
in seeking universality, this theory creates diffi-
culties for itself by regarding any set of observable 
inequalities in the distribution of advantage as 
stratification, irrespective of the mode of their 
institutionalization. Given this, the errors regarding 
relations between family and stratification seem 
inevitable. But in segmentary lineages, which are 
political structures despite their familial com-
ponents, and in age-set systems, though positions of 
unequal advantage and responsibility are general, the 
mode of their institutionalization involves an 
automatic serial rotation of these positions, since 
the modal life-cycle and life-chances are equal and 
standardized. Stratification consists in institu-
tionalized differentiations of access to positions 
of differing advantage, rather than in the mere fact 
of social differentiation.22 
In addition to showing inadequacies in standard strati-
fication assumptions Smith also attempts to show that the 
stability of a society is more related to its political 
structure than to either an achievement or ascriptive 
22 Ibid., pp. 159-60. 
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assignment of status. He does this by showing the exis-
tence of both stable and unstable societies with a similar 
emphasis on achievement-ascription. He says that many 
societies do not place emphasis on one or the other but 
combine these principles. He uses the following examples in 
discussing stable stratification systems with a mixed 
emphasis. 
This baronial competition has numerous parallels 
in other intermediate societies. In India, Kshatriyas 
were rivals or allies; in Buganda, Anuak, Zulu, Swazi, 
etc., royals fought for the throne while eligible 
commoners, recruited restrictively, competed for 
lesser offices open to them. Among the Hausa-Fulani, 
royals competed for the throne, noble lineages for 
reserved office, clerics for clerical office, slaves 
and eunuchs for theirs also. In Japan, daimyo were 
recruited mainly from daimyo and samurai competed 
with samurai. We cannot simply write off these com-
binations of restriction and competition as transi-
tional phenomena, as Nadel would have us do. The 
combination of competitive achievement and restricted 
eligibility is too variable and widespread to be 
glossed over lightly. Examination may show that it is 
in one form or another a universal feature of all 
stratification systems. Certainly such mixed systems 
vary widely in their particulars, and merit detailed 
study. Even modern industrial societies whose 
ideologies explicitly stress universalistic and 
achievement orientations exhibit restrictive parti-
cularisms which, despite their educational and 
financial bases, effectively preserve racial and 
social inequalities. Without this structured con-
trast with ideology, the conflicting interpretations 
of American stratification by such writers as 
Parsons, Mills and Warner are incomprehensible. 23 
Such combined societies exist and have existed, been 
industrial and not been. Smith's work derives the 
23Ibid., pp. 168-69. 
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hypothesis this thesis is testing from stratification as-
sumptions, assumptions which he shows to be incorrect, and 
then sets limitations on the utility of the distinction by 
showing the empirical frequency of mixed cases. Smith's 
observations deserve a wider sociological audience than 
they have received. At the minimum, they are clearly in-
compatible with the conventional view's treatment of the 
issues embodied in the distinction between ascription and 
achievement. 
Empirical studies of these topics seem rare. This view 
is corroborated by Robert Marsh. "In reply to your ques-
tions, I fear I cannot be very helpful because, of Parsons' 
pattern-variables the one concerned with ascription-
achievement has almost never been measured and empirically 
studied. 1124 Marsh made one of the few empirical studies of 
ascription and achievement. Using family background as an 
indicator of ascription and social mobility as an indicator 
of achievement, he compared officials in pre-industrial 
China to contemporary American engineers. Holding occupa-
tional demand constant, he found the relation between 
father's status and son's mobility to be basically the same 
in each society. He suggests that the presumed "openness'' 
of American society is due to a greater occupational demand 
24Robert M. Marsh, personal communication, November 26, 
1968. 
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rather than a unique cultural emphasis. 25 
Goode complained that he had not been able to locate 
an adequate empirical study of even the American popula-
tion ' s commitment to the idea of evaluation by achieve-
ment.26 He did so in the context of an article entitled 
"The Protection of the Inept." In his opening comments he 
says, 
We are assured that we live in an achievement-
oriented society, and the norm is to place indi-
viduals in their occupations by merit. Never-
theless, the inquiries of sociologists and psy-
chologists demon~trate that as the child passes 
through the successive gateways to higher education, 
the cumulative effect of class, race, sex, and 
other readily ascribed traits grows rather than 
lessens. For example, lower class or Negro 
children who could perform well by comparison with 
their more advantaged peers in the first few 
grades drop farther and farther behind. The gap 
between them widens.27 
And his article considers the following issues: 
1. Does the evidence suggest there is a wide-
spread pattern of protecting the less competent? 
2. In supposedly achievement-oriented societies, 
is this protection merely an evasion of widely 
accepted achievement norms, i.e., is it "real," 
as contrasted with "ideal," behavior, or do people 
in fact accept many norms contrary to achievement? 
25Robert M. Marsh, "Values, Demand and Social Mo-
bility," American Sociological Review, 28 (August, 1963); 
also Robert M. Marsh, The Mandar i ns: The Circulation of 
Elites in China 1600-1900, Glenco, Ill.: The F ree Press, 
1961. 
26william J. Goode, "The Protection of the Inept," 
American Sociological Review, 32 (February, 1967), pp. 5-19. 
27Ibid., p. 5. 
3. What are the specific or general processes and 
patterns protecting the less able? 
4. Presumably, different social structures handle 
the problem of ineptitude differently. What con-
sequences flow from these differences?28 
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His conclusions are speculative and justified by 
illustrative evidence rather than data but he said, yes, 
there is a widespread pattern of protecting the incompetent 
and that people do in fact accept many norms contrary to 
achievement. Good says we have more rhetoric than reality 
in assertions that industrial societies are characterized by 
an achievement emphasis. It is probable that a stronger 
argument can be made. For example, a full exposition of 
discrimination by sex shows that this discrimination is 
widespread throughout all sectors of American society, 
noticeably so in the professions. Evidence like Geode's, 
and like statistical facts on sexual occupational discrimi-
nation, present a picture of American society different from 
that taught in introductory sociology books. Although this 
thesis does not build the case, it is nevertheless a fact 
that a strong case can be built to show that industrial 
societies are not necessarily achievement oriented. 
Goldschmidt describes three Northern California Indian 
tribes, the Yurok, Karok and Hupa, with a class system based 
28Ibid., p. 6. 
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on possession of private property. 29 They combined a lack 
of political centralization with an individual acquisitive-
ness unknown in other California tribes. They both 
practiced slavery as a payment of financial debt and would 
shoot other tribe members who poached on their land. They 
placed a high public emphasis on achieving and possessed a 
culture, according to Goldschmidt, which approximated the 
sixteenth century capitalism of Weber's protestant ethic. 
Zurcher, using the Stouffer-Toby Role Conflict Scale, 
found Mexican bank employees more concerned with harmonious 
social ties than American employees, who were more concerned 
with office efficiency. 30 It should be noted that the dif-
ference had little effect on their adjustment to work in 
the rational efficient work atmosphere of the bank. 
Porter 31 and Form and Geschwender, 32 in critiques of 
the social mobility literature referred to evidence showing 
29walter Goldschmidt, "Ethics and the Structure of 
Society: An Ethnological Contribution to the Sociology of 
Knowledge, 11 American Anthropologist, 53 (October-December, 
1951), pp. 506-24. 
30Louis A. Zurcher, et al., "Value Orientation, Role 
Conflict and Alienation fromWork: A Cross-Cultural Study," 
American Sociological Review, 30 (August, 1965), pp. 539-48. 
31John Porter, "The Future of Upward Mobility," 
American Sociological Review, 33 (February, 1968), pp. 5-19. 
32william H. Form and James A. Geschwender, 11 Social Re-
ference Basis of Job Satisfaction: The Case of Manual 
Workers," American Sociological Review, 27 (April, 1962), 
pp. 228-37. 
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an absence of achievement motivation on the part of American 
workers and said the assumption that an achievement ethos 
pervades American society should be revised. 
Silberman's study of Meiji bureaucracy33 found a 
"certain degree of acceptance" of achievement norms before 
1868 and a large degree of acceptance by 1873. After 1783 
the Japanese governmental bureaucracy could be described in 
rational Weberian terms. He suggests that a combination of 
ascription and achievement is the optimal meld for economic 
growth since it maximizes essential factors such as politi-
cal experience and technical knowledge. 
Marsh, in his book, Comparative Sociology, writes "In 
all societies--regardless of degree of differentiation--
major, relatively full-time, functionally significant roles 
(e.g., occupations) are evaluated according to the degree of 
knowledge or responsibility required of the performer. The 
use of this common criterion in all societies may explain 
the hierarchy described above."3 4 The "hierarchy" mentioned 
above is the similarity in occupational rankings that has 
33Bernard s. Silberman, "Criteria for Recruitment and 
Success in the Japanese Bureaucracy, 1868-1900: 'Tradi-
tional' and 'Modern' Criteria for Advancement," Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 14 (January, 1966), 
pp. 158-73. 
3 4Robert M. Marsh, Comparative Sociology , New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967, p. 184. 
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been found across societies. 35 This line of research was 
stimulated by Inkeles and Rossi in the context of a study of 
industrial society. They showed that people in six dif-
ferent industrial countries ranked occupations in a similar 
way, and suggested that the high correlations might reflect 
"a relatively invariable hierarchy of prestige associated 
with the industrial system 11 36 despite cultural differences 
among the countries. In other words, the authors presented 
an empirical finding and a theoretical explanation for it. 
That explanation was congruent with the "conventional view" 
35Alex Inkeles and Peter H. Rossi, "National Compari-
sons of Occupational Prestige," American Journal of Socio-
~, 61 (January, 1956), pp. 329-39; Edward A. Tiryakian, 
"The Prestige Evaluation of Occupations in an Underdeveloped 
Country," American Journal of Sociology , 63 (January, 1958), 
pp. 390-99; Charles E. Ramsey and Robert J. Smith, "Japanese 
and American Perceptions of Occupations," American Journal 
of Sociology, 65 (March, ~960), pp. 475-82; E. Murray 
Thomas, rtReinspecting a Structural Position on Occupation 
Prestige," American Journal of Sociology, 67 (March, 1962), 
pp. 561-65; Kaare Svalastoga, Prestige Class and Mobility, 
Toronto: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1959, pp. 62-67 and 79-
108, esp. the tables on pp. 91 and 108; David M. Lewis and 
Archibald O. Haller, "Rural-Urban Differences in Pre-
Industrial and Industrial Evaluations of Occupations by 
Japanese Adolescent Boys," Rural Sociology, 29 (September, 
1964), pp. 324-29; Archibaldo. Haller and David M. Lewis, 
"The Hypothesis of Intersocietal Similarity in Occupational 
Prestige Hierarchies," American Journal of Sociology, 72 
(September, 1966), pp. 210-16; J. Michael Armer, "Inter-
society and Intrasociety Correlations of Occupational Pres-
tige," The American Journal of Sociology, 74 (July, 1968), 
pp. 28-36. 
36 Inkeles and Rossi,~- cit., p. 339. 
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which stressed the uniqueness of industrial societies. 
However, later studies have shown that a similar 
ranking emerges from populations in non-industrial areas and 
enough studies have been done to establish this as a re-
liable conclusion. Thus later research has shown the 
phenomena exists in places that the standard theoretical 
explanation could not account for since it stressed the dif-
ferences between industrial and non-industrial countries 
rather than potential similarities. This entire line of re-
search is an example of a paradigm which generates an 
empirical line of research that the paradigm cannot account 
for. Armer concludes, 
While subsequent research involving more cir-
cumscribed samples may find less agreement in occu-
pational prestige evaluations than the present or 
previous studies, the evidence is clear that a high 
degree of intersocietal uniformity does exist in the 
evaluation of occupational prestige by large seg-
ments of traditional as well as modern societies. 
The importance of this finding is more fully recog-
nized when the uniformity is compared to the great 
variation between societies in the evaluation of 
other widespread social categories, such as 
religious, ethnic, and sex categories. As yet, 
however, no theoretical explanation has been ad-
vanced which adequately deals with this unusual 
cross-cultural uniformity. A major implication of 
these results is the great need for such a theory 
based on an analysis of social and social-psychological 
processes and conditions shared much more widely than 
jus~ amo~~ modern industrial or semi-industrial 
nations. 
37Armer, £2.· cit., p. 36. 
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These results are surprising only to those who con-
tinue to believe in the conventional view. The empirical 
distribution of occupation and the ways occupational groups 
react with one another are different across societies. How-
ever, the principles underlying occupational prestige, 
evaluation of occupational performance, and assignment of 
people to positions may be similar. In other words, an 
emphasis on individual accomplishments and individual 
achievement evaluated only by merit might be found across 
many societies, both industrial and non-industrial. 
Lambert's study of textile factories in Poona, India 
concluded, 
To summarize our conclusions, then, concerning 
,the possible effect of the factory in producing 
the general transformation outlined in the Intro-
duction--substituting contract for status, de-
creasing the primary group organization of work, 
encouraging the growth of achieved status attri-
butes, increasing mobility, and raising aspiration 
levels--the internal organization of the factories 
does not represent nearly so sharp a break with 
the past as might be expected.38 
The factories he examined were not "rationally" ordered. 
For example, the newer the factory the more its recruitment 
practices reached out for better educated workers, regard-
less of the work to be performed. In addition, the 
companies have little or no measurement of individual 
38Richard D. Lambert, Workers , Factories, and Social 
Change in India, Princeton, New Jersey: Pr inceton Uni -
versity Press, 1963, p. 222. 
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performance. Lambert says that higher education is irrele-
vant since work requirements are unrelated to it. Educa-
tion may be an achieved status but inside the factory it is 
not since it is unalterable within the factory. From the 
point of view of status assignment within the factory edu-
cation is an ascribed status and to make it a job require-
ment is irrational since it is unrelated to job performance. 
Data from socialist countries do not typically appear 
in American sociological doctoral dissertation. This dis-
sertation is not an exception. Djilas's New Class describes 
the creation of a new upper class in Eastern European coun-
tries, especially his own, Yugoslavia. A new upper class 
emerged based on ascriptive membership within the Communist 
Party and created by access to privilege and power that 
party membership and political power bring. Having a suc-
cessful revolution is not a sufficient guarantee that a new 
and even more centralized ruling class may emerge. As party 
members pass these privileges on to their children we see 
the emergence of an industrial power in which kinship 
(ascription) plays an important part. 39 Domhoff's analysis 
of the American ruling class 40 shows a similar ascriptive 
39Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the 
Communist System, New York: Frederick Praeger, 1957. 
40G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America, Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967. 
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emphasis. Access to an entire life style and choice of 
occupational histories is mediated through ascriptive ties 
instead of individual accomplishment. This is true in 
capitalist as well as a "socialist" country. In other 
words, the operation of ascriptive ties that a society uses 
are not invariably linked to the same level of technological 
sophistication or economic-political government. 
The voting trends analyst of the Nixon organization, 
Kevin N. Phillips, 41 who is now Special Assistant to 
Attorney General John N. Mitchell, has written a well docu-
mented analysis of American politics to explain and defend 
the Republican Party's victory in 1968. His description of 
the American electorate is heavily couched in ascriptive 
categories and emphasizes that this is the best way to 
understand the behavior of the American electorate. 
For a century, the prvailing cleavages in 
American voting behavior have been ethnic and 
cultural. Politically, at least, the United 
States has not been a very effective melting 
pot. In practically every state and region, 
ethnic and cultural animosities and divisions 
exceed all other factors in explaining party 
choice and identification. From New York City, 
where income level has only minimally influenced 
the mutual hostility of Jews and Irish Catholics; 
to Wisconsin, where voting analysis requires an 
ethnic map of the state's Welsh, Belgian, French, 
Swiss, Finnish, Polish, Dutch, German, Danish, 
Swedish, Norwegian and Yankee populations; to 
Missouri, where partisanship has long pivoted on 
41Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority, 
New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1969. 
Virginian, New England, hillbilly and German 
settlement patterns and ensuing Civil War 
sympathies--everywhere ethnic, regional and 
cultural loyalties constitute the principal 
dynamics of American voting.42 
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These hints and indications that an industrial society 
like the United States contains a much greater emphasis on 
ascriptive principles than American mythology is willing to 
admit, are complimented by what data we have from non-
industrial countries which show the operation of achievement 
principles. For example, James points out that discrimina-
tion against women in the Bombay textile industry is not 
based on ascriptive principles. 43 Rather management dis-
criminates because women have a history of greater labor 
militancy than men .. The discrimination is based on rational 
evaluations of their effectiveness as labor organizers. 
Thus fragmentary and scattered evidence tends to deny 
long-standing assumptions about the operation of achievement 
principles in "modern" and "traditional" societies. Unlike 
other assumptions in the "conventional view," the linking of 
achievement emphasis to industrial societies has not been 
generally discredited. We have nowhere near the amount of 
evidence on that linking that we have on, for example, the 
42rbid., pp. 39-40. 
43Ralph C. James, "Discrimination Against Women in 
Bombay Textiles," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
15 (January, 1962), pp. 209-20. 
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existence of extended family patterns in industrial society. 
The current situation is that writers continue to recite the 
conventional view in discussing achievement even though its 
other assumptions are recognized to be out-dated. For 
example, Gordon's work on kinship patterns first states: 
This view of preindustrial societies as being 
particularistic and socially and geographically 
stable and industrial societies as being the direct 
opposite is contrary to fact. Significant geographi-
cal mobility for economic and other reasons has been 
documented for eras long before industrialization in 
England (Raftis, 1964). And, Goode (1963a: 245-46) 
also mentions the fact that "there was relatively 
high class mobility based on achievement in twelfth 
and thirteenth century Europe and the T'ang through 
Ch'ing dynasties in China. Therefore, in addition 
to level of technology, settlement pattern (shifting 
versus permanent) and mean community size (small 
versus large) will be used as variables. Permanent 
settlements, large community size, and the presence 
of industrialization should be associated with the 
presence of neolocal residence in the society. Pre-
viously cited controversy over the extended family 
indicates that no relationship between family organi-
zation and settlement pattern, community size, and 
level of technology need exist.44 
However, Gordon goes on to link achievement norms with an 
increase in population and occupational specialization. 
"Large communities (as measured by mean community size) 
indicate greater mobility--both geographical and social--
and the presence of achievement norms .... In short, as 
44oan1el N. Gordon, Kinship , Settlement Pattern and 
Technology : A Cross-Cultural Analy s i s. Presented t o the 
64th Annua l Mee tings o f The Amer i can Sociological Associa-
tion, September 1-4, 1969, San Francisco, California, p. 6. 
(Dittoed.) 
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settlement size increases, geographical mobility, social 
mobility, and achievement norms also tend to increase. 1145 
Seibel and Jaeger studied achievement and ascription in 
a German and an American iron ore mine in Liberia.46 First 
they stated the conventional view: 
1. Introduction: Perceived basis of status allo-
cation. The distinction between industrial ancr--
traditional, or developed and underdeveloped, or 
relatively modernized and relatively nonmodernized 
societies is not solely based on differences in the 
economic and in the technological system of the two 
types of societies but also on differences in the 
social system. Until recently, social scientists 
shared the holistic view that the economic, 
technological and social systems are closely inter-
related and form one functional unit so that one 
type of social system is found, and necessarily 
found, in all technologically and economically ad-
vanced societies while another type of social system 
is universally found in all technologically and 
economically backward societies. One part of the 
social system for which this relationship to the 
economic system is strongly asserted is the system 
of status allocation.47 
After describing ascription and achievement as forms of 
status allocation, they write, 
Since social scientists took it for granted that 
achievement is a feature of the status allocation 
system of industrial societies and ascription of 
traditional societies, little effort was made to 
gather empirical evidence to substantiate this 
45 Ibid., p. 7. 
46 tt. Dieter Seibel and Wieland w. Jaeger, Achievement 
and Authority: Sociological Studies in Liberian Mining 
Industry, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 
1969. 
47Ibid., p. 15. 
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hypothesis. However, there has been at least some 
evidence which seems to contradict the popular 
belief in the dichotomy between achieving industrial 
society and ascriptive traditional society.48 
They then reviewed the evidence known to them and suggested 
a comparative study of a foreign-run industrial enterprise 
in a non-industrial society would be a way of resolving this 
question. They interviewed 355 staff members at the German 
run Bong Iron Ore Mine in Liberia, also took a random 
sample of 500 workers (actual N = 383) from the Bong Mine 
and then interviewed 75 staff members at another iron ore 
mine run by the American controlled Liberia Mining Company. 
Both mines are large multi-million dollar operations. They 
found the German staff at the Bong Mine to be much more 
ascriptive than the Liberian workers. 
The results are: 
SUMMARY 
1. Industrial societies are generally considered 
achievement oriented while traditional societies are 
characterized as non-achievement oriented. This dif-
ference should show in a dual system like Bong Mining 
Company whose employees originate from both modern 
and traditional societies. 
2. The differences actually found are opposite to 
what they were expected to be. With regard to German 
and other European employees, BMC is not, and is not 
perceived as, an achievement system. 
3. With regard to Africans employees, BMC is, and 
is perceived as, an achievement system. 
4 8 Ibid. , p. 17. 
4. LMC is, and is perceived as, an achievement 
system with regard to both American and African 
employees. 
5. Nevertheless, achievement is considered by 
BMC staff members as the ideal basis for status 
allocation. 
6. At the same time BMC staff members have inter-
nalized the BMC system of status allocation to the 
extent that they are satisfied with their position 
as well as with promotion opportunities. 
7. Measures of social control for the maintenance 
of achievement are applied, to a significantly 
larger extent, by staff members in LMC and African 
employees in BMC than by German and other European 
staff members in BMC. 
9. BMC and LMC are both rather authoritarian, as 
probably most industrial enterprises are, with re-
gard to both the formal and the informal structure 
of decision making. However, while in BMC authori-
tarian patterns extend into the social sphere by 
creating social bars between supervisors and sub-
ordinates and by being formalized in a hierarchical 
system of housing, this is not so, or much less so, 
in LMC. 
. . . . . 
Thus in terms of the indicators used to measure 
authoritarianism, the data do not support the 
hypotheses (1) that Germans are more authoritarian 
than Americans and (2) systems of status allocation 
based on achieved criteria are less authoritarian 
than systems based on non-achieved criteria.49 
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Seibel and Jaeger end by noting that the hierarchical 
social arrangements and poor work climate at the Bong Mining 
Company do not effect production schedules. The mine is 
49 rbid., pp. 5-6, 39. 
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producing what it was planned to produce and it could in-
crease its production if necessary. The amount of iron ore 
that is mined, concentrated and shipped is irrelevant to 
the rigid fixed social relationships existing among the 
German staff. The technology used is independent of the 
social relationships among the people using it. 
In summary, the "conventional view" is succinctly 
expressed by Goode: 
The prime social characteristic of modern indus-
trial enterprise is that the individual is ideally 
given a job on the basis of his ability to fulfill 
its demands, and that this achievement is evaluated 
universalistically; the same standards apply to all 
who hold the same job. His link with the job is--
functionally specif i c; in other words, the enter-
prise cannot require behavior of him which is not 
relevant to getting the job done.SO 
This view is probably wrong. Enough evidence exists to show 
that continual repetitions of this sentiment are misplaced 
and the literature on social change needs a more realistic 
appreciation of what it is that is changing. It is diffi-
cult to respect the reputation of theorists like Levy who 
continue to assert unreal propositions on topics which 
either have no evidence to support them or contradictory 
evidence denying them. The next chapter describes how 
50william J. Goode, World Revolution and Family Pat-
terns, Glenco, Illinois: The Free Press; London: 
Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1963, p. 11. 
ascription-achievement was studied in the author's West 
African study and what the results are. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE STUDY OF ACHIEVEMENT AMONG LIBERIAN TRIBES 
Research Procedure 
A description of how the data were collected neces-
sarily precedes its presentation in order that its quality 
may first be appraised. The Ph.D. proposal was written in-
country with an awareness of local conditions. It was a 
momentary summation of hunches and analysis that had slowly 
built in the writer's mind over the previous years. The 
design decisions were made after a three-week visit to 
Cocopa Rubber Plantation, the first research site. During 
the visit the writer lived in a nearby village, talked to 
local people, plantation staff, workers, missionaries, and 
a nearby anthropologist. On the basis of this visit the 
writer decided to use a short questionnaire with simple 
questions and aim for a large number of interviews. This 
design is infrequently used in non-Western countries since 
most detailed social research is done by anthropologists who 
still typically do intensive studies of a single area or of 
an activity within an area. The use of survey research 
technique to sample across tribes is infrequent. Most 
anthropology departments still do not introduce their 
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students to the full range of contemporary methodological 
techniques available to social scientists and most sociolo-
gists who know statistics work on research projects in 
industrial countries. 
The Cocopa site was used as a pre-test. In addition to 
pointing out the defects of the questionnaire, the pre-test 
showed that random samples were impractical because of: 
(a) inefficient labor registration, (b) high monthly turn-
over among divisions due to de-centralized control, (c) a 
fear that replies would not be anonymous, and (d) manage-
ment's understandable requirement that interviewing not be 
done on company time. With the exception of Uniroyal's 
plantation in Bassa, control of labor is generally left to 
lower Liberian staff. Each of the separate divisions keeps 
a daily record of both the quantity and quality of each 
person's work, and this record is sufficient for the econo-
mic operation of the plantation. The records on the work 
force are scattered across the plantation rather than being 
centralized in a single location. De-centralization is both 
a cause and a consequence of high monthly turnover in 
divisions. A tapper can quit work on one division, change 
his name, and be rehired on a different division. For 
example, a major part of the monthly turnover rates of 15 to 
20 per cent at B. F. Goodrich are due to this shifting 
around. In other words, the entire work force has a yearly 
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rate of turnover that exceeds 150 per cent. However, this 
does not necessarily interfere with the economic operations 
of the company since migration among divisions does not 
necessarily imply a loss of skilled manpower. This turn-
over does, however, make random sampling impossible. 
In addition, false names were given 10 to 15 per cent 
of the time to the interviewers, even by headmen. Research 
for the sake of research is not generally understood in 
this cultural area. The writer was thought to be a job 
recruiter for the new diamond mines, "a spy," a company spy, 
a government inspector and a banker who was looking for a 
place to build a new bank, i.e., this is why so much was 
asked about money. Motives of people asking for informa-
tion are carefully examined and the most frequently asked 
question was "what good will it be to me to answer these 
question?" This fear is not restricted to the tribal 
workers. It operates at all levels. For example, Seibel's 
study of the German staff at the Bong Mine found a similar 
suspicion that it was unwise to talk about management. In 
turn, management itself as this writer encountered it, has 
the very difficult problem of operating within a political-
legal environment that at its clearest, is generally ambi-
guous to foreigners. The vague diffuse fear of possibly 
saying something that might offend someone exists at all 
levels. For the purposes of this research it meant that 
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workers would refuse to admit who they were if you came 
looking for them specifically, or they would give false 
names if you interviewed them. This combination of factors 
eliminated the feasibility of random sampling, and the 
analysis of financial information about the company's opera-
tion. 
Thus, for a variety of reasons, it was difficult to 
random sample. Other researchers have experienced similar 
problems. Even though Seibel and Jaeger were attached to 
the staff at the Bay Mine and presumably had the active 
cooperation of management they were nevertheless only able 
to interview 383 out of their sample of 500 workers. Hand-
werker, in his study of Bassa households in Marovia, 
encountered a refusal rate of greater than 75 per cent. 
Since statistical guarantees could not be obtained, a 
proportional quota sampling was used. A list of the number 
of workers in each division was obtained at each of the four 
plantations and the same percentage of non-randomly selec-
ted workers would be interviewed in each division. For 
example, Cocopa employed about 800 workers. A sample of 200 
seemed feasible. Some 20 per cent of the workers in each 
division were interviewed. From 15 to 20 per cent of the 
workers were interviewed at each plantation. The inter-
viewers would go out to the camps in the afternoon and talk 
to whomever was there until the percentage quota was met 
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and then they would go to the camps of the next ~ivision. 
The samples are not statistically random but they are large 
enough to have prima facie reliability. Division of labor 
was controlled for, i.e., the proportion of truck drivers 
interviewed is the same as the proportion of tappers. The 
majority of the interviews were done by hired interviewers. 
This eliminates one possible source of bias arising from a 
white man doing the interviewing, but introduces possible 
error in asking and recording information. The information 
reported here has an unknown proportion of error in it 
arising from using hired interviewers. Since interviewers 
were not told what exactly was being sought for, the use 
of different interviewers at each plantation would randomize 
this source of bias. Any trends in the data appear despite 
interviewers' error rather than because of it. Large N's 
also help to randomize error. 
Description of Sample 
We begin the examination of the data by looking at the 
demographic characteristics of the sample. We will con-
sider education, pay rate by hour, age began work, length 
of time at company work, per cent of working life spent 
working for money, age, number of wives, length of time 
spent at place interviewed. 
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TABLE 1 
EDUCATION 
% N 
0. no English 62.2 809 
1. grade 1-2 7.4 96 
2. grade 3-4 8.5 111 
3 . grade 5-6 10.4 135 
4. grade 7-8 5.3 69 
5. grade 9 2.6 34 
6. grade 10-11 1.5 20 
7. grade 12 1.5 20 
8 • vocational training, uncom. 0.2 3 
9. vocational training, compl. 0.3 4 
99.9* 1301 
*The percentage in this and the following tables may 
not equal 100.0 because of rounding errors. 
As Table 1 shows approximately two-thirds of the re-
spondents made no claim to understand English, Liberia's 
official language. Only 10 per cent claimed to have more 
than a primary school education. 
TABLE 2 
PAY RATE BY HOUR 
% N 
0. 8-14 cents 88.1 1143 
1. 15-25 cents 8.5 110 
2 . 26 cents and up 3.4 41 
100.0 1295 
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The minimum agricultural wage in Liberia is eight cents 
an hour, although some plantations pay nine cents. The 
majority of workers on the rubber plantations are tappers 
or do maintenance work and are paid the minimum wage. The 
industrial minimum wage is fourteen cents an hour. In all 
of the wage labor sector only those men who work for pri-
vate farmers get paid less than agricultural laborers. 
TABLE 3 
AGE BEGAN COMPANY WORK 
% N 
0. under 15 20.1 239 
1. 15-17 17.4 207 
2 . 18-20 23.8 283 
3. 21-23 15.0 178 
4. 24-26 12.6 150 
5. 27-29 2.9 34 
6. 30 and older 8.1 96 
99.9 1187 
Most men started working for companies before they were 
twenty-five, and 20 per cent started before they were 
fifteen years old. 
The distribution in Table 4 is reasonably even. At 
least a third of the men have worked at wage labor for sub-
stantial periods, not only on rubber plantations but for 
other kinds of employers as well. 
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TABLE 4 
LENGTH OF TIME AT COMPANY WORK 
% N % N 
0 . less than 7 . 7 years 6.1 82 
one year 3.7 49 8. 8 years 6.4 86 
1. 1 year 5.2 69 9. 9 years 9.2 123 
2 . 2 years 7.0 93 x. 10 to 15 
3. 3 years 8.5 113 years 15.3 204 
4 . 4 years 6.9 92 Y. more than 
5. 5 years 9.0 120 15 years 17.0 227 
6. 6 years 5.7 76 
100.0 1334 
TABLE 5 
PER CENT OF WORKING LIFE SPENT WORKING FOR MONEY 
% N 
0. 0-20 per cent 17.8 237 
1. 21-40 per cent 17.5 234 
2. 41-60 per cent 18.2 243 
3. 61-80 per cent 20.0 267 
4. 81-99 per cent 26.5 353 
100.0 1334 
The distribution in Table 5 is also reasonably even 
indicating the sampling technique is picking up a wide 
variety of work experiences. We have men who spent all 
their working lives in paid labor and men who have farmed 
for most of their lives. 
% 
1. 0-18 3.1 
2. 19-20 6.1 
3 . 21-23 12.0 
4. 24-26 14.8 
5 . 27-29 14.4 
6. 30-32 13.9 
N 
36 
71 
140 
172 
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TABLE 6 
AGE 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
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% N 
33-35 8.6 100 
36-38 8.7 101 
39-41 7.2 84 
42 and older 11.1 129 
99.9 1162 
Approximately 40 per cent of the sample are between the 
ages of twenty and thirty. The above distribution is only 
an approximation since many of the respondents did not keep 
track of their ages in precise years. 
% 
0. not married 26.5 
1. 1 53.1 
2. 2 16.0 
3 . 3 3.4 
4. 4 0.3 
TABLE 7 
NUMBER OF WIVES 
N 
354 5 . 
708 6. 
214 7. 
45 8 . 
4 9. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
% N 
0.4 5 
o.o 0 
0.1 2 
0.1 1 
or more 0.1 1 
100.0 1334 
As Table 7 shows, approximately three-fourths of the 
sample said they have one wife or less. Less than 4 per 
cent said they had three or more. A small amount of error 
enters in since some men may have had a wife outside the 
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plantation which they did not report. However, the distri-
bution is probably not too inaccurate since no economic or 
social reasons exist to assume low paid agricultural workers 
would have more than one wife. 
TABLE 8 
LENGTH OF TIME SPENT AT PLACE INTERVIEWED 
% N % N 
0. less than six 6. 6 years 4.3 57 
months 12.8 171 7. 7 years 2.8 37 
1. 1 year 13.5 180 8. 8 years 3.2 43 
2. 2 years 11. 5 153 9. 9 years 3.9 52 
3. 3 years 11.2 149 X. 10 to 15 years 8.2 109 
4. 4 years 9.7 129 Y. more than 15 
5. 5 years 8.2 109 years 10.9 145 
100.2 1334 
According to Table 8, two-thirds of the men have 
worked at their present place five years or less. Twenty 
per cent have worked at one place for over ten years. 
In summary of this section, we see a group of men who 
have worked in agriculture most of their lives either as 
farmers or as low paid wage labor. Most neither read nor 
write English. In general, these are not urban or "modern" 
men. In the next section we show the majority of them give 
"modern" responses to the questions we asked them. 
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The Achievement Responses 
The problem of measuring an emphasis on achievement, or 
its absence, was not satisfactorily solved. Enough of the 
partial solution exists to allow commentary. However, no 
test emerged which yielded a single, simple, reliable score 
for each person. No test exists in the literature and no 
test created itself under field conditions. This writer 
followed a classical format of offering alternative choices 
to each question, one choice mentioning an achieved property 
and the other a fixed property. No assumption is made that 
an underlying dimension exists within the questions or that 
a suitably selected combination, if properly weighed, would 
yield a valid index. Such assumptions put the cart in 
front of the horse since the rationale required to justify 
them presupposes a thorough knowledge of processes under-
lying the patterns of answers. Yet it is this very know-
ledge that we hope to infer from the questions. 
As indicated previously in this dissertation, the major 
hypothesis to be tested is that achievement characterizes 
the industrial society and ascription characterizes the 
traditional society. The design of this dissertation tests 
for that relationship by inferential methods. We do not 
have comparative data and thus cannot empirically speak 
about achievement in industrial society. Our design is 
based on Popper's suggestion that the best logical way to 
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test a theory is to falsify it. That is, if a theory 
implies a prediction and if that prediction is false, then 
it is logically valid to conclude that the theory is incor-
rect. According to the "conventional view'' ascription 
characterizes "traditional" society. As the previous 
section shows, the sample of people we interviewed is 
largely rural people. Thus according to the conventional 
view they should consistently choose ascriptive responses 
to our questions. Our data show that the respondents do 
not choose ascriptive responses. Thus an implication of the 
conventional view is empirically falsified. 
The following analysis will deal with a series of 
questions and examines their results one-by-one. Rather 
than using an index or similar measurement technique, a 
series of questions is shown and a general tendency is in-
ferred from the results. 
Each of the following attitudinal questions aims to 
compare an achieved property such as intelligence or 
strength with ascribed property, birth order, sex, etc. 
Each of the questions will be presented in turn along with 
the total number of replies to each alternative. 
Q 34. Two men 
plenty family. 
children. Both 
get more, young 
TABLE 9 
AGE-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
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both do same good work. One man older, 
Other man younger, no got family, not got 
work for you, how you pay them. Older man 
man get more, both same? 
% N 
O. Older get more 34.5 
9.5 
56.0 
449 
124 
728 
1. Younger get more 
2. Both get same 
100.0 1301 
A clear majority give the achievement response that 
both men should receive the same money for equal work. We 
do not have comparable data on American populations, how-
ever, that response should also be the most frequently 
chosen. When asked why, the most frequent justification was 
the mention of an equal work-equal pay principle. 
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TABLE 10 
AGE-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE 
Q 37. Man with small money got two sons, both want money 
for school business. Big son is dull, but small son is 
plenty clever. Who should man give money to? 
0. Older boy who dull 
1. Small boy who clever 
2. Both 
% 
3.3 
67.7 
29.0 
100.0 
N 
43 
892 
382 
1317 
Two-thirds of the respondents chose the achievement 
response. Birth order is not as important as personal 
characteristics. Very few people would directly give the 
money to the older son. As in the above question~ the 
justifications are very pragmatic. The stupid son will 
waste the money and the money is too important to be wasted. 
The persons who would give money to both justify this deci-
sion because the stupid son is a son and the man is under 
obligation to help him. Almost never will the stupid son 
receive money in preference to the smart son. A high social 
valuation is placed upon intelligence and careful expendi-
ture of money. 
TABLE 11 
SEX-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
Q 67. Man with small money got 
money for school business, girl 
clever. Who man give money to, 
O. Dumb boy 
1. Smart girl 
2. Both 
boy and girl. 
plenty smart, 
smart girl or 
% 
12.5 
52.6 
34.9 
100.0 
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Both need 
boy he not 
dull boy? 
N 
48 
202 
134 
340 
This question was first asked at the last plantation 
therefore the N is small. Even if a woman is involved at 
least half of the sample pick the achievement response and 
say they would give the money to the female. Justifica-
tions make reference to the adjective "smart" rather than to 
intrinsically valuable properties of femaleness. 
TABLE 12 
POLITICAL STATUS-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
Q 36. Two men. Who should we respect more? One man he 
town chief, work plenty hard, other man he clan chief, but 
he lazy. Who we respect more? 
% N 
0. Lazy clan chief 13.3 172 
1. Hard working town chief 74.7 967 
2. Both 12.0 156 
100.0 1295 
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So many people pick the "hard working town chief" that 
the variable cannot be used for further analysis. A clan 
chief is distinctly higher in power and prestige in the 
official government hierarchy but three out of four respon-
dents react to the adjectives of "lazy" and "hard working." 
TABLE 13 
SECOND POLITICAL STATUS-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
Q 52. Two men. Who should we respect more, one man he clan 
chief, work plenty hard, other man he town chief, but he 
lazy? 
0. Hard working clan chief 
1. Lazy town chief 
2. Both 
% 
83.7 
6.1 
10.2 
100.0 
N 
643 
47 
78 
768 
Question 52 was first asked at the third plantation 
visited so tappers at the first two plantations did not 
reply to the question. This is why the N is 768. The 
question itself is a reversal of Question 36. Now the 
adjectives are reversed and it is the clan chief who is 
hard working. The results are consistent with this dis-
sertation's expectations: (a) a comparison of Questions 36 
and 52 shows that an overwhelming majority respond to the 
adjectives characterizing the behavior of the chiefs rather 
than to the actual positions themselves, and (b) being a 
clan chief does have an effect, but this effect is small 
compared to a change in the adjectives. That is, by 
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Table 12, 74.7 per cent picked the "hard working town chief" 
reply and in Table 13, 83.7 per cent picked the "hard 
working clan chief. 11 The nine per cent difference between 
the two may be plausibly attributed to the higher prestige 
of the clan chief's position since the same justifications 
were given for both answers. A high social valuation is 
placed upon hard work. These are subsistence economies and 
to be lazy is to go hungry. As the data itself bears 
witness, a consistently strong emphasis on hard work was 
commonly encountered. 
TABLE 14 
FRIEND-FAMILY COMPARISON 
Q 38. If you got small money and both your best friend and 
a family man want money for same business, who you give 
money to? 
0 . Family man 
1. Friend 
2. Both 
% 
36.0 
25.6 
38.4 
100.0 
N 
463 
329 
494 
1286 
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Conventional theoretical speculations about ''primitive" 
societies invariably stress the overwhelming importance of 
kinship ties that presumably characterize such societies. 
Two separate streams of analysis seem to be merging on this 
question. The evidence cited in Chapter Two points out that 
a much greater reliance on kinship ties actually exists than 
the individualistic mythology of American industrial society 
is willing to admit. This evidence emphasizes the 
importance of kinship ties in contemporary "modern" socie-
ties. A second line of evidence de-emphasizing the impor-
tance of kinship and other ascriptive ties in "traditional" 
societies was cited in the previous chapter. The data from 
Question 38 substantiate this de-emphasis. It is probably 
the case that a wide range of situations exist in which the 
obligations of family and close friends overlap. The large 
percentage of respondents choosing the category "both" is 
indicative of this overlap. Either can make similar re-
quests for time, money or other resources. Admittedly this 
is crude data, but few other researchers have empirically 
asked these questions before. The justifications for pre-
ferring one over the other were generally the same regard-
less of which was chosen. With the exception of referring 
to blood ties, the same justifications were offered re-
gardless of whether friend or family man was chosen. 
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TABLE 15 
SECOND FRIEND-FAMILY COMPARISON 
Q 51. Is friendship business stronger than family business? 
% N 
0. Family business stronger 61.0 478 
1. Friendship business 
stronger 19.7 154 
2. Both equal 19.3 151 
100.0 783 
When asked directly which is more important, family or 
friends, a majority chose family. This cannot be used as 
proof that family ties receive a unique or unusual emphasis 
in cultures of this geographical area because it is not 
known what results would have been found had this question 
been asked of an American population. The evidence in 
Chapter Two and the existence of folk proverbs such as 
"blood is thicker than water" give us no reason for presuming 
that an American population would answer this question any 
differently. No other situation is asked in this question. 
As we saw in Table 14, when the question of money demands 
is raised only 36 per cent replied that they would give 
money to their family. 
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TABLE 16 
FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
Q 56. You got small money and both your best friend and a 
family man come to you, need money, friend he work plenty 
hard, but family man he lazy. Who you give money to? 
0. Lazy family man 
1. Strong friend 
2. Both 
% 
28.5 
51.8 
19.6 
N 
109 
198 
75 
100.0 382 
Unfortunately this question was only asked at the last 
plantation but the general trend is clear, achievement 
adjectives clarify a situation and their placement strongly 
alters the results received from asking about unspecified 
situations. The justifications for these answers are the 
same as justifications for the earlier family-friend 
questions. A man who works hard should be given more 
respect, even if family ties are involved. 
A majority of anthropological ethnographies of rural 
people analyzes kinship. In part this focus stems from 
customary field technique. The anthropologist typically 
enters an area without an ability to speak the local 
language. It is easier to gain rapport and knowledge by 
learning innocuous kinship vocabulary, mapping kinship 
relations, and personal histories, than by asking about 
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local sexual practices or political faction. Such an 
emphasis is also necessary in completing an initial census 
of the village. It is reasonable for a non-anthropologist 
to raise a question of methodological bias. To what degree 
do anthropological field techniques affect evaluations of 
the importance of kinship patterns. This is a relevant, 
although unanswerable question. Little attention or 
emphasis has been paid to the importance of voluntary asso-
ciations in tribes. Yet in Liberia we know that they exist, 
are organized around both work and recreational activities, 
that membership is limited to a single sex, and that these 
voluntary associations may have a relatively high division 
of labor within them. This emphasis on kinship is com-
pounded by an academic environment that increasingly 
stresses quantification and formal technique. Linguistic 
patterns (and language) can be qualified and formally 
analyzed. An ability to quantify the phenomena also affects 
theoretical judgments as to its importance. The cumulative 
effect of these events has been to create the impression 
that in tribal societies kinship obligations are literally 
equivalent to all important social roles. 
A conservative interpretation of the data reported 
above implies that kinship obligations have ~heir limita-
tions and these limitations involve criteria emphasizing 
achievement. It is reasonable to speculate that kinship 
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ties which are efficient in obtaining satisfaction for a 
person will be preferred over similarly efficient bonds of 
friendship. However, ineffective kinfolk will not be pre-
ferred over efficient friends. This is not true for all, 
but our information implies it is true for a majority. 
In the hypotechnological vocabulary of an earlier 
theoretical era, when an evaluation of role performance is 
combined with a theoretical description of role, the re-
sulting conceptual entity cannot a priori be classified as 
either achievement or ascription, because some questions 
must be answered factually. 
In summary, by the conventional view these are sur-
prising results. When adjectives stressing hard work and 
intelligence were contrasted with age, sex, birth order, 
political position and kinship ties, a majority of the 
respondents chose the former. We have no comparable data 
from Euro-American samples on these questions. So while we 
cannot effectively criticize the often repeated assumption 
that industrial populations emphasize achievement, we can 
criticize the often repeated, still-repeated assumption 
that social relationships in non-literate tribes are 
characterized by rigidly prescribed custom bound ways of 
feeling and living. In the data cited above the effect is 
very strong because it is apparent despite many opportuni-
ties for errors of translation, poor questions, and poor 
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interviewing to randomize the results. That is, the phe-
nomena are strong enough to appear despite the distortions 
introduced by unknown amounts of error. This is prima 
facie evidence that the conventional view is, in matters of 
fact, wrong. 
Modernization Variables as a Potential Explanation 
How are these results to be accounted for? In terms 
of the conventional paradigm an immediate and obvious ex-
planation is the following: "While it may true that these 
results indicate an achievement emphasis your samples are 
taken from men doing wage labor work on rubber planta-
tions thus it is natural that as a group the majority 
should give these responses. In other words your sample is 
biased since you did not sample directly from village 
populations." The conventional view would search for 
variables which are reflective of "western influence," 
"modernization," "urbanization," "industrialization," and 
then show that "rational" western responses vary systemati-
cally with these variables. That is, the more modernized a 
person the greater his tendency to respond with achievement 
replies. A simple linear function should be observable in 
examining sub-categories of variables reflecting "moderni-
zation." 
In other words, it is not sufficient to simply show 
184 
the existence of achievement responses among rural peoples. 
It must also be shown that the tendency to give these re-
sponses is independent of variables stressed by the "con-
ventional view." 
The dependent variables referring to achievement that 
were previously introduced: age-performance comparison 
Q 34, age-family-performance comparison Q 37, sex-perform-
ance comparison Q 67, political status-performance compari-
son Q 36, second political status performance comparison 
Q 52, friend-family comparison Q 38, and friend-family-
performance comparison Q 56, were run against a set of six 
possible independent variables. 
These six independent variables presumably reflect 
"modernization" and if the "conventional view" is correct 
they should systematically vary achievement responses. The 
forty-two cross tabulations are reproduced in Appendix A. 
These tables are put in the Appendix to enable the reader to 
analyze the data for himself if he so desires. Only five of 
the forty-two cross-tabulations were statistically signifi-
cant at the .05 level. Tables 17 and 18 show some of the 
essential information. 
Table 17 was constructed by collapsing Education, Q 1, 
into three levels. The first row contains the proportion of 
people with 0-2 grades of school which chose the achievement 
responses. If the conventional view is correct the per-
centages within each column should increase. 
\ 
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TABLE 17 
PER CENT GIVING ACHIEVEMENT RESPONSES BY 
YEARS OF EDUCATION 
Q 34 Q 36 Q 37 Q 52 Q 56 Q 67 
0 - 2 55* 73 66 82 50 52 
3 - 4 53 79 68 85 54 56 
5 - 12 64 74 76 87 22 42 
*Thus 55 per cent of the people with 0-2 grades of 
school chose the achievement response in Q 34, and 45 per 
cent chose non-achievement responses. 
The columns were obtained by taking the achievement category 
of each dependent variable and computing the proportion of 
people who chose the achievement response. For example, in 
column one, 55 per cent of the respondents at the lowest 
educational level chose the achievement category in Q 34. 
Only the columns for age-family performance Q 37 and second 
political status-performance comparison Q 52, show a ten-
dency to increase with educational level. The columns for 
friend-family-performance Q 56 and sex-performance compari-
son Q 67 are difficult to interpret since they were asked at 
the last plantation and only a score of respondents claimed 
to have more than an eighth grade education. 
Does Table 17 show a clear tendency for the proportion 
of people choosing the achievement response to increase as 
education increases? No, the table does not show this. 
The evidence is mixed. We find that a majority of the 
respondents at all educational levels chose achievement 
responses. 
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Table 18, which shows achievement responses by amount 
of urban experience, shows a clearer rejection of the con-
ventional view. 
TABLE 18 
PER CENT GIVING ACHIEVEMENT RESPONSES BY 
YEARS URBAN EXPERIENCE 
0 
Less than 1 
One or more 
Q 34 
55 
59 
52 
Q 36 
75 
74 
75 
Q 37 
71 
66 
65 
Q 52 
86 
81 
83 
Q 56 
42 
53 
50 
Q 67 
63 
47 
58 
Urban experience Q 23 was collapsed into three cate-
gories. The first row includes those people who never saw 
Monrovia, Liberia's largest city. The second includes those 
who "visited" Monrovia and the third row includes those 
people who lived in Monrovia for some length of time. The 
results approximate a random distribution. The proportion 
of people choosing achievement responses does not increase 
with amount of urban experience. None of the six columns 
shows a linear increase. 
Thus an analysis of education and urban experience, two 
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variables frequently cited by conventional writers, does 
not support conventional expectations. 
Modern Men 
Corollary to the conventional view is a search for 
"modern men" as begun and exemplified by Lerner. 1 Of it, 
't 2 Armer wries: 
Central to social psychological interest in 
developing areas of the world are questions con-
cerning the nature, degree and distribution of 
changes in individuals. What changes in values, 
attitudes and behavior lead to, follow from, or 
occur concomittantly with socioeconomic change of 
societies? Comments concerning modernization of 
individuals may be found throughout the theoreti-
cal and empirical literature on socioeconomic 
development, but recently there have been at least 
a half dozen publications dealing explicitly and, 
to a large extent, exclusively with the problem. 
Among these are three discoursive studies by 
O'Connell, Inkeles, and Peshkin and Cohen, and 
three studies by Smith and Inkeles, Doob, and Kahl 
which attempt to develop measures of modernity. 
These six studies define and describe the cognitive 
orientations which are assumed to characterize men 
in "modern" societies, by which is usually meant 
urban, industrial societies as distinct from "less 
advanced" areas of the world. 
1navid Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society : 
Modernizing the Middle East, New Yo r k : Harcourt Brace & 
World , Inc., 195 8. The most recent article is by Alex 
Inkeles, "Making Men Modern: On the Causes and Conse-
quences of Individual Change in Six Developing Countries," 
American Journal of Sociology , 75 (September, 1969), pp. 
208-25 . 
2Michael Armer, "Individual Modernity: A Review and 
Reconceptualization," a paper read at the American Socio-
logical Association meetings, August 1968, San Francisco, 
California. 
Although the resulting lists of "modern man" 
characteristics overlap in a number of respects, 
an examination clearly indicates a lack of con-
sensus on the meaning of individual modernity. 
"What is the modern man, and what makes him what he 
is?? Modern society is conceived as one charac-
terized by "urbanization, education, mass communi-
cations, industrialization, politicization" which 
contribute to the "transformation of traditional 
man [to] •.• certain new ways of thinking, 
feeling and acting. 11 3 
Armer's review of the literature concludes: 
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The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this 
brief review of studies is that consensus does not 
exist on the cognitive components characterizing 
"modern man". Although some components appear in 
several of the lists (e.g., receptivity to change, 
personal efficacy, and positive evaluation of 
science), none of the components are mentioned in 
all six sources. Of course, consensus is not an 
index of the validity of ideas since it may also 
result from shared misconceptions, but lack of con-
sensus among independent scholars certainly chal-
lenges the creditibility of all conceptions. This 
is especially true because of the largely specula-
tive nature of the modern man conceptions and the 
absence of objective procedures for justifying the 
selection of components. 
In short, serious conceptual problems face scholars 
interested in psychological modernity despite, or 
perhaps because of, the several attempts to identify 
the psychological components.4 
Armer's analysis on the lack of consensus in the 
"modern men" literature provides sufficient justification 
for questioning its empirical adequacy. Its ideological 
3Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
4 Ibid. , p. 5 . 
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assumptions have also been critically scrutinzed. 5 
A search was made in this data for "modern men." A 
card sorting of the dependent variables 34, 36, 37, 38, 52, 
56, and 67 found no distinct group which consistently gave 
"western" responses. In general, a group of "well edu-
cated," "urbanized," "modern men" who consistently give 
"modern" responses to the attitude questions does not exist 
in our sample. First, a majority of the respondents give 
"modern'' responses. Secondly, the majority of the 1300 
conversations reported here are with illiterate men who 
have spent two-thirds of their working lives farming. 
Forty per cent of our sample has never seen Monrovia. This 
is not the typical sample of middle class high school or 
college students that is typically interviewed in African 
research. 6 This sample is primarily composed of agricul-
5In the last three years a wide ideological attack has 
been mounted on the assumptions of sociology and the other 
social sciences. In the "sociology of social change" a 
germinal article has been Andre Frank's "Sociology of De-
velopment and Underdevelopment of Sociology," Catalyst, 
(Summer, 1967), pp. 20-73. In March of 1967, another basic 
critique was written by Kathleen Gough, "New Proposals for 
Anthropologists," Current Anthropology, 9 (December, 1968), 
pp. 403-31. These early critiques have been extended and 
enlarged into a sizeable literature. A repetition of it 
would be redundant but this writer is sympathetic to its 
general emphases and criticisms of the conventional view. 
See also Robert I. Rhodes, "The Disguised Conservatism in 
Evolutionary Development Theory," Science and Society, 
Vol. XXXII, No. 4, pp. 383-412. 
6The listing of card decks for Africa in the Survey 
Research Center at the University of California are all on 
student surveys. 
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tural laborers who do manual field work and get paid eight 
cents an hour. So explanations of this data in terms of 
"modern men" are rejected. 
Tribal Social Structure 
Explanations in terms of industrialization and urbani-
zation have been accorded such a priority that for many 
theorists such explanations literally exhaust the set of 
possible independent variables. People raised and trained 
in the paradigm which this thesis calls "the conventional 
view" are especially prone to couch their understanding of 
social change in terms of an impact due to outside forces. 
To them, the data reported here is an anomaly. We have 
"modern" responses from people who have no theoretical 
business giving us responses like that. Moreover, an 
independent study by Seibel and Jaeger on a random sample 
from an iron ore mine in the same country found the same 
general results. Or, better phrased, found results which 
permit the same inferences. To this point, the validity of 
the data is still open to interpretation, but its relia-
bility is reasonably established. It is established enough 
to put the burden of proof on the critic. 
How are we to understand these responses? The under-
standing exists, but it requires a shift in perspective. 
Generally, writers on social change look at things from the 
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point of view of the city's effect on the countryside rather 
than the countryside's effect on the city. For example, in 
the United States we still have no decent studies of 
"country" sub-cultures in American cities, no analyses of 
country and western music, and no studies of the assimila-
tion of "Okie" migrants into California. More generally, 
industrialization and urbanization are seen as outside 
forces introduced into areas whose previous cultures and 
social arrangements were not equipped to handle or control 
forces of such large magnitudes. The details within this 
point of view have been described earlier. 
The shift in perspective required to sympathize with 
the results reported in this dissertation is to see events 
from the point of view of the countryside. The importance 
of industrialization and urbanization is not minimized. 
The growth of an industrial economy and the concentration 
of population into central areas are transforming processes 
and justifiably deserve the attention they have received. 
However, not all aspects of social change can be explained 
by them nor is there compelling evidence that they even have 
operated the same way in different countries. They have 
their limitations and the social change literature suffers 
from the lack of a balanced appreciation of them. These 
limitations include political consideration, geographical 
variation and properties of non-urban sectors. All three 
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are important limitations. 
"Political considerations'' include questions on foreign 
policy determinants, i.e., who actually makes foreign policy 
and why do the great powers pursue particular third world 
policies, what is the depth and extent of business control 
in third world countries, what has been the actual iffect of 
colonialism and imperialism, and how successful have coun-
tries been in shaping their own culture, e.g., a study of 
Algeria's or Libya's revolution? In American sociology, a 
concern with such questions is still largely a ''radical" 
activity. But until a thorough study of them is made we 
will simply not be able to understand contemporary social 
change in non-industrial countries. 
"Geographical variations" include an understanding of 
region-by-region variations due to history, climate and 
location. Some areas have more favorable locations than 
others as trade routes or for raw mineral production. For 
example, Liberia has poor rivers with many rapids which 
prevent the use of water transport. It also is different 
because it did not first link up its coastal cities as other 
West African countries did, but went straight inland. It 
does, however, have the proper climate for rubber and also 
possesses extensive iron ore deposits. All of these 
factors affect social change but sociologists and anthro-
pologists usually take them as givens or leave them to 
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economists and geographers. 
Finally, by "properties of non-urban sectors" we mean 
the culture and social structure of the rural countryside. 
A review of Chapter One shows the kind of comments made 
about rural peoples and the lack of empirical evidence to 
substantiate the comments. This dissertation is a contri-
bution which, hopefully, will add to a greater concern and 
integration of country with city. That is, we begin our 
effort to understand these "modern" responses by looking to 
"traditional" social structure. Even if a moderately per-
suasive case could be made for the importance of "modern" 
variables in generating these responses, as it can for 
Seibel and Jaeger's data since they studied an "industrial" 
work site, the justifications of searching for "traditional" 
variables is strong enough to warrant the attempt anyway. 
If "traditional" social structure significantly varies by 
region then social change patterns across regions will also 
be different. 
This writer has done research in Latin America and 
Africa and now firmly believes that any theory of "moderni-
zation" or "socio-economic development" which fails to dis-
tinguish the two continents as separate situations will not 
be an adequate theory. To cite some obvious differences, in 
the former case, we have single language countries with a 
dominant church and written histories. In the latter we 
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have multi-language "countries" with no dominant seculari-
zed church and inadequate historical records. Liberia is a 
case in point. The basic mapping of what languages are in 
the country and where their linguistic boundaries are has 
just been started. The concept of "tribe" is critical here 
and represents an obvious starting point to analyze the 
data. The following data demonstrates its importance but 
the neglect of its importance also makes its analysis more 
difficult, as we shall see. 
The importance of "tribe" as a variable became apparent 
in a superficial exploration of the data. Cross-tabulations 
of it with all other variables have more departures from 
random patterns than other potential explanations. Not 
only were a greater number of chi-squares significant, but 
they were also more significant, i.e., they had greater dif-
ferences between them and random patterns. The next step in 
the analysis was to use factor analysis to search for 
mathematical dimensions which might underlie the data. 
Two questions are at issue. First, how many dimensions 
underlie the items? Secondly, how many dimensions underlie 
the tribes? That is, are the tribes "qualitatively" dif-
ferent from one another or do they load on the same dimen-
sion? We define "qualitatively" in terms of orthogonal 
areas in an n-dimensional space. 
The first factor analysis took questions Q 34, Q 36, 
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Q 37, Q 38, and Q 51, which have already been introduced as 
dependent variables and added to these attitude questions 
another attitude question, Q 35, on whether or not a woman 
should work; Q 01, amount of education; Q 42, preference 
for being a town chief or working in Monrovia; Q 44, satis-
faction greater with work or home; and Q 20, self-
conception as civilized or country. These ten questions 
had twenty-eight possible responses. The initial data 
matrix had ten rows, one row for each tribe with twenty-
five or more respondents to it, and twenty-eight columns. 
Each column being one of the response categories. The 
individual cell of this data matrix contained the percentage 
of people in a tribe who chose that response category. This 
data matrix, and its transpose yielded a factor analysis of 
items and a factor analysis of tribes. 
The first analysis of items proved difficult until it 
was realized a degree of freedom problem is created by cor-
relating percentaged categories since a low loading in one 
sub-category implies a high loading in another sub-category 
of the same question (each question only had two or three 
sub-categories). Thus a negative correlation is built into 
the analysis. While this may be a diagnostic device for 
analyzing sub-categories it violates independency assump-
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tions. Item analysis was thus discarded. 7 
The first factor analysis of tribes encounters no 
degree of freedom problem since each correlation is a cor-
relation between independent response profiles. One factor 
was retained, indicating a very high linear similarity among 
the tribes. That is, these tribes may differ, but they 
differ in positions upon the same continuum rather than in 
a qualitative way. One factor was found, indicating a high 
linear similarity, however, this result does not establish 
the degree of similarity among groups of tribes, assuming 
such groups exist. So the correlation matrix was cluster 
analyzed. 
This correlation matrix is a correlation of response 
profiles across the twenty-eight sub-categories. This same 
correlation matrix is graphically portrayed in the cluster 
analysis. 
The three tribes whose patterns are indicated by the 
solid line in the cluster analysis are the Kru, Krahn and 
Grebo. These tribes are all Kwa-speaking tribes in Southern 
Liberia. On these items, they might as well be the same 
tribe since their results are so close together. This is 
7Non-metric factor analyses such as Guttman's Partial 
Order Scalogram Analysis (POSA) and Smallest Space Analysis 
(SSA) were considered but rejected since in the former 
ordinality of item sub-categories could not be assumed and 
in the latter no advantage over metric factor analysis was 
apparent and SSA is more expensive to run. 
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TABLE 19 
CORRELATION MATRIX FROM FIRST TRIBAL FACTOR ANALYSIS 
KPELLE KRU LOMA KISSI BASSA GREBO GOLA GIO MANO KRAHN 
KPELLE .76 .84 .83 .92 .81 .92 .82 .93 .83 
KRU .68 .74 .64 . 96 .73 .57 .71 .94 
LOMA .84 .85 .74 .89 .81 .80 .77 
KISSI .80 .75 .87 .85 .85 .78 
BASSA .65 .88 .88 .91 .66 
GREBO .79 .63 .75 .96 
GOLA .85 .90 .78 
GIO .94 .61 
MANO .74 
KRAHN 
the only distinct group. The Loma and Kissi tend to vary 
together and so do the Bassa, Mano and Gio. The Gola and 
Kpelle appear to occupy middle positions. None of these 
latter seven tribes really forms a distinct cluster like the 
Kwa group does. 
A second factor analysis was run on the same theoreti-
cally important items Q 34, Q 36, Q 37, Q 38, and Q 51, and 
the other added ones. However, this time only one key 
category was picked from each item. 8 For example in Q 34 
8Let the first two digits represent the question and 
the third the chosen category of the question. The data 
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the achievement response of "give the money equally to both 
men" was chosen and in Q 36 "give the money to the smart 
son." This use of one category eliminated the degree of 
freedom problem since correlations based on response cate-
gories were now independent. The second item analysis 
yielded four factors which was plausible considering the 
diversity of subject matter of the questions. Q 34, Q 36, 
and Q 37, the three questions which "unambiguously" tap 
into achievement responses, did not load on the same factor. 
This implies that we do not have sufficient information on 
these cultures to analyze for underlying dimensions. 
The second tribal factor analysis yielded two dimen-
sions. The loadings are given in Table 20, Tribal Factor 
Analysis #2. 
These are factors rotated to maximize independence. 
Factor 2 clearly pulls the three Kwa-speaking tribes in the 
South out as a separate group. No other tribe has such high 
loadings on the second factor. The remaining seven tribes 
all have high loadings on Factor 1. Why should a sub-set 
of categories from the same items bring out two factors? 
The answer appears to be that when only these theoretically 
important sub-categories are examined "noise" from the 
matrix used were the tribes' percentage responses to 342, 
351, 361, 371, 382, 010, 422, 440, 512, 200, and 230, e.g., 
category 2 was chosen from Q 34 and so on. 
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others is eliminated and a better discrimination among the 
tribes is possible. The correlation matrix from which the 
two factors were extracted shows a greater variation 
within it than the first matrix. 
TABLE 20 
TRIBAL FACTOR ANALYSIS #2 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
KPELLE .830 .454 
KRU .169 .956 
LOMA .919 .004 
KISSI .885 .336 
BASSA .942 .135 
GREBO .183 .971 
GOLA .947 .256 
GIO .880 .221 
MANO .736 .535 
KRAHN .262 .950 
For example, compare the correlation between the Kru 
and the Loma between the first and second matrices. In the 
first matrix it is .68, in the second it is .19. The same 
patterns still exist but they are accentuated since there 
seems to be a greater difference between the three Kwa-
speaking tribes, the Kru, Krahn and Grebo, and the remaining 
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TABLE 21 
CORRELATION MATRIX FROM SECOND TRIBAL FACTOR ANALYSIS 
KPELLE KRU LOMA KISSI BASSA GREBO GOLA GIO MANO KRAHN 
KPELLE .57 .72 .83 .91 .57 .92 .74 .84 .65 
KRU .19 .48 .31 .95 .43 .30 .56 .94 
LOMA .84 .82 .18 .89 .75 .56 .28 
KISSI .82 .47 .92 .86 .79 .56 
BASSA .28 .95 .78 .75 .36 
GREBO .42 .40 .65 .96 
GOLA .83 .76 .49 
GIO .89 .41 
MANO .67 
KRAHN 
tribes on these categories than when all of the categories 
taken together. That is, evidence from both the cluster 
analysis and the factor analysis indicates a high linear 
similarity in the way tribes answer the questions, but there 
are significant variations within that similarity. Three of 
the tribes group together. These same tribes speak 
languages from the same linguistic grouping and are next to 
each other geographically within Liberia. 
Thus, we have so far shown that the existence of 
"modern" responses cannot be explained by reference to 
"modernization" or "urbanization." And we have also shown 
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that rural social structure, as exemplified in the variable 
"tribe," does vary with the questions on achievement. 
Analysis of Tribal Differences 
The results of the analysis to this point indicate 
that rural social structure as exemplified by the variable 
"tribe" does statistically vary with the achievement re-
sponses. Liebenow lists the tribes in Liberia and their 
sizes. The tribal distribution for this sample is included 
with it. As Liebenow shows the ten largest tribes in 
Liberia are also the ten largest in this sample of rubber 
workers. Only those tribes for which the number of respon-
dents was greater than twenty-five were used in the factor 
analysis and in the examination of tribal differences. Ten 
tribes were above this arbitrary cutting point. 
A control for tribe was made by dividing the ten tribes 
into two groups. The basis for decision was the cluster and 
factor analyses. They loaded seven tribes in one factor 
and three on a second factor. Below is a map of these 
tribes, and the directions from which they entered Liberia. 
The three tribes loading on the second factor and also 
forming a clear cluster are the Kru, Krahn and Grebo. These 
are all Kwa-speaking tribes in the South. These three 
tribes are treated as a single group and the remaining 
seven tribes were treated as a second group. Having found 
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TABLE 22 
TRIBAL AFFILIATION OF LIBERIA'S POPULATION, 1962* 
Kpelle 
Bassa 
Gio 
Kru 
Grebe 
Mano 
Loma 
Krahn 
Gola 
Kissi 
Mandingo 
Vai 
Gbandi 
Belle 
Dey 
Tribe 
Mende 
Miscellaneous 
Total tribal 
Alien African 
No tribal affiliation 
Total population 
Size 
211,081 
165,856 
83,208 
80,813 
77,007 
72,122 
53,891 
52,552 
47,295 
34,914 
29,750 
28,898 
28,599 
5,465 
5,396 
4,974 
2,299 
984,120 
8,875 
23,478 
1,016,473 
Per 
Cent 
20 
16 
8 
8 
8 
7 
5 
5 
5 
4 
3 
3 
3 
97 
1 
2 
100 
.5 
. 5 
.5 
.5 
Rubber 
Sample 
176 
209 
92 
155 
262 
155 
40 
63 
33 
85 
4 
25 
21 
2 
5 
18 
31 
1323 
7 
3 
1333 
205 
Per 
Cent 
13.2 
15.7 
6.9 
11.6 
19.6 
11.6 
3.0 
4.7 
2.5 
6.4 
0.3 
1.9 
1.6 
0.1 
0.4 
1.3 
2.3 
99.2 
0.5 
0.2 
99.9 
*From J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Evolution of 
Privilege, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Last 
two columns my data. 
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that "tribe" has an effect, we now wish to find out what the 
effect is. So we take each of the questions examined 
earlier and examine how the two groups answered the ques-
tions. 
TABLE 23 
AGE-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WHEN TRIBE IS 
CONTROLLED FOR 
Q 34. Two men, both do same good work, one man older, 
plenty family. Other man young, no got family, not got 
children. Both work for you, how you pay them. Older man 
get more, young man get more, both get same? 
Total Groue 1* Groue 2 
% N % N % N 
0. Older 
get more 34.5 449 27.6 112 36.8 263 
1. Younger 
get more 9.5 124 3.7 15 14.3 102 
2. Both get 
same 56.0 728 68.7 270 49.0 350 
100.0 1301 100.0 406 100.0 715 
*In this table and the next series of tables Group 1 
includes the Kru, Grebe, Krahn. Group 2 includes the 
Kpelle, Loma, Kissi, Bassa, Gola, Gio and Mano. 
The presumed achievement response here is that both men 
should be paid equal pay for equal work rather than one man 
or other receiving more because of age or economic position. 
The third row shows that Group 1, the three Kwa tribes, has 
a distinctly higher rate of picking the achievement re-
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sponse. Overall, half the persons chose "both get same," 
but almost 70 per cent of the Kwa group chose it. 
TABLE 24 
POLITICAL STATUS-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WHEN 
TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR 
Q 36. Two men, who should we respect more? One man he 
town chief, work plenty hard, other man he clan chief, but 
he lazy. Who we respect more? 
Total GrouE 1 Grou:e 2 
% N % N % N 
0 . Lazy clan 
chief 13.3 172 11.0 46 15.0 111 
1. Hard working 
town chief 74.7 967 77.9 325 72.3 536 
2. Both 12.0 156 11.0 46 12.7 94 
100.0 1295 100.0 417 100.0 741 
When we examine the percentage of respondents to the 
achievement response "strong town chief" we again find that 
a substantial majority of the people in both groups chose 
it in preference to a "lazy clan chief" or "both." That is, 
even though the clan chief has a much higher social position 
few say they are willing to respect him more than a hard 
working town chief. Group 1, the Kwa group, has a slightly 
higher percentage than the total sample and the other seven 
tribes. 
TABLE 25 
SECOND POLITICAL STATUS-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WHEN 
TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR 
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Q 5,2. Two men, who should we respect more, one man he clan 
chief, work plenty hard, other man he town chief, but he 
lazy. 
Total Grou:e 1 Grou:e 2 
% N % N % N 
0. Hard working 
clan chief 83.7 643 84.8 335 80.5 206 
1. Lazy town 
chief 6.1 47 6.1 24 7.4 19 
2. Both 10.2 78 9.1 36 12.1 31 
100.0 768 100.0 395 100.0 256 
This is a reversal of Q 36. The adjectives describing 
performance are reversed. Both groups score in the 80's, 
whereas in Q 36 they scored in the 70's. A hard working 
clan chief is more respected than a hard working town chief, 
which is reasonable. Note that the Kwa group scores 
slightly higher than Group 2. These differences are indi-
cative although four out of five pick the "hard working" 
alternative. When that alternative was placed in front of 
town chief 75 per cent chose it. When it was placed in 
front of clan chief 84 per cent chose it. 
TABLE 26 
AGE-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WHEN 
TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR 
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Q 37. Man with small money got two sons, both want money 
for school business. Big son is dull, but small son is 
plenty clever. Who should man give money to? 
Total GrouE 1 Grou:e 2 
% N % N % N 
0. Older boy 
who dull 3.3 43 1.9 8 4.0 30 
1. Small boy 
wno clever 67.7 892 70.0 291 67.3 511 
2. Both 29.0 382 28.1 117 28.7 218 
100.0 1317 100.0 416 100.0 759 
The achievement response is "small boy who clever" and 
the majority of respondents chose this. As in the two 
previous questions, the Kwa in Group 1 score higher than 
the total sample and Group 2, the other seven tribes. 
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TABLE 27 
FRIEND-FAMILY COMPARISON WHEN TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR 
Q 38. If you got small money and both your best friend and 
a family man want money for same business, who you give 
money to? 
Total Grou:e 1 Grou:e 2 
% N % N % N 
0. Family man 36.0 463 48.6 197 28.0 207 
1. Friend 25.6 329 20.7 84 28.4 104 
2 . Both 38.4 494 30.6 124 43.6 366 
100.0 1286 100.0 405 100.0 740 
This question is different from the previous three as 
it does not make reference to hard work or achievement. It 
was originally asked to check out the commonly held belief 
that 11 family" is the key variable to analyze in order to 
understand the social structure and economic organization 
of non-literate societies. The total results show that 
when presented with this situation "family man" was not the 
most frequently chosen reply. Almost half of the Kru, Krahn 
and Grebo in Group 1 chose this reply. This is the same 
group that scored higher on the achievement responses of the 
previous three questions. In other words, it is possible 
that an emphasis on achievement may exist in the same cul-
ture with an emphasis on family. 
TABLE 28 
SECOND FRIEND-FAMILY COMPARISON WHEN 
TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR 
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Q 51. Is friendship business stronger than family business? 
0. Family 
business 
stronger 
1. Friend 
business 
stronger 
2. Both 
Total 
% N 
61.0 
19.7 
19.3 
100.0 
478 
154 
151 
783 
Group 1 
% N 
68.6 
17.8 
13.6 
100.0 
273 
71 
54 
398 
Group 2 
% N 
50.4 
21. 8 
27.9 
100.0 
132 
57 
73 
262 
Q 38 is a stronger re-phrasing of the previous ques-
tion. When no situations at all are specified 60 per cent 
of the respondents say they place an emphasis on family. As 
in the previous question, this varies by tribe since the 
three Kwa tribes in Group 1 again stress family much more 
than do the other seven tribes in Group 2. Question 51, 
above, is a stronger re-phrasing of Q 38 and both tap into 
the same phenomena. A rank order correlation for the ten 
tribes was computed for sub-category zero, "family man," on 
questions 38 and 51. Rho= .80 indicating that, in 
general, the ten tribes proportionately increased their 
percentages from Q 38 to Q 51. The three Kwa tribes also 
/ 
212 
stressed achievement more, and the next question compares an 
emphasis on family to an emphasis on achievement. 
TABLE 29 
FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WHEN 
TRIBE IS CONTROLLED FOR 
Q 56. You got small money and both your best friend and a 
family man come to you, need money, friend he work plenty 
hard, but family man he lazy. Who you give money to? 
Total Grou12 1 Groue 2 
% N % N % N 
0. Lazy family 
man 28.5 109 35.4 17 29.0 73 
1. Strong 
friend 51.8 198 39.6 19 53.2 134 
2 . Both 19.6 75 25.0 12 17.9 45 
100.0 382 100.0 48 100.0 252 
The previous question did not use achievement responses 
and the three Kwa tribes in Group 1 had a much higher per-
centage responding to the alternative "family man." Q 56 
was first asked at B. F. Goodrich, the last plantation the 
author visited, so the Group 1 N only equals 48, forty of 
them are Grebo. This is not a good sized sample but the 
writer will use it anyway. The differences between Table 28 
and Table 27 are striking. The placement of adjectives re-
ferring to achievement results in noticeable shift. The Kwa 
group drops from 70 per cent to 35 per cent, the other 
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seven tribes drop from 50 to 30 per cent. The Kwa group 
shows the greatest reaction to the achievement adjectives, 
dropping 35 per cent. Although this was an extensive drop 
the Kwa end up with a higher percentage of people pre-
ferring to give money to the "lazy family man." It should 
be remembered that two-thirds of the respondents picked 
"strong friend" or "both." 
This evidence in this chapter shows an overall 
tendency on the part of the workers to choose achievement 
answers. Within this general tendency is a tendency for 
the Kwa tribes to score slightly higher in their achieve-
ment responses. This tendency is strong enough to be 
pulled out as a separate factor. This general finding is 
corroborated by Dieter Seibel. He writes, 
The only tribes on which I have some definite 
knowledge about the traditional system of status 
allocation are Kpelle (closer to the ascriptive 
end of the continuum) and the Kru tribes (Kru, 
Grebo, Krahn-Sapo, Belle, De - of the latter two, 
I have only 3 individuals) which are closer to 
achievement end of the continuum. So, I compared 
the 115 Kpelle and the 104 members of Kru tribes 
in my workers' sample (381). I compared the mean 
score of adaptation to wage labor which is com-
posed of several factors with which you are 
familiar from my questionnaire. 
I did two tests: a one-way analysis of. variance 
resulted in an F ratio of 15.25, the T-test came up 
with 3. 906. In both tests, the difference is sig-
nificant at the 0. 001 level, and indeed beyond it. 
So, it appears we got something, according to our 
predictions. I hope, your results are also in 
the predicted direction.9 
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To this point we have shown that (a) a majority of 
these rice farmers-rubber workers pick achievement re-
sponses, (b) variation in responses is not associated with 
"modernization 11 or "urbanization," but (c) the answers do 
vary by "tribe." That is, the search for an explanation 
cannot be account for by "outside" factors, rather we have 
to go into "traditional" social structure to find an 
explanation for the existence of responses from people who, 
according to the conventional view, have no business making 
those responses. The next chapter reviews what little 
ethnographic information we have on the tribes within the 
area. The anthropological evidence is introduced to 
complement, validate and elaborate the survey research 
findings described in this chapter. 
9Hans-Dieter Seibel, personal communication, April 24, 
1970. 
CHAPTER SIX 
HISTORY AND ETHNOGRAPHIES OF THE LIBERIAN TRIBES 
Liberia has been the meeting place of three language 
groups: Mande from the interior, West Atlantic from the 
north and Kwa speakers who are indigenous to the area. 1 
1An excellent literature exists on the history of West 
Africa, the climate and geography of Liberia and the history 
of Liberia as a country. This literature is available if 
the reader is interested in it but this chapter will focus 
on the indigenous culture and social structure of tribal 
groupings. For a short description see United States Army 
Area Handbook for Liberia, Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1964, pp. 23-34. A platoon of the Army 
Topographical Batallion, headquarters in Italy, is stationed 
outside of Monrovia and has been working on mapping the 
country. Its work includes both aerial photography and 
gravitational readings using a Losch-Romberg Gravity Meter. 
The basic political work on Liberia is J. Gus Liebenow, 
Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege , Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1969. Th e basic economic work is 
Robert W. Clower, et al., Growth Without Development , North-
western University Press, Evanston, 1966. Both are less 
than laudatory in their description of government opera-
tions. However, these criticisms can be over-emphasized. 
Liberia, as an African country, is subjected to the same 
predatory trade policies that third world countries every-
where experience: Its foreign debt burden is drastically 
increasing, it now must import food having lost its previous 
self-sufficiency, the capital development of its economy is 
increasingly planned by the foreign corporations who invest 
there, its cost of imports rise faster than its income from 
exports, it has no control over the price it receives for 
its natural rubber and iron ore, and the market for natural 
rubber will continue to decline thus aggravating an already 
bad unemployment rate, and its military officers are rotated 
to the United States for counter-insurgency training. In 
the long run it is the "America-Liberian" elite which 
suffers the most from these conditions since it is they who 
control the country's government. 
216 
From his work on sickle cell gene distribution, Living-
stone has reconstructed historical migration in West Africa. 
Seventy-five per cent of the malaria in West Africa is due 
to the mosquito, Anopheles gambiae. It cannot breed in (a) 
shaded water, (b) water with a strong current, (c) brackish 
water and (d) alkaline or polluted water. His argument is, 
if we consider the types of water found in the tropical rain 
forest we see that only these types of water are found 
there. Therefore, non-forested agricultural areas will have 
higher numbers of mosquitos. Sickle cell anemia is a 
genetic adaption by human beings to malarial conditions. 
That is, the higher the rate of exposure to mosquitos the 
greater the frequency of sickle cell genes in the popula-
tion. Therefore, tribes will have differing frequencies 
depending on their geographical location and cultural prac-
tices, and relatively speaking, we can tell how long tribes 
have been agricultural. For Liberian tribes Livingstone 
has the following distribution. 
We see that the Kwa speaking Greba Krahn Kru, and Webbo 
have the lowest frequencies. These tribes have only taken 
up agriculture in the last few hundred years and still live 
in dense tropical forest. Livingstone writes: 
Although there is no correlation of the frequency 
of the sickle cell trait with the linguistic sub-
families in this part of West Africa, the tribes with 
low frequencies in both Portuguese Guinea and Eastern 
Liberia seem to be the indigenous inhabitants of West 
Africa who have been forced back into these areas by 
Tribe 
Kissi 
Mende 
Gbandi 
Vai 
Kpelle 
Loma 
Gola 
Belle 
Bassa 
Dei 
Mano 
Gio 
Grebo 
Krahn 
Kru 
Webbo 
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TABLE 30 
THE FREQUENCIES OF THE SICKLE CELL TRAIT IN 
THE TRIBES OF LIBERIAa 
Investi-
gations 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
Number 
Examined 
298 
77 
352 
93 
982 
511 
183 
29 
811 
53 
709 
428 
69 
154 
148 
77 
Number 
Positive 
58 
13 
54 
13 
128 
65 
22 
3 
58 
2 
15 
9 
1 
1 
1 
0 
Sickle Cell 
Trait (%) 
19.46 
16.88 
15.34 
13.98 
13.03 
12.72 
12.02 
10.34 
7.15 
3.77 
2.12 
2.10 
1.45 
0.65 
0.68 
0.00 
aFrank B. Livingstone, "Anthropological Implications 
of Sickle Cell Gene Distribution in West Africa," American 
Anthropologist, 60 (June, 1958), pp. 533-62. Table on 
pp. 538-39. 
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later migrants from the east. The distribution of 
the West Atlantic languages along the coast with 
some isolated pockets in the interior indicates that 
the speakers of these languages were once more wide-
spread and have been forced back to the coast by 
more recent invaders.2 
He also writes: 
Also from Nigeria, some of the Kwa peoples spread 
in similar fashion through the West African tropical 
rain forest to the Ivory Coast and forced other Kwa 
peoples, the Kru and Lagoon speakers, westward into 
the Ivory Coast and Liberia. The Kru and Lagoon 
peoples were probably in the tropical rain forest as 
hunters and gatherers prior to this spread of agri-
culture. Agriculture has since been introduced to 
most of the Kru and Lagoon peoples, but it usually 
has rice as the basic crop, which comes from a dif-
ferent center of dispersal, or manioc, which was 
introduced into West Africa from the New World. Even 
today in the Ivory Coast, as several botanists (Miege 
1953; Chevalier 1952) have remarked, there is a sharp 
boundary of yam· cultivation on the Bandama River, 
which is also the border between the Baoule and Kru 
peoples. In addition, the yarn cultivators, such as 
the Agni, have an elaborate ritual associated with 
the yam harvest (Rahm 1953; Miege 1953), which indi-
cates great reliance on this crop. Although the Kru 
peoples have for the most part adopted agriculture, 
there is still more reliance on hunting in the Kru 
area (Kerharo and Bouquet 1949), and there are some 
groups who are still mainly hunters. 3 
Thus the Kru, Grebe and Krahn have a way of living and 
social history which is different from the other Liberian 
tribes. It is therefore not surprising that a factor 
analysis loaded these tribes onto a separate factor. The 
historical information we have about the area is congruent 
with the statistical analysis of the previous chapter. The 
2Ibid., p. 544. 3Ibid., p. 552. 
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Mano and the Gio have the lowest rates after the Kru, Krahn 
and Grebo. They are Mande speaking tribes who entered 
Liberia from the direction of Upper Volta. The Kpelle and 
other Mande peoples, and the West Atlantic group came down 
from the north through Sierra Leone and the northeast 
through Guinea. 
At the border between the Mano and the Kpelle, the 
frequency of the sickle cell trait increases sharply. 
Although these peoples both speak Mande languages, 
they belong to different subgroups of the Mande sub-
family (Prost 1953). Kpelle is related to Mende and 
Susu to the northwest in Sierra Leone, and this tribe 
has undoubtedly come into Liberia from that direction. 
However, Mano and the other Mande languages whose 
speakers have low frequencies of the sickle cell trait 
are related to several Mande languages in the Upper 
Volta Province of French West Africa and also to a 
Mande language in Nigeria. Vendeix (1924) states that 
the Dan, and Tauxier (1924) that the Gouro, came into 
their present habitats from the northeast. Donner 
(1939) states that the Dan came from the north into 
the forest and forced the Kru peoples ahead of them. 
It would thus appear that these Mande tribes with low 
sickling frequencies came into their present location 
by a different route than that of their Mande neighbors 
to the northwest in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The 
Bobofing, who speak a language related to these Mande 
languages whose speakers have low sickling frequencies, 
have 25 percent of the sickle cell trait and are some 
distance to the northeast of the Dan and Gouro; so 
that it seems that the sickle cell gene was introduced 
after the separation of these languages. The Mandingo 
are to the north of the Mano, Dan, and Gouro, and be-
tween them and the Bobofing. From the 12th to 15th 
centuries A.D. when the Mali Empire, which was ruled 
by the Mandingos, was at its height, these people are 
known to have expanded out from their original home-
land. It would appear that this expansion of the 
Mandingo forced the Mano, Dan, and Gouro into the 
forest and separated them from their relatives to 
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the northeast. 4 
For the purposes of this dissertation several points 
need to be established: First a substantial cultural uni-
formity exists among the peoples of West Africa. Secondly, 
tribes in the area are differentiated into distinct cul-
tural groupings. 
Forde writes: 
Thus the linguistic distributions in West Africa 
suggest several important underlying features of 
cultural development. First, since apart from the 
Saharan extensions into the savanna around Lake Chad, 
all the languages of West Africa appear to be ulti-
mately derived from a common stock, one would expect 
to find significant elements of a common early tradi-
tion in the cultures of all West African peoples. 
Little systematic enquiry has so far been given to 
this question but there are many indications that 
underlying the great regional and tribal differences 
in the elaboration of cult and cosmological ideas 
there is a very widespread substratum of basic ideas 
that persists in the rituals, myths and folk tales 
of West African peoples.5 
Forde also describes the cultural differentiation and 
his description is applicable to the forest peoples in this 
sample: the Kru, Grebo and Krahn. 
As far as they can be judged, from those existing 
forest peoples who have remained outside the spheres 
of the most complex state organization of northern 
4rbid., p. 546. 
5oaryll Forde, "The Cultural Map of West Africa: 
Successive Adaptations to Tropical Forests and Grasslands," 
in Simon and Phoebe Ottenberg (eds.), Culture and Societies 
of Africa, New York: Random House, 1960, pp. 116-138. 
Quote from p. 123. 
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origin or of later developments in response to 
European commerce, the older patterns of social 
organization in the forest belt, while variable, were 
all small in scale and rooted in local ties of kin-
ship. The local community, rarely exceeding a few 
thousand persons and often only a few hundred strong, 
was virtually autonomous, with its own organization 
into groups of kinsfolk and its own system of 
authority. It had external contacts with similar 
neighboring groups, intercourse that was sufficient 
to maintain general similarity of speech, custom and 
social organization. Beliefs, skills and social 
innovations could spread widely from one to another 
and a sense of cultural unity maintained among a 
considerable number of communities. Their inter-
relations were not regulated from above, they took 
the form of chains of friendships and alliances, 
liable to be broken by feuds and intermittent hos-
tilities. A lineage system (patrilineal, matri-
lineal, or even dual) whereby kinsmen in one line of 
descent maintained solidarity for both internal 
organization of their own group and for external co-
operation and competition with similar groups, appear 
everywhere to have provided the first order of 
grouping within a locality. Among some peoples the 
lineage principle was more widely extended to embrace 
a series of local communities conceived and organized 
as a body of kin, segmented into ultimately related 
groups. Elsewhere, and associated with peoples living 
in larger compact settlements comparatively isolated 
geographically and socially from one another, a vil-
lage organization, with territorial, age-set and 
status-associations, is superimposed on the system of 
kin groups of more restricted significance. Nowhere, 
except where the extranous influence of invading 
minorities is both traditionally asserted and intrin-
sically probable, were politically centralized states 
with an administrative and territorial system of 
government established. The relations between lineage 
or small clan-organized tribes or between autonomous 
village communities were those of give and take in 
trade and intermarriage, punctuated by differences 
settled through arbitration, feud or warfare. 6 
6rbid., pp. 125-26. 
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Forde's description verifies the statistical findings 
in the previous chapter which showed the Kwa speaking group 
to be both more achievement oriented and more family 
oriented. He goes on to describe other cultural variations 
which are applicable to the smaller West Atlantic and Mande 
tribes in Liberia. 
But the agricultural patterns of the Western Sudan 
have also gone through several phases of development 
as more advanced techniques and additional crops and 
associated crafts were developed in some areas. 
Among some of the savanna peoples, as we have seen, 
there persists a more primitive economy with a less 
productive agriculture, lacking textiles and other 
specialized crafts and often dependent on a sporadic 
trade for iron. When we consider the social organi-
zation of such peoples we find it broadly similar in 
character to that of the forest peoples in the high 
degree of autonomy of small local communities and 
the importance of extended kin groups for the organi-
zation of social relations within and between them. 
The more advanced and productive agricultural 
systems and the elaboration of specialized crafts in 
cloth and metal, on the other hand, are associated 
with a different social order. Such peoples whether 
Mandingka in the West or Hausa and Kanuri in the East 
are organized in states, which although they vary 
greatly in size, have basic features of social organi-
zation in common, namely the centralization of 
authority in a ruler with his councilors and subchiefs 
drawn from an aristocracy of birth; an elaborate 
etiquette of obeisance, expressive of ranking and sub-
ordination of classes in the social order; the col-
lecting of tax and tribute to maintain the central 
organs of government and its agents. The more primi-
tively organized peoples referred to above have per-
sisted only in areas which have not been dominated and 
incorporated in these states and one of the processes 
of incorporation was very apparent when Europeans 
first penetrated and began to administer the various 
territories in the Western Sudan. The kin-organized 
tribes on the periphery of the centralized states were 
the slave-raiding reservoirs of the former. Only 
those in the more remote and difficult country re-
mained unmolested.7 
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From these general descriptions we narrow the focus to 
Liberia specifically. d'Azevedo, who did field work among 
the Gola, writes about the lack of adequate ethnographic 
information on tribes in Liberia. 
The particular section of the coast under con-
sideration here will be referred to as the Central 
West Atlantic region comprising a bloc of peoples 
in southern Sierra Leone and western Liberia. 
Ethnologic investigation in this region has been 
sparse and uneven. There are few complete reports 
for any of the groups, others have been but 
briefly described in surveys, and there are some 
sections--particularly in Liberia--about which there 
is scarcely any information. British and French 
research has maintained a high degree of mutual 
insularity in approaches, as well as a territorial 
exclusiveness. Both have been concerned primarily 
with the study of the larger ethnic populations 
within their respective provinces of political con-
trol, and have tended to make generalizations about 
the characteristics of entire ethnolinguistic 
entities from data derived from the investigation 
of particular communities, chiefdoms, or sections. 
Important features of variation within groups, as 
they pertain to an understanding of local adaptation 
or the effects of intertribal contact, are minimized. 8 
This was written in 1962 and the lack of ethnographic 
accounts has not improved since. The above comments also 
help to put the contributions of this thesis into per-
spective. No survey research techniques hav~ even been 
7rbid., p. 127. 
8warren L. d'Azevedo, "Some Historical Problems in the 
Delineation of a Central West Atlantic Region," Annals of 
the New York Academy of Science, 96 (January 20, 1962), 
pp. 512-37. Quote from pp. 512-14. 
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applied to a comparative study of tribal populations. Nor 
have studies attempted to corroborate and validate their 
findings using historical and demographic information. 
Typical studies involve research in a single location and 
then generalize their findings to the entire tribe or geo-
graphical area. 
d'Azevedo presents the following picture. From the 
north, Western Atlantic and Mande tribes have formed a 
common cultural heritage. 
Such matters as traditions involving intertribal 
marriages between members of ruling lineages, the 
heterogeneous and mobile populations of chiefdoms 
briefly united by alliance or conquest, the rich 
mutual reference that appears in legend and 
genealogy concerning coastward migration under 
pressure of advancing Mande peoples, and the politi-
cal and economic problems created by the concentra-
tion of new populations in the forest area, all have 
contributed to a common content of references to the 
past and to a high degree of cultural homogeneity 
among peoples of diverse origins.9 
These tribes have developed Poro and Sande types of secret 
society.lo Poro has not yet, if it ever will, diffused to 
the Kru, Krahn and Grebe. However, it has begun to effect 
the Bassa, a Kwa-speaking group north of the Kru, and 
neighboring Mande tribes. The following description does 
not apply to the Kru, Krahn and Grebe. It applies in part 
9rbid., p. 515. 
lOFor an early account of secret societies see F. W. 
Butt-Thompson, West African Secret Societies, London: 
Witherby, 1929. 
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to the Bassa, Mano and Gio, but it does apply to the Nor-
thern and Northwestern tribes: Kpelle, Loma, Kissi, 
Gbandi, Gola, and Vai. This latter group includes both the 
West Atlantic and Mande tribes. 
The societies of this region are small autonomous 
monarchies whose wider sphere of diplomacy and 
alliance in the recent past frequently involved 
tenuous federation of chiefdoms over wide areas re-
gardless of tribal or linguistic affiliation. A 
complex structure of authority obtains in these small 
political units in which aspects of power are rele-
gated to the ranked-lineage hierarchy, to the secret 
societies, and to the secular administrative appara-
tus with its varying degrees of clientship and 
bureaucratization. The extent to which particular 
circumstances have tended to concentrate power in 
one or the other of these institutions accounts for 
much of the variation of form to be found among the 
chiefdoms within and among the tribal groups. 
Genealogical material and other evidences from oral 
traditions would substantiate the view that there has 
been a transition, over the past two or three cen-
turies, from an emphasis on kinship in the organiza-
tion of political units to a territorial and village 
emphasis involving more complex and heterogeneous 
groups. The peculiar form of secret society known 
as Poro appears to have emerged as a crucial institu-
tion in defense of traditional principles of ranked-
lineage authority in competition with the rise of 
secular, individualistic political principles repre-
sented by new war lords, conquest, and immigrant 
populations imposed upon the older system. In a 
highly mobile and diversified adaptive situation, the 
Poro provided a sacred and secret arm of political 
authority and intergroup diplomacy that helped to 
maintain stability through appeal to the gerontocratic 
and hierarchical principles derived from the ideal 
model of the ranked-lineage structure of the past. 11 
Thus Liberia has been the meeting place of three 
language groups, two of which, the West Atlantic and Mande, 
11rbid., p. 516. 
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have culturally merged over the last 300 years. The 
southern Kwa group is distinct from the other two groups. 
The position developed in the present paper is in 
substantial agreement with Murdock's view that the 
cultural homogeneity characteristic of this southern 
extension of the West Atlantic area is attributable 
primarily to tribal contacts and borrowing within the 
area, and that "the original cultural differences 
among the three linguistic groups have become very 
much blurred." However, this is only true of the 
Mande and West Atlantic speakers of Sierra Leone and 
northern Liberia. It does not hold for the Kwa-
speaking peoples south of the Saint John River in 
central Liberia. None of the available sources would 
substantiate Murdock's claim that the Poro-type 
secret society, circumcision, and rice cultivation are 
general throughout the entire area with one or two 
exceptions in the western Ivory Coast. These 
features are still in the process of spreading south-
ward from the Central West Atlantic cluster of peoples 
and from the eastern Mande. Their appearance among 
the Kwa-speaking peoples is weak and extremely recent. 
Poro has been adopted by certain Kru peoples adjacent 
to the Kpelle, Mano, and Gio, but it has not spread 
southward into the major coastal groups. Those 
groups adopting Poro also adopt circumcision practices. 
Among most of the Kru, Grebe, and other Kwa-speakers 
of central and southern Liberia these practices are 
abhorred. They have begun to spread southward during 
the past few decades under influence of Liberian and 
European medical services and, through contact with 
people, to the east and north due to increased mobility 
and communication. Rice cultivation and intensive 
slash-and-burn agriculture are sporadic and have been 
noted among these groups only in the past century. 
It is clearly a result of the influence of Liberian 
colonists, the depletion of forests, and the dis-
appearance of game. 
Of special significance for the present discussion 
is the fact that southern Liberia and the western 
Ivory Coast appear to be the locus of a sharp division 
of these agricultural traditions. The Bandama River, 
which separates the Baoule and the Kru peoples, is 
also the northernmost boundary of intensive yam 
cultivation. Where yams appear in agriculture north 
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of this boundary, their harvest is not associated 
with the elaborate ritual that is found among the 
Agni and other Kwa-speaking peoples farther to the 
south. The Kru, Bassa, and many other Kwa-speaking 
peoples of the central Liberian forests have not 
been intensive farmers until quite recently, and 
still rely more upon fishing, hunting, and forest 
gathering than do the West Atlantic-speaking and 
Mande-speaking peoples to the north and east of 
the Saint Paul River. Thus the forests of south-
eastern and central Liberia appear to represent an 
area of hiatus between the spread of Sudanic agri-
cultural patterns from the northeast, and the root 
and wild-forest crop complex from the easterly 
tropical forests of the Volta and Niger deltas. 
Although rice has spread more rapidly as an 
intensive crop along the West Atlantic coast than 
either cotton, millet, or sorghum, it can be dated 
no earlier than one century ago for many of the 
southern Bassa, Kru, and Grebo peoples. Among the 
Grebo, rice cultivation has appeared only in the 
present century through the influence of Liberian 
settlers and government development programs. 
Minimal yam and cassava cultivation were a mere 
supplement to fishing and forest gatherinr prior 
to this time. 
Thus it would seem that the area between the Mano 
and the Saint John Rivers represents a convergence 
of a number of distinct cultural traditions arriving 
in the coastal forests of Sierra Leone and Liberia 
from three directions and at different historical 
periods. This convergence has taken place within 
the past three centuries in a very narrow corridor 
along the coast. The close proximity of these 
peoples and the intensity of their political and 
economic interrelations during the ensuing period 
are given added significance by the fact that the 
Poro-type secret society is represented in its most 
classic form among them and that they are the most 
culturally homogeneous cluster of peoples within 
the Central West Atlantic region despite their 
language differences. These peoples are the Mende, 
Vai, Gola, Kpelle, and De. 
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The phenomenon of north-to-south shading of popu-
lation density is accompanied by a similar distri-
bution of the size of villages and chiefdoms. Mende 
towns in the Sierra Leone may contain 1000 or more 
persons; chiefdoms may vary from 5000 to 20,000 per-
sons. The size of these units increases to the north 
and eastward among the Temne, Limba, and Susu. Among 
the Gola, the largest towns that I visited seldom 
exceeded 100 huts or about 500 persons; the most 
populous chiefdoms did not exceed 3000 to 5000 per-
sons. This appears to be the case for most of the 
peoples surrounding the Gola in the western province 
of Liberia. On the eastern border of Liberia, however, 
the Mande-speaking peoples have several large towns 
approaching the Mende and Temne figures. Yet among 
the Sapu, Pudu, Kru, and Grebo to the south, the 
largest villages reported are from 50 to 90 huts, and 
much smaller hamlets are the general rule.12 
d'Azevedo ends a most useful description by saying, 
Rice cultivation and slash-and-burn practices were 
carried on intensively throughout the interior. Non-
African tree crops such as coffee, cocoa, rubber, and 
fruits were grown on large tribal and colonial 
plantation. As the European demand for African tim-
bers increased, forests were thinned, and entire 
sections were turned into scrub and grassland by 
agriculture. However these developments did not 
directly affect the Kwa-speaking peoples or the ter-
ritory south of the Saint John River. These peoples 
had not been incorporated into the confederacies and 
other political and economic alliances of the Central 
West Atlantic region immediately to the north. The 
true rain-forest belt has now receded into central 
Liberia where it extends southeastward to a con-
siderable depth along the coast. Migration was never 
an important factor in this area, and the populations 
are more stable. Until very recently the Kwa-speaking 
groups have constituted an almost impregnable bulwark 
against the spread of intensive rice cultivation and 
other Sudanic and Central West Atlantic features. 
They have, nevertheless, adopted many of the new 
American crops transmitted through Europeans and 
Liberian colonists. 
12rbid., pp. 518-31. 
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The populations of the chiefdoms of the Kru, 
Grebo, and other Kwa-speakers remain ethnically 
homogeneous in contrast to the extreme neterogeneity 
of the Central West Atlantic groupings. Their social 
organization, languages, and economic activities are 
looked upon--even in the present day--as alien and 
mysterious by the Central West Atlantic peoples 
immediately to the north of them.13 
Two clear assertions emerge: (a) this geographical 
area has cultural homogeneity in it and (b) heterogeneity 
exists between the southern Kwa group (Kru, Grebo and Krahn) 
and the other Liberian tribes. These assertions directly 
corroborate the results obtained from the factor analytic 
techniques used in the previous chapter. 
General Differences Among Liberian Tribes 
Having shown that historical reconstructions are com-
patible with the statistical findings reported previously, 
the logical next question is why do the tribes differ. An 
influential early (1940) writing on this topic was African 
Political Systems by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard14 which dis-
tinguished between centralized and segmentary systems. This 
was expanded by Brown15 who pointed out four types of 
13Ibid., pp. 536-37. 
14M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, African Politi-
cal Systems, New York: Oxford University Press, 1940. 
15paula Brown, "Patterns of Authority in West Africa," 
Journal of the International African Institute, 21 (October, 
19 51 ) , pp . 2 61- 7 8 . 
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political authori~y in West Africa: The first exercised 
only in and through kinship groups; the second with authori-
tative associations and kinship groups; thirdly, by kinship 
groups, associations and state organizations; and fourthly, 
by state organizations and subordinate kinship groups while 
associations are absent or of minor political importance. 
These initial discussions have been built up by other 
writers such as Tait and Middleton16 and Cohen and Middle-
ton.17 These analyses have set forth the key factors to 
look for in considering differences among tribes. 
We have already discussed historical 'differences among 
Liberian tribes. A few commentators have mentioned these 
differences explicitly. 
Liberty writes: 
Socl al differentiation varied according to com-
munity. Among the Vai, Mandinka, and Liberian, it 
was most pronounced; visible but less rigid among 
Kpelle, Lerma, Gola, Kisi, and Gbandi; less 
apparent among the Dey, Belle, and Bassa [these 
three are Kwa tribes]; and almost non-existent 
among the Kru. Political structure ran the entire 
centralization gamut from the highly centralized 
proto-Western Liberian, to the equally centralized 
sudanic Mandingo, to the proto-sudanic Vai, to the 
confederated Gola and Lerma, the more loosely con-
1 6John Middleton and David Tait (eds.), Tribes Without 
Rules: Studies in African Segmentary Sy stems, London: 
Routle d ge and Kegan, 1 958. 
17Ronald Cohen and John Middleton (eds.). Comparative 
Political Sy stems: Studies in the Politics of Pre-
Indus tr~al Societies, New York : Natural Hi story Press, 
1967. 
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federated Kpelle, Gbandi, Dey, Kis, Bassa, and Belle. 
The economic basis of the communities reflected a 
like diversity. A few like the Lorma and Kpelle 
were agriculturalists with sizeable towns and a 
market economy which provided most of the 
indigenously-made items of trade. Others like the 
Gola practiced a mixed economy of agriculture, 
hunting and food gathering, occasionally employing 
their strategic geographic location to supplement 
their sources of income. The Vai and Mandingo 
depended largely upon their commercial skills and 
the manufactures of their artisan stratum. The Kru 
were a kind of rural proletariat, fishermen and 
boathandlers. And the Liberian were preoccupied with 
trade ventures.18 
Liebenow writes: 
The process of political and social decentrali-
zation of authority was most severe among the coastal 
Kru and among the Grebo and Krahn in the southeast. 
The most that could be found there were clusters of 
villages or towns, few of which numbered over several 
hundred inhabitants. Within these small units, most 
of the political, social, and economic transactions 
of traditional tribal society took place. The Gola, 
Mende, Vai, Loma, and Kpelle in the north and west 
were organized into larger units under chiefs. As 
noted above, however, the tribe was broken into a 
number of relatively autonomous units. The Vai, for 
example, are divided into nine chiefdoms, only four 
of which are located in Liberia. The political frag-
mentation among the larger Kpelle community is far 
greater.19 
The Kru Tribe 
Both the above writers are in substantial agreement 
1 8c. E. Zamba Liberty, 
presented at First Liberian 
versity, August 1-2, 1969. 
"The Decline of the Dey," paper 
Conference, Stanford Uni-
Quote from pp. 2-3. 
l9J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Evolution of Privi-
lege, ~- cit., p. 39. 
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with each other and with the historical picture previously 
presented. The Kwa group has less political centralization 
and less social differentiation. The Kwa group has not 
been studied as well as other tribes such as the Kpelle and 
Gola. However, we can make the following points. 
Fraenkel writes: 
Traditionally the Kru were organized in a large 
number of independent towns, each with its own 
chief, who owed no allegiance to any other ruler, 
although he might have under him the heads of 
smaller villages which were usually offshoots of 
the main town. There was frequent fighting be-
tween the towns, usually over the question of 
land, and alliances of several towns sometimes took 
place, but these were only temporary, and Kru 
political structure contained no machinery for 
permanent co-operation between one town and an-
other. 20 · 
Fraenkel says that the river system on the Kru part of 
the coast made the construction of a coastal road from 
Monrovia quite difficult and that this area of Liberia has 
always been the most isolated. Even at the height of the 
dry season this writer found the 650 km. laterite road 
almost impassable since the dense jungle shades and pre-
vents evaporation of the 150 inches a year rainfall. 
Fraenkel continues saying the basis of social organi-
zation in Kru town is the pa nton , or exogamous particlan. 
The clan organization, based on kinship, cuts across towns 
20Merran Fraenkel, "Social Change on the Kru Coast of 
Liberia, 11 Africa, 36 (April, 1966), pp. 154-72. Quote from 
p. 154. 
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and acts as a segmentary lineage in the event of war or dis-
putes among towns. The lineages do not appear to be ranked 
hierarchically since towns have a system of checks and 
balances which allocates political office and prevents any 
one panton from becoming too strong. A system of age-grade 
sets cuts across the panton organization. The military 
basis of the age set system has disappeared and it now 
carries out civic and ceremonial duties. 
The central government's imposition of chiefs on this 
area created confusion. The "chief" as a political system 
was based on experience with the Vai-Gola region to the 
north which was traditionally organized into chiefdoms, 
unlike the Kru which were organized into politically 
autonomous towns. 
Seibel makes the following two points, both of which 
corroborate the statistical findings of the previous. 
First, all the Liberian tribes are generally achievement 
oriented. Secondly, the Kwa group is more achievement 
oriented than the tribes to the northwest. 
In all Liberian tribes status is largely allocated 
on the basis of achieved criteria. The differences, 
though of a minor scale, existing between the tribes 
confirm the hypothesis about a connection between 
traditional system of status allocation and recepti-
vity to achievement systems in modern settings. 
As far as the traditional system is concerned, 
the existence of an incipient class system, of 
chieftaincy, and of strong secret societies extending 
their power into many spheres of secular life among 
the Kpelle and the absence of these institutions 
among the Kru tribes places these two groups on 
different ~oints on the achievement-ascription 
continuum. 1 
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The initial crude beginnings of a complete ethnography 
on Liberian tribes has been started by the Tubman Center of 
African Culture and its preliminary report on the Kru has 
been published. 22 Pertinent to our purposes, it makes the 
following points. The Kru have a complex social organi-
zation, and traditionally had a well developed set of 
political and administrative positions and independent 
polygnous families. Public offices were balanced among 
kinship groups but performance of office was largely evalu-
ated by achievement criteria. Publicly the Kru peoples 
maintain an achievement emphasis and deny the existence of 
stratification although some stratification exists now and 
slave owning did exist. The secret societies of Poro and 
Sande are not prevalent among the Kru tribes although they 
have filtered down to neighboring tribes including the 
Bassa, Mano and Gio. Historically the Kru tribes are known 
as fierce and warlike. 
21H. Dieter Seibel, "Achievement and Ascription in 
Liberia: A Comparative View," paper presented on the panel 
'Change and Development in Liberia,' Liberia Conference, 
August 1-2, 1969, Stanford, California. Quote from p. 9. 
22Kjell Zetterstrom, "Ethnographic Survey of South-
eastern Liberia--Preliminary Report on the Kru," Roberts-
port, Liberia: Tubman Center of African Culture, 1969. 
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The Bassa Tribe 
The Bassa are a Kwa speaking tribe but are farther to 
the northwest than the Kru, Grebo and Krahn and thus, as 
would be expected, are more influenced by the Mande and 
West Atlantic tribes. The result is a cultural mixture. 
Handwerker's study of Bassa in Monrovia makes reference 
to social structure in the rural areas. 23 As with the other 
Kwa tribes, the Bassa are politically decentralized with 
small villages predominating. Lineages may have been 
partially ranked within villages. Like the Kru, no 
indigenous markets on any sizeable scale existed. The Bassa 
sold slaves to non-African slaves and like the Kru peoples, 
worked as stevedores and deckhands. Moral and sacred 
leadership had more ascriptive requirements than political 
or military leadership which was based on achievement pri-
marily. Unlike the Kru peoples, the Bassa circumcise and 
participate in Poro and Sande, and age-grade organizations 
are not prominent if they exist at all. Nor do Bassa vil-
lages have a clear "clan" (panton) organization. Rice 
farming probably diffused to the Bassa from the Kpelle. 
23winston Penn Hardwerker, "A Preliminary Study of 
Migration, Settlement and Social Organization in the Bassa 
Community, Monrovia, Liberia," unpublished Master's thesis, 
University of Oregon, 1969. 
' . 
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Siegmann's study of the Bassa for the Tubman Center 24 
complements the above description. Siegmann says the Bassa 
have clans but they are not as important as they are among 
the Kru, Grebo and Krahn. He presents a similar picture of 
political decentralization, small politically autonomous 
villages, with leadership selected for an ability to resolve 
disputes and guided by a council of elders which acted as a 
check on the leader. The Bassa then are a buffer zone be-
tween the cultural practices of the Kru peoples to the 
southeast and the Mande to the northwest. 
Kpelle and Gola Tribes 
Better historical and ethnographic information exists 
on two other Liberian tribes: Gibbs' work on the Kpelle 25 
and d'Azevedo's on the Gola. Little ethnographic informa-
tion exists on the Sapo, Webbo, Krahn, Gio, Mano, Loma, 
24william Siegmann, Report on the Bassa: Ethnographic 
Survey of Southeastern Liberia, Robertsport, Liberia: 
Tubman Center o f African Culture, 1969. 
25James L. Gibbs, Jr., "The Judicial Implications of 
Marital Instability among the Kpelle," unpublished Doctoral 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1960; "Poro Values and 
Courtroom Procedures in a Kpelle Chiefdom," Southwestern 
Journal of Anthropology, 18 (1962), pp. 341-50; "The Kpelle 
Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the Informal Settlement of 
Disputes," Africa, 33 (1963), pp. 1-11; "Marital Instability 
among the Kpelle: Towards a Theory of Epainogamy," Ameri-
can Anthropologist, 65 (1963), pp. 552-73; "The Kpelle of 
Liberia," in Peoples of Africa, ed. by Gibbs, New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, pp. 119-240. 
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Belleh, Dey and Vai. On the Kpelle Gibbs writes: 
The Kpelle have an incipient class system that 
distinguishes three classes: to. nuwai (rich men), 
loi lonni (sons of the soil), and tii ke nuwai 
(workmen o r clients)--an upper class, middle c lass, 
and lower class, respectively. This is termed an 
"incipient" class system because the range of attri-
butes on which the classes differ is small, the 
ratio of intraclass interaction to interclass inter-
action is small, and the number of people in both 
the upper and lower groups is small. 
This class system has historical origins because 
it stems from the domestic slavery once practiced 
by the Kpelle, although slavery has, of course, 
been abolished by the Liberian government. In 
earlier times there were three classes: freemen, 
slaves, and pawes.26 
No discussion of Kpelle or Gola society can be made 
without an understanding of Poro. 
Little writes: 
One of the most interesting problems of pre-
colonial history is the relation of so-called secret 
societies to indigenous government. In West Africa 
they are concerned mainly with the ownership and use 
of supposedly supernatural medicines and the propa-
gation of certain cults. 
These are the functions also of other associations, 
but what principally distinguishes secret societies 
from the ordinary medicine society or cult is the 
esoteric basis of their activities. Not only do the 
secret societies employ particular rituals, signs, 
symbols, and forms of knowledge which are withheld 
from non-initiates, but these things are required 
as a special source of power through being kept pri-
vate. Associations of this kind are prevalent in 
southern Nigeria, and are particularly numerous in 
the coastal area of rain-forest in general, including 
the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and parts of 
Ghana and Portuguese Guinea. They are not secret in 
26Ibid., p. 214. 
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any other respect. On the contrary, not only is the 
existence and general purpose of these societies 
known to every grown-up person, but in many places 
the wide range of their activities makes them the 
dominant social force. They are frequently respon-
sible for tribal education, regulate sexual con-
duct, supervise political and economic affairs, and 
operate various social services, including enter-
tainment and recreation as well as medical treat-
ment.27 
Little goes on to say the institution is probably more 
than 400 years old and has diffused throughout this section 
of West Africa. No hard information on membership, actual 
political influence or any important facet of Poro is 
available and none is being collected. 28 The absence of 
hard information is not due to a lack of interest in Poro, 
rather the absence is due to intense security precautions 
which prevent information from passing to non-members, 
especially white men. 
One of the major problems in analyzing Poro is that of 
determining its relation to the public political hierarchy 
of chiefs. 29 The extremely rapid rates of social change 
27Kenneth Little, "The Political Function of the Poro," 
Africa, 35 (October, 1965), p. 349. 
28A search of bibliographic items in Rural Africana 
and Research in Rural Africa indicate no research is being 
done on Poro. In a personal communication to this writer 
Little said he knows of no research being done on it. 
29see Eugene A. Walter, Terror and Resistence: A Study 
of Political Violence, with Case Studies of Some Primitive 
African Communities, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1969. 
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and flux that have characterized this geographical area has 
already been mentioned. Poro developed as an integrative 
social organization that drew members from potentially war-
ring tribes and enforced its authority across wide areas. 
The British colonial system of indirect rule, which was 
also used by the Liberian government, created a series of 
appointed chiefs which supposedly represented the in-
digenous tribal hierarchy. However, this political struc-
ture does not accurately reflect historical conditions of 
Sierra Leone or the Northwestern and Central sections of 
Liberia where the non-Kwa speaking tribes are found. 
Little writes: 
Needless to say, quite apart from the question of 
Poro, the indigenous system was much more complex 
than this. True, a number of individual chiefdoms 
existed, each relatively independent and under the 
control of its own chief, sub-chiefs, and headmen. 
But, according both to tradition and the earliest 
written accounts of conditions in the Guinea Coast, 
the underlying situation involved an intricate net-
work of political ties and affiliations corresponding, 
in some ways, to quite large hegemonies or confedera-
cies. The impression gained is that these arose out 
of the exigencies of tribal warfare, which seems to 
have been almost continuous in certain areas, 
prompting a constant need for military alliance and 
for protection on the part of weaker chiefdoms. For 
this reason, but also as a result of conquest, there 
was often a single chief, or "high chief", whose 
general leadership over a group of chiefdoms was 
recognized by his neighbours. Each of the latter 
kept his own administration, but the arbitration of 
the high chief was accepted in important cases, in-
cluding disputes between fellow members of the 
11 confederacy 11 .30 
Little suggests that: 
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It is hardly necessary to repeat that under the 
warlike conditions obtaining, the system of politi-
cal relationships just described waslargely the 
result of military factors. Fighting being on a 
limited scale, personal qualities of leadership, in-
cluding audacity and skill in ambush, were more 
important than the number of a man's followers or 
the ethnic and kin relationships between groups . 
. . . [S]ome sanction was necessary which could 
operate more widely and more effectively than 
mere physical force or even traditionally in-
grained attitudes of allegiance.31 
In other words, 
. [W]ith growing political centralization, the 
judicial and executive function of a secret society 
may be retained and its members as the personal 
agents of the ruling chief may constitute the 
effective police of the state.32 
Political control, then, was divided between the 
two institutions. Also, it was vested in the hands 
of relatively few individuals. Principally, there 
were the officials of the Poro, and there was the 
chief, who, as well as directing the civil affairs 
of the chiefdom, might also occupy a senior grade in 
the society. In these terms, positions of leadership 
were hereditary or could be achieved by ritual means. 
In addition, individual chiefs obtained extra power 
through military success which they were able to 
retain because an interlocking organization of local 
Poro lodges cut across kinship lines and the local 
30Little, 
~-
cit., p. 64. 
31Little, 
~-
cit., pp. 65-66. 
32Little, 
~-
cit., p. 67. 
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group. The latter organization kept the scale of 
political interaction potentially wider than that 
encompassed by a single chiefdom. It offered, 
despite continuous warfare and inter-chiefdom 
rivalry, a framework of relationships upon which 
political integration could proceed. 
By these arrangements--to paraphrase Morton-
Williams's analysis of the Yoruba state--there was 
produced a system of social control capable of 
working in a small community, or in one of several 
thousands, and adapted to a confederation of petty 
chiefdoms.33 
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The existence of secret centralized societies puts a 
check on individualistic pursuits. The end result is de-
scribed by Gibbs. His description of the Kpelle ethics is 
noteworthy since it is a description of "traditional 
society" and processes operating within it that are in 
sharp contrast to the descriptions offered by the conven-
tional view in Chapter One. 
Kpelle culture has two conflicting dominant themes. 
The first is a stress on personal autonomy and the 
individual achievement of status. Eligibility for 
high rank such as chieftaincy is not ascribed pri-
marily on the basis of birth as a member of a parti-
cular lineage or clan as it is in many middle-range 
African societies. Rather, it is achieved on the 
basis of individual effort. A Kpelle may climb ahead 
of his fellows through the possession of certain 
obtainable s.kills. Most important is the ability to 
work hard, that is, to farm well, and to manage his 
economic resources skillfully. This will enable him 
to attract wives, themselves the major source of 
wealth, for Kpelle women claim to be drawn to a man 
mainly by his industriousness. The possession of 
interpersonal skills enables a man to hold his wives 
and the clients whom they may attract. He will then 
become known as a man who knows how to "hold people 
33Little, £2.· cit., p. 70. 
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good," and, if he has a gift for oratory and settling 
palavers, he will be selected for political office. 
Some of this know-how he may acquire by starting 
adult life as the client of a prominent man or by 
working in bride service for the daughter of such a 
man. The variability of marriage forms and residence 
patterns in Kpelle society exists because men make 
marriages less to give expression to a particular 
kinship principle than to enhance their status by 
taking a step in the process of acquiring power over 
people. 
The basic quest is for the individual acquisition 
of wealth through hard work and shrewd investment of 
this wealth in persons. At advantageous times one 
collects the social debts thus created. Throughout 
there is not too subtle a stress on the instrumental 
manipulation of others to one's own advantage. What 
is significant is that this is an individual enter-
prise, not one of a corporate group. However, if a 
man is prudent, he will not neglect his supernatural 
resources. He will protect and enhance his gains by 
investing in medicines and charms to hold his wives 
and protect his crops; perhaps he will use sorcery 
to slow the process of his rivals. But he will 
approach the creator god or the ancestors only when 
in dire straits. 
In a society where the achievement principle is 
widely followed, it is clear that competitive rival-
ries and shifting allegiances can be a source of con-
siderable friction. This is especially true where, 
as in Kpelle society, kinship groups are weak and 
exercise few restraints on the individual. Those in 
constituted authority are constantly faced with the 
unsettling possibility of being replaced by the 
newly powerful. 
The counterweight to the theme of individual ad-
vancement is the stress on conformity and regulation 
as exemplified in the tribal societies. Through the 
initiation schools they assure the continuity of 
basic Kpelle values and by the application of com-
bined ritual and secular sanctions, they ensure ad-
herence to those values. This means that individual 
Kpelle are guided by the same expectations in the 
competition for power. They play by the same rules 
and for the same stakes, which means that no one goes 
too far in the means he uses to acquire position. If 
he does, the sanctions are forceful and effective. 
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Through its officials, the Poro regulates the speed 
with which a man with a following may acquire formal 
political or Poro office. 
Using game board maneuvers as an analogy, one would 
say that no one can advance along the game board too 
fast. Thus only those men who have demonstrated 
respect for proper authority and traditional values 
win the game, whereas others are not allowed to pro-
ceed too far. In short, those with ritual and 
secular power who form the top echelon of the Poro 
and society as a whole take care to allow themselves 
to be replaced only by those who share their outlook. 
This is especially significant if, as noted above, 
these Poro gatekeepers are themselves selected by the 
inherently conservative ascriptive hereditary 
principle. Thus, the Poro minimizes the disruptive 
effects of the achievement principle and competition 
for individual status, and serves as a stabilizing 
and conserving force in society. 
Following this Gibbs says the Kpelle are "strikingly 
similar" to most of the neighboring tribes: Vai, Gola, 
Mano, Gio, Loma, Mende and Kissi. d'Azevedo's description 
of the Gola is approximately similar. He several times 
speaks of "achievement-oriented Gola society, 1135 and goes 
on to discuss Poro and centralized political control. 
In summary, the available ethnographic information 
supports both the statistical conclusions of the previous 
chapter and the historical evidence that began this chapter. 
All the tribes in this geographical area are achievement 
34Gibbs, "The Kpelle of Liberia," £E.· cit., pp. 229-30. 
35warren L. d'Azevedo, "Common Principles of Variant 
Kinship Structures among the Gola of Western Liberia," 
American Anthropologist, 64 (1962), pp. 504-20. 
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oriented, and of them, the Kru are more achievement oriented 
since the existence of centralized political authority en-
forced by a secret society puts greater limitations on 
individual accomplishment. 
Social Complexity and Ecological Adaptation 
These findings are corroborated by independent lines 
of theoretical speculation. Sahlins, in his comparative 
study of Social Stratification in Polynesia 36 arrives at the 
general conclusion that as economic productivity increases 
the society becomes more stratified. Productivity creates 
a surplus which adds non-economic roles and creates a 
system of redistribution. Sahlins is careful to limit his 
generalization to the geographical area from which his data 
was collected. However, his description of three forms of 
stratification, the ramage, descent and atoll, and their 
association to types of economic resources is suggestive. 
These forms of social organization may be thought of as 
adoptive variations to ecological conditions. 
The ramage form is centralized, a high chief is the 
direct descendent of the founder, lineages are ranked by 
distance to the founder, succession is by a primogenitive 
36Marshall D. Sahlins, "Social Stratification in 
Polynesia," The American Ethnological Society, Verne F. 
Ray, (ed.), Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958. 
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principle and the ramage form is the most stratified of the 
three forms. Descent-line soci-ties are composed of local 
groupings of small, unrelated lineages, descent lines, no 
definite rule of succession exists, territorial councils do 
the ruling and the descent lines, which are not ranked, have 
a representative on the council. These two forms of social 
organization are alternative solutions to the problem of 
distributing surplus production, solutions related to the 
particular type of basic adaption of the culture. A ramage 
form develops where the spatial distribution of rich re-
source zones is too scattered to be exploited by one house-
hold or the range of crops is quite large and must be grown 
in different areas. Kin ties provide an equitable distri-
bution of different products and are maintained. Descent 
line society develops where rich resources are concentrated 
in a single space or the range of crops is small. No 
economic distribution by kin networks develops and isolated, 
nucleated settlements are the rule. Both the ramage and 
descent forms of social organization are an adaption to the 
differential placement of resource zones and range of 
crops. Both forms are adaptions to abundant resources and 
are more socially stratified than t~e atoll form. 
The atoll form is an adaption to scarce resources and 
is different from the previous two forms. The social 
organization may be quite complex but it is not stratified. 
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The society undergoes an intensive specialization so that 
all available resources are exploited. The result is a 
complex social organization with many associations, age-
grade societies, village organization and double descent 
succession. The long occupation of a limited area under 
conditions of low productivity may result in an intensive 
ecological specialization. 
Qualifications can be made but in general, the social 
organization of the Kru tribes approximates the decentrali-
zed non-stratified, low productivity, atoll organization. 
To be relatively unstratified does not necessarily imply a 
simple social organization or simple ecological speciali-
zation. Kru tribal members, historically, have worked as 
deckhands on ships for at least 400 years, and also been 
fishermen, hunters and farmers. 
The social organization of the other Liberian tribes 
in our sample approximates the more centralized, stratified 
ramage social organization. Outside of the dense rain 
jungle, resources are more abundant since farming and trade 
possibilities are available. The Kpelle and Gola have 
ranked lineages, centralized chiefs and at least a rudi-
mentary social class system. 37 The same opportunities for 
37The abolition of slavery by the Liberian government 
in 1930 literally created a social revolution among the Vai, 
Gola, Kpelle, and other tribes whose ruling families had 
much of their wealth in slaves. For a fuller account of 
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material accumulation which stimulated the constant warfare 
also fostered the growth of pan-tribal occupation associa-
tions and secret societies, of which Poro is the most well 
known. As the ethnographic reports of Gibbs and d'Azevedo 
indicate an achievement emphasis is still emphasized but 
its expression is restricted and this restriction shows up 
in the statistical data. 
None of the Liberian tribes have a completely centrali-
zed bureaucratic government. Wide regional variations in 
political autonomy exist and the class system is not 
rigidly developed. Based on the preceding theoretical 
analyses it is reasonable to assume that, in general, these 
tribes are achievement oriented and that Kru, Krahn and 
Grebo are relatively more achievement oriented than the 
other tribes. 
In summary, these last two chapters have attempted to 
present a coordinated picture of a geographical area using 
survey research techniques, historical information and 
anthropological reports. Both an emphasis on achievement 
and a differential emphasis by tribal grouping are shown to 
be a natural and plausible part of an entire complex of 
events. Enough descriptive materials have been presented 
the destruction of the old social class system see Warren 
L. d'Azevedo, "A Tribal Reaction to Nationalism (Part 2) ," 
Liberian Studies Journal, 2 (1969), pp. 43-63. 
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to enable the reader to compare the actual conditions of 
these tribes with the images of "the traditional society" 
given by the conventional view. Given their turbulent and 
chaotic social histories and the continual ecological 
requirements of low productivity economic organizations 
under difficult climatic conditions, it is not surprising 
to find an explicit achievement ethos. Any strong stress 
upon allocating responsibilities on the basis of fixed 
ascribed characteristics such as sex, age or specific 
genealogical ties would probably be mal-adoptive and result 
in the eventual elimination of that social grouping. 
;J '/ 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE NEED FOR A THEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTION 
Summary of Previous Chapters 
Before starting the concluding chapter it is useful to 
briefly summarize. The opening chapter describes a per-
spective that this writer feels has been the prevailing 
orthodoxy in the sociological study of social change in 
non-Western countries. This orthodoxy was described as it 
appears in contemporary introductory textbooks and more 
specialized writings. Since the "conventional view" 
operates as a paradigm and not as a theory, the opening 
chapter attempted to give a full range of its assumptions 
and assertions. It was pointed out that one of its asser-
tions is that "achievement" characterizes industrial 
societies and "ascription" characterizes pre-industrial 
societies. This assertion is supported by other assertions 
and assumptions that, in general, say: most, if not all, of 
the important social events occurring in "pre-industrial" 
societies are due to outside factors summarized in the con-
cepts "industrialization," "urbanization," "modernization" 
or more recently "developmental change." Central to this 
view is the distinction between "traditional" and "modern." 
J 
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These social conditions are thought to exist and be opposed 
alternatives. Social change is a shift from "traditional" 
to 11 modern 11 and the shift is caused by the processes of 
11 industrialization 11 et al. Moreover, this shift is rapid 
and discontinuous, creating urban slums and 11 social dis-
organization.11 
The second chapter focused on a single assertion, that 
11 industrialization 11 broke down a previously existing ex-
tended family and replaced it with a nuclear family. This 
assertion is also found in the references cited in the 
opening chapter and plausibly fits into the three stage 
model of social change that is characteristic of conven-
tional thinking. Enough clear empirical evidence has slowly 
been developed to say this assertion is incorrect. If this 
evidence is accepted, then the assumptions of the perspec-
tive which generated it must inevitably be questioned. 
Thus the second chapter is the beginning of a partial 
empirical refutation of the conventional view. Philosophers 
of science such as Popper and Kuhn, indicate that neither a 
theory nor a paradigm can be definitively rejected. No 
complete empirical refutation of the conventional view is 
possible. Rather, enough evidence is slowly accumulated to 
show its assertions and assumptions need to be re-analyzed. 
Chapter Three attempts several aims: It takes a pro-
minent theorist, W. E. Moore, and examines his influential 
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classic work Industrialization and Labor. It traces his 
writings over a twenty-year period and points out the 
changes in his theoretical views. It also reviews post-
1950 empirical evidence on industrialization and labor. The 
purpose of this chapter was to move beyond the rhetoric of 
the conventional view and list the empirical evidence which 
already exists that contradicts its assumptions. Until 1960 
Moore's views reiterated conventional conceptions. However, 
under the stimulus of adverse empirical criticism his views 
became modified and this is reflected in his writings. 
Chapter Four reviews the evidence on the importance of 
ascription and achievement. The assertion that an emphasis 
on achievement is unique or especially prevalent in "modern" 
industrial societies is shown to be seriously debateable. 
This belief is shown to lack adequate empirical documenta-
tion. The complementary assertion that an emphasis upon 
fixed, rigid, custom-bound, family-linked principles charac-
terizes "traditional" societies also lacks empirical docu-
mentation. 
Chapters Five and Six report on the statistical 
evaluation of interviews with 1300 rubber workers, and on 
the historical and ethnographic characteristics of the 
Liberian tribes. we found that a majority of the men we 
interviewed are "achievement-oriented," that an emphasis 
upon achievement is not associated with "modernizing" 
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experiences since the emphasis varies by tribe. The his-
torical and ethnographic information shows this part of the 
West Africa coast is anything but stagnant and unchanging. 
It is an area that has undergone rapid and extensive change 
for .as far back as existing historical documentation goes. 
In a strict sense, these results are not generalizable to 
other geographical areas, but had the conventional view been 
generally correct in its emphases, then we should have 
found evidence for it in this area. 
Theoretical Critiques of the Conventional View 
Having reviewed previous chapters, especially empha-
sizing the empirical contradictions they raise with con-
ventional assumptions, this concluding chapter will review 
recent theoretical criticisms of the conventional view. 
The purpose is to gain a better understanding of social 
structure in so-called traditional countries. We begin by 
reviewing theoretical attacks upon the conventional view. 1 
Blumer writes: 
1An early critique of the "conventional view" that 
anticipates later, more systematic critiques was made by 
the last Chinese sociologist to public in the American 
Sociological Review. See Francis L. K. Hsu, "Incentives to 
Work in Primitive Communities," American Sociological Re-
view, 8 (December, 1943), pp. 638-42; see also, William R. 
Bascom, "West Africa and the Complexity of Primitive Cul-
tures," American Anthropologist, 50 (January-March, 1948), 
pp. 18-23. 
( 
What does the introduction of industrialization 
do to the traditional order of preindustrial 
societies? The conventional answer of sociologists 
is that industrialization undermines the tradi-
tional order. Industrialization is regarded as 
displacing existing occupations, shifting pro-
duction from the home and the village, producing 
migration and urbanization, fostering social 
mobility, introducing monetary and contractual 
relations, arousing new wishes and expectations, 
and promoting secular and rational perspectives. 
The impact of such changes is alleged to break 
down the existing family system, disrupt the pre-
vailing class structure, disintegrate status and 
role arrangements, undermine paternalistic rela-
tions, weaken the established system of authority, 
transform traditional tastes, and erode established 
values. My studies convince me that this widely 
held view is markedly inaccurate. I wish to sketch 
its major deficiencies and suggest a more balanced 
conception.2 
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Blumer goes on to correctly say that "industrializa-
tion" as a concept is too broad. As commonly used it sub-
sumes a heterogeneous collection of processes and events: 
machinery, electrical power, a western market, transporta-
tion networks, credits, educational facilities, and people 
with abilities to operate the preceding. The concept in-
cludes so much that it is not a useful term. Similarly, the 
concept of the "traditional society" also subsumes such a 
heterogeneous collection of historical experiences and pre-
sent situations as to be largely useless for serious 
2Herbert Blumer, "Industrialization and the Traditional 
Order," Sociology and Social Research, 48 (January, 1964), 
pp. 129-38, quote f rom p. 129. See a l so Herbert Blumer, 
"Early Industrialization and the Laboring Class," 
Sociological Quarterly, 1 (January, 1960), pp. 5-14. 
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analysis. 
Given this heterogeneity neither a general theory of 
''industrialization" is possible nor can a theory of social 
change be built around it. Blumer goes on to indicate that 
a wide variety of responses are possible to potential 
changes, and non-industrial countries exhibit all combina-
tions of responses. Blumer identifies five responses: 
"rejective," "disjunctive," "assimilative,'' "supportive" 
and "disruptive.'' That is the pre-industrial society might 
reject "industrialization," exist in a dual, "disjunctive," 
economy, assimilate it, be supported by it, or be destroyed 
by it. Of these responses, Blumer firmly rejects the con-
ventional view. 
First, it would be a mistake to assume that the 
picture of differential responses is to be found 
only at some initial stage of early industrializa-
tion, only to pass over subsequently into a single 
current of descriptive response. To the contrary, 
each one of the five responses may be a continuing 
affair, maintaining itself during decades of contact 
with the industrializing process. Second, it should 
not be thought that the rejective, disjunctive, 
assimilative, and supportive responses take place 
only in scattered and insignificant parts of the 
traditional order. They may cover broad and impor-
tant areas of the social order. They operate in all 
of the major areas on which sociologists are prone 
to fasten their concern--such areas as the class 
structure, the authority system, the organization and 
life of families, the structure of social roles and 
status systems, the institutional organization, the 
system of values, and the array of tastes and 
aspirations. Traditional arrangements in such areas 
do not merely disintegrate or fade away before the 
imputed onslaught of the industrializing process; 
they may meet industrialization in any or all of the 
other four ways, with great frequency and with great 
vigor. Third, we have no evidence to support a 
claim that the disruptive response--or for that 
matter any of the other four--is in some ultimate 
sense the most important or the most dominant of 
the five responses. The idea, in itself, of 
trying to rank them in an order of comparative 
importance is probably meaningless because of the 
great variety of the situations in which they 
occur. But even if we entertain the idea we must 
note that we have no comparative studies of the 
five responses. Indeed, scholars are so ill 
cognizant of the rejective, disjunctive, assimila-
tive, and supportive responses that they have not 
even singled them out for individual study. 
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Enough has been said, I trust, to belie the con-
ventional idea of industrialization which is so 
deeply embedded in both scholarly and lay thought. 
The idea that industrialization is a massive force 
which proceeds relentlessly to undercut the pillars 
of the traditional order into which it is introduced 
is false. The blithe way in which the idea has been 
taken for granted by scholars and the tenacity with 
which they cling to it tell a great deal about 
peculiarities of scholarly thought but nothing 
reliable about the empirical world onto which the 
idea is projected. The idea, it may be mentioned in 
passing, seems to have originated in the colorful 
and largely inaccurate depictions of the Industrial 
Revolution in England; and to have subsequently 
taken root largely because of involvement in the 
political and social agitation of the 19th century. 
Whatever may have been its history, the idea has 
become fixed in sociological lore. Yet, despite its 
axiom-like status the idea turns out to be untrue 
when matched against empirical reality.3 
This is a strong and emphatic condemnation of a widely 
believed perspective and of so-called "scholars" who con-
tinue to recite it without subjecting its assumptions to 
empirical study. In its place, Blumer urges we make a more 
3Blumer, "Industrialization and the Traditional 
Order," £E.· cit., pp. 136-37. 
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careful study of the ways in which non-Western cultures 
selectively pick and choose which aspects of "industriali-
zation" they want. A sociological analysis of "indus-
trialization" must include the historical awareness that the 
world's largest nation has, as governmental ideology, the 
belief that the Western political organization associated 
with the development of machine technology is an exploita-
tive organization. We know that China will be an industrial 
power quite soon, already they have the means to use atomic 
warheads. However, we know almost nothing about the social 
organization of the Chinese people. Their reaction to 
Western influence has been selective. The goal of posses-
sing large scale heavy industry is clearly accepted but 
mostly everything else associated with Western industriali-
zation has been rejected. The sociological literature on 
Chinese social organization is non-existent. 
Goddard opens a critique of the distinction between 
primitive and modern by saying: 
We have the idea in sociology that precise, 
clearcut distinctions can be made between primitive 
and modern societies. The most common assumption 
is that, in contrast to modern societies and the 
intermediate stages thought of as leading up to 
them, primitive societies possess simple, undif-
ferentiated social structures that are ordered 
solely in accordance with principles of kinship. 
Not all societies conventionally designated as pri-
mitive are thought to meet this criterion, but at 
least some are supposed to do so. In these cases 
the social structure is "compactly" contained in 
the kinship system; relationships of consanguinity, 
affinity and alliance effectively establish and 
exhaust social relationships.4 
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He goes on to elaborate the supposed differences be-
tween "traditional" and "modern" societies and says it is 
not surprising that the image of the truly primitive is 
nearly always linked to an evolutionary emphasis since 
social differentiation is thought of as starting from a 
simple undifferentiated level. Since the society has a 
simple institutional development internal sources of change 
are infrequent and change, if it is to occur, must come from 
the outside. The stronger the outside the greater the rate 
of change, i.e., the more communications, the more foreign 
aid, the greater the Western influence, etc., the more 
modern a "pre-industrial" society will become. 
Talcott Parsons' evolutionary position, as reflected in 
his article "Evolutionary Universals in Society, 115 is used 
by Goddard to illustrate his argument. Parsons presents an 
evolutionary view of how the primitive society changes. 
"The evolutionary origin of social organization seems to be 
kinship. 116 "The key to the evolutionary importance of 
4oavid Goddard, "The Concept of Primitive 
Social Research, 32 (Autumn 1965), pp. 256-76. 
p. 256. 
Society," 
Quote from 
5Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in 
Society," American Sociological Review, 29 (June, 1964), 
pp. 339-57. 
6 Ibid. , p. 3 41. 
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stratification lies in the role in primitive societies of 
ascription of social status to criteria of biological 
relatedness. The kinship nexus of social organization is 
intrinsically a 'seamless web' of relationships which, in 
and of itself, contains no principle of boundedness for the 
system as distinguished from certain subgroups within it." 7 
That is, kinship, or ascription, is a "seamless web" it 
contains no rule or principle for distinguishing sub-
sections, or making a "seam," within the group of biologi-
cally related people. In other words, the basis for social 
organization within the "primitive" society is kinship and 
kinship is an ascriptive principle which cannot be used to 
internally differentiate the group. Thus stratification is 
a "breaking out" of this lower evolutionary stage and that 
is why it is theoretically important. 
Social stratification in its united development 
may thus be regarded as one primary condition of 
releasing the process of social evolution from the 
obstacles posed by the strong emphasis on kinship 
in much of the sociological literature on strati-
fication tends to obscure the fact the new mobility 
made possible by stratification is due primarily 
to such breaks in kinship ascription as that across 
class lines.a 
Kinship groupings become differentiated on the basis 
of prestige and this differentiation leads to a tendency to-
ward vertical differentiation of the society. This tendency 
7rbid., p. 342. 8rbid., p. 344. 
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is sufficiently strong to override the "pressure of the 
seamless web of kinship to equalize the status of all units 
of equivalent kinship character. Relative prestige dif-
ferences give a differential access to economic advantage 
and political power. A system of "cultural legitimation" 
simultaneously to legitimize the social inequality. The 
undifferentiated "we" of the collectivity becomes a 
culturally sanctioned division into an "us" and "them." 
Goddard says: 
What Bellah and Parsons are attempting is the 
identification of an original transition: from 
the rigid and massively reified social structures 
of the authentically primitive to an "open" form 
of social organization, a paradigmatic break from 
the "closed" to the "open" society. 
My purpose is to examine the distinction between 
"primitive" and "archaic" society, and to try to 
determine whether any sense can be given to it in 
the light of the available evidence. The first 
part of the discussion consists in asking whether 
a truly primitive society, or something approaching 
it, is anywhere to be found in reality, either 
among existing societies conventionally designated 
as primitive, or in the shape of valid inferences 
from archaeological or prehistoric evidence.9 
Goddard answers no to this question. 
Of this latter possibility, we can say at the 
outset that we have very slight knowledge of the 
social organization of Neolithic man, and certainly 
not enough to reconstruct actual types of social 
structure and corresponding forms of consciousness. 
9Goddard, "The Concept of Primitive Society," ££· cit., 
pp. 258-59. 
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There may be good a priori grounds for assuming that 
social structures were simple and undifferentiated, 
and we might also conclude this from the considerable 
amount we know of the material culture, but beyond 
this it is impossible to go. In more recent history 
the position is much better. A great deal is known 
of early Western and Middle Eastern societies. But 
all the evidence points to the existence of quite 
highly differentiated societies which, despite the 
universal significance of kinship, appear well past 
the primitive stage we are attempting to isolate.10 
Even the so-called "primitive" societies of today such 
as smaller Brazilian tribes might be the descendents of more 
complex societies. The primitiveness of even the few ob-
jectively simple social organizations we know about today 
can only be insisted on if we make the assumption that their 
culture has remained relatively unchanged for thousands of 
years. This is not a plausible assumption. All of us are 
adult. 
Goddard goes on to develop the general argument that 
meaningful social class differences must be posited in all 
so-called "primitive" peoples. Goldkind's work in Chan Korn 
and his critique of Redfield substantiates this. 11 
Corollary to this, and due to the same over-emphasis on 
kinship, is an ignorance of the existence of voluntary asso-
ciations. The size and frequency of voluntary associations 
in "primitive" societies is neither mapped nor understood. 
We know such societies exist but studies of their 
lOrbid., p. 259. 11Goldkind, ~- cit. 
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functioning and importance are non-existent. We cannot 
assume kinship is equivalent to social structure or that it 
forms the basis of it. 
Goddard concludes that no "real" differences between 
"traditional" and "modern" can be established and that in 
the end as Durkheim says, societies are simply different 
"ways of existing." 
Gusfield lists seven fallacies in contemporary social 
change theory: 12 (1) developing societies have been static 
societies, (2) traditional culture is a consistent body of 
norms and values, (3) traditional society is a homogeneous 
social structure, (4) old traditions are displaced by new 
changes, (5) traditional and modern forms are always in 
conflict, (6) tradition and modernity are mutually exclu-
sive systems, and (7) modernizing processes weaken tradi-
tions.13 
12Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Mis-
placed Polarities in the Study of Social Change," American 
Journal of Sociology, 72 (January, 1967), pp. 351-62. 
13see also Hilda Kuper, Urbanization and Migration in 
West Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1965, p. 4 ff; James Allen Dator, "The 'Protestant Ethic' in 
Japan," The Journal of Developing Areas, 1 (October, 1966), 
pp. 23-40; Hideo Kishimoto, "Modernization versus Westerni-
zation in the East," Journal of World History, 7 (April, 
1963), pp. 871-74; P. C. Lloyd, "The Yoruba Town Today," 
Sociological Review, 7 (July, 1959), pp. 45-63; Gideon 
Sjoberg, "Folk and 'Feudal' Societies," reprint from The 
American Journal of Sociology, 58 (November, 1952), p~231-
39; William Bascom, "Urbanism as a Traditional African Pat-
tern," Sociological Review, 7 (July, 1959), pp. 29-42; w. 
• I 
) 
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Scattered evidence, mostly from India, is used to sup-
port his list of fallacies. Again these issues cannot be 
definitively proved since they are as much perspective as 
assertion of fact. Rather Gusfield's work is a "gut" in-
dictment by one person who accumulated enough evidence in a 
country he was familiar with to reject conventional assump-
tions and suggest that theoretical alternatives can be built 
around their denial. 
Tilly begins a monumental study of over 4000 incidents 
of French urban violence between 1830 and 1860 by stating 
the conventional view of social change, i.e., urbanization, 
as a destructive force. 
Why and how does urbanization affect collective 
violence? Sociologists have some well-fixed ideas 
on the subject. After stressing the disruptive 
personal effects of migration and the "frictions" 
produced by the rubbing together of urban and pre-
urban value systems in expanding cities, Philip 
Hauser tells us that: 
Another group of serious problems created or 
augmented by rapid rates of urbanization are 
those of internal disorder, political unrest, 
and governmental instability fed by mass misery 
and frustration in the urban setting. The facts 
that the differences between the "have" and 
"have not" nations, and between the "have" and 
"have not" peoples within nations, have become 
Penn Handwerker, , "Some Aspects of Household Organization: 
Organization among Urban Bassa," Eugene: University of Ore-
gon, Department of Anthropology, 1969; and Robert E. Bald-
win, Economic Development and Growth, New York: Wiley, 
1966, pp. 112 ff. These references provide additional evi-
dence for Gusfield's views apart from other sources cited 
in the body of the text. 
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"felt differences", and that we are experiencing 
a ''revolution in expectations", have given huge 
urban population agglomerations an especially 
incendiary and explosive character. 
In Hauser's view, the breaking of traditional bonds 
and the conflict of values feed disorder, while the 
swelling city's combination of misery and heightened 
hopes nearly guarantees it. Change produces tension, 
tension breaks out in collective explosions, and a 
form of action more frenzied than that of stable, 
developed countries erupts into life. 
Hauser's analysis, I believe, sums up the pre-
dominant sociological position. Seen from the out-
side, the set of ideas looks solid and chinkless. 
Unpeeled, it reveals gaps and tangles. 
Turn this set of ideas over. On the other side 
is stamped a complementary set: that there is a 
sharp disjunction between healthy and pathological 
social states, between the normal and the abnormal, 
between order and disorder, which justifies 
treating different specimens of disapproved col-
lective behavior as manifestations of the same 
general phenomenon--"deviance". The responses which 
other people give to the disapproved behavior win 
another general label--''social control". 
Collective violence almost automatically receives 
both the complementary treatments. It is easy to 
treat it as the final expression of a fundamental 
pathology which also shows up as a crime, delinquency, 
family instability or mental illness. It is even 
easier to treat it as radically discontinuous from 
orderly political life.14 
14charles Tilly, "A Travers Le Chaos Des Vivantes 
Cit~s," a paper presented to the Sixth World Congress of 
Sociology Evian-les-Bains, September 1966, to appear in 
Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, 
April, 1968, pp. 2-3. Also, Charles Tilly, "Collective 
Violence in Nineteenth Century French Cities," revised ver-
sion of a Public Lecture delivered at Reed College, 
February, 1968. 
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After this he cites five reasons for not believing in 
these ideas. 
The work of his group on the properties of individuals 
known to be involved in urban violence and the social 
characteristics they represent supports the following 
assertions: 
But the second thoughts on the nature of collective 
violence we encountered earlier suggests some dif-
ferent predictions: a weak connection of political 
disturbances with crime, misery or personal dis-
order, a corresponding rarity of the criminal, 
miserable or deranged in their ranks, a strong con-
nection with more peaceful forms of political con-
tention, a significant continuity and internal order 
to collective violence where it does occur, a long 
lag between urban growth and collective outbursts 
due to the time required for socialization and for-
mation of a common consciousness on the part of the 
newcomers, a tendency for disturbances to cluster 
where there is a conflict between the principal 
holders of power in a locality and more or less 
organized groups moving into or out of a modus 
vivendi with those holders of power, a marked 
variation of the form of the disturbance with the 
social organization of its setting.15 
The continuing empirical study by Tilly and his col-
leagues is another example of a different theoretical per-
spective being developed in reaction to older perspectives 
which were not well founded. Tilly actually found an in-
verse correlation between rapid urban growth and political 
violence. 
lSTilly, "A Travers Le Chaos Des Vivantes Cites," 
££.· cit., p. 11. 
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Nettl and Robertson 16 first describe the conventional 
view using Parsons' pattern variables. Next they criticize 
it for its abstractness and inability to account for any 
actual events. They criticize both "industrialization" and 
11 modernization. 11 About "modernization" they say: 
In both sociology and political science one can 
further isolate three major deficiencies in the use 
of such terms as modernization and modernity. 
First, as previously implied, the major problem is 
that of confusion and vagueness. Second, normative 
statements frequently assume prominence in dis-
cussions in this sphere. The most obvious tendency 
to note at this point is the frequent suggestion--
sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit--that the 
typical condition of modernity pertains to the 
social, political and economic characteristics of 
Western liberal democracie~. Third, in close pro-
ximity to this tendency, is the suggestion that 
modernity represents a single, final state of 
affairs, namely 'the state of affairs' to be found 
in a number of Western societies. 
The structural differentiation model, as it stands 
at present, is limited in respect to the societies to 
which it can be fruitfully applied. In the use of 
the theory of structural differentiation in the con-
ventional manner we find one of the main reasons for 
the equation of modernity with Western liberal 
democracies. The idea of structural differentiation 
owes much in its evolution to the economic concept 
of the division of labour in capitalist or neo-
capitalist societies. In fact, culture-boundedness 
in conceptualization and economistic tendencies are 
both prominent features of the intellectual uses 
to which structural differentiation has been put.17 
16J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, "Industrialization, 
Development or Modernization," British Journal of 
Sociology, 17 (September, 1966), pp. 274-91. 
17rbid., pp. 281-82. 
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Sheth's Oriental factory study18 recapitulates several 
major lines of argument of this thesis. He criticizes the 
conventional view as it occurs in the works of Parsons, 
Hoselitz, Moore and Kerr et al., 19 and points out how these 
conceptions are shown to be empirically inadequate "in the 
light of intensive sociological studies of industriali-
zation in different parts of the world." His concluding 
paragraphs summarize his empirical study. 
What, then, is the nature of relationships in an 
Indian factory such as Oriental? Are they the type 
of relationships supposed to be characteristic of a 
rationalistic, industrial society? Or are they the 
type of relationships allegedly found in the tra-
ditionalistic, non-industrial society? They are pre-
dominantly neither, and partly both. In one sense 
the factory is an ordinary factory and could compare 
with a similar factory anywhere else. In another 
sense, it incorporated the features and values of 
Indian society and thus was unique to the social 
world within which it operated. In a third sense, 
it imbibed the norms and values of informal groups 
and in this respect, again, I believe it had much in 
common with industrial organizations elsewhere. The 
overall picture that emerges is of an inter-mixture 
of traditionalistic and rationalistic norms--
particularism alongside universalism, ascription 
flanked by achievement, and so on. What, in this 
18N. R. Sheth, The Social Framework of an Indian 
Factory, North Manchester, Indiana: University Press, 1968. 
19sheth specifically mentions Bert F. Hoselitz and W. 
E. Moore (eds.), Industrialization and Society Proceedings 
of UNESCO Conference on Social Implications of Industriali-
zation and Technical Change, 1963. Moore's books Indus-
trialization and Labor and Labor Commitment and Social 
Change in Developing Areas which are discussed in Chapter 
Three of this dissertation and Clark Kerr et al., Indus-
trialization and Industrial Man, Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1960. 
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event, is the validity of the argument that the 
values of a pre-industrial society are incompatible 
with those of the industrial society? In Oriental, 
one finds a coexistence of the two sets of values 
and neither seems to hinder the operation of the 
other.20 
Goode, in his book World Revolution and Family Pat-
terns, gives a general critique of both "urbanization" and 
"industrialization." 21 Both contain so many diverse 
meanings that neither is really useful. The former is 
probably subsumed under the latter, or at least, increasing 
concentration of population implies some change in techno-
logy. But beyond this he says it is probably impossible to 
tell the variables apart. He makes the philosophical point 
that each concept contains so many variables that they are 
their own cause and effect, hence, really cannot be used to 
explain very much. 
Weinberg also makes general theoretical critique of the 
conventional view especially about its assumption that 
industrial societies, and hence all societies, will tend to 
converge towards generally similar social structures. He 
writes: 
The concept of convergence has become often 
inextricably connected with modernization theory, 
which in its turn, uses an evolutionary-functional 
20sheth, The Social Framework of an Indian Factory , 
2.E.· cit., pp. 202-203. 
21william J. Goode, World Revolution and Family Pat-
terns, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963, pp. 168 ff . 
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model, associated with Parsons, Moore, Smelser, 
Levy and Eisenstadt. Modernization is defined as 
the use of inanimate resources for the multiplica-
tion of human effort, with manifold consequences 
for structural arrangements in an inter-dependent 
social system. Societies evolve from small-scale, 
traditional, kin-oriented and relatively undif-
ferentiated units towards large-scale industrial 
societies with a high degree of differentiation of 
organizations and roles. Traditional systems of 
action, such as the family, contract their scope, 
and industrial systems, such as the market, extend 
theirs. The use of inanimate resources "constrains," 
in Moore's terminology, the interdependent elements 
of the social system to adapt to industrialism. A 
common terminus is often denied, even though 
industrial societies are "teleonomic" because 
deliberate change is a shared feature, and because 
societies solve their perennial problems, whether 
related to industrialism or not, in different ways. 
The objections to this approach become objections 
to convergence as such, and they are: •.. 22 
His objections are that (1) there is often an uncriti-
cal acceptance of evolutionary theory by functionalists as 
a solution to the problem of social change, (2) the inter-
dependence of social systems is exaggerated, (3) social 
change of any significance which is unconnected to indus-
trialization is not recognized, (4) social change is por-
trayed in a mechanistic, teleological sense since it is 
maintained the "traditional" order must inevitably be changed 
toward a "modern" industrial economy, like the United 
States, and (5) these views emphasize the psychological and 
22 ran Weinberg, "The Problem of the Convergence of 
Industrial Societies: A Critical Look at the State of a 
Theory," Comparative Studies in Society and History , 
forthcoming, p. 10. 
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social-psychological postulates of similarities between 
personality structures in industrial societies and emphasize 
the need for similar personalities in non-industrial 
societies to the detriment of understanding social structure. 
Weinberg goes on to point out that little empirical 
evidence has actually been collected to substantiate the 
conventional view. He ends by concluding that the concept 
should not be discarded all together, rather, if we actually 
make empirical studies without over-emphasizing evolutionary 
assumptions, then we should probably find limited cases of 
convergence. 
A substantial body of evidence is developing to show 
that kinship ties, i.e., an ascriptive emphasis, provide 
important mechanisms through which economic development 
operates at an individual level. This evidence is in marked 
contrast to conventional emphases that existing kinship pat-
terns must/will be disrupted by outside influences. 
Isaac, with his own data and other literature to sub-
stantiate him, writes that kinship ties are not nearly as 
inimical to economic growth and development as many scholars 
have assumed them to be. 
A common-sensical explanation--and, indeed, one 
encountered frequently in the professional litera-
ture--of why more indigenous populations do not 
follow the lead of the strangers who trade among 
them is that indigenous peoples are caught in a 
local web of kinship that stifles innovation and 
enterprise. This line of reasoning has come under 
severe attack in recent years. Jones (1969: 266-27) 
( 
concludes: 
The field studies · [in Keyna, southern 
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone] revealed few if 
any signs of impairment of the function of the 
marketing system because of familial ties .... 
none of the studies reported the kinds of 
problems referred to by ..• others that prevent 
the African trader from controlling his enter-
prise and employing his earnings as he sees 
fit. The explanation may be that traders who 
are so bedevilled by their kinsmen do not re-
main solvent for long and are not likely to 
make up a very large proportion of the traders 
who are active in the market at any one time. 
Perhaps so, but none of the studies show what 
may be regarded as unusually high turnover of 
trading businesses. Whatever the reasons, the 
important fact is that a great many Africans 
are able to carry on successful trading 
businesses, however persistent the claims of 
kinsmen may be. Furthermore, there is a 
general evidence of family cooperation in 
trade whether in the form of advancing funds 
or in the acceptance of kinsmen as partners 
and employees. 
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In a similar vein, I have pointed out in Chapter 
IV of this dissertation and elsewhere that the kins-
men of Pendembu's entrepreneurs frequently make 
positive contributions toward initial capital accu-
mulation and toward sustaining an established bus-
iness. This is true even in the case of many of the 
entrepreneurs belonging to the minority tribes, be-
cause many of them have resided in the community 
long enough to have become involved in local kinship 
networks--although in most cases, not to the extent 
that the majority of the residents are involved in 
similar networks. I have also stressed that rela-
tively few business failures in Pendembu could be 
attributed to the entrepreneurs having consumed their 
capital to meet kinship obligations. Furthermore, the 
lack of an aggressive and expansive policy on the 
part of most of Pendembu's entrepreneurs cannot be 
laid to drains imposed by their kinsmen. I have 
attempted to demonstrate that low initial capital 
inputs, low consumer incomes, and a low level of 
business aspirations are more important factors in 
( 
keeping businesses small than are drains by 
kinsmen.23 
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Benedict1 reviews a wide range of literature and ends 
by stressing the importance of the family firm in economic 
development. The social roles involved are neither mutually 
exclusive nor necessarily conflicting. 
Andre Frank's article, 25 "Sociology of Development and 
Underdevelopment of Sociology," is an early attack upon con-
servative political biases of the conventional view. The 
literature of "radical sociology" has increased greatly in 
the three years since its publication and been broadened 
into an attack upon sociology as an entire profession. 26 
However, the points Frank makes about the conventional 
view's treatment of economic development have not been 
superseded. Frank identifies three inter-related modes of 
thinking about social change: The first is the ideal type 
23Berry LaMont Isaac, "Traders in Pendembu, Sierra 
Leone: A Case Study in Entrepreneurship," unpublished 
Doctoral dissertation, University of Oregon, 1969, pp. 213-
15. 
24Burton Benedict, "Family Firms and Economic Develop-
ment," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 24 (Spring, 
1968). 
25Andre Gunder Frank, "Sociology of Development and 
Underdevelopment of Sociology," in John Hillman (ed.), 
Catalyst, 3 (Summer 1967), pp. 20-73. 
26Martin Nicolaus's speech on "Fat-Cat Sociology," to 
the American Sociological Association Meetings, Boston, 
September 1968, is a case in point. 
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approach as typified by Hoselitz's use of the pattern 
variables, and stages as typified by Rostow. The second is 
the diffusionist approach and the third is the psychological 
approach as exemplified by McClelland. Each of these is 
examined for its empirical adequacy, theoretical adequacy 
and policy effectiveness. Of them, Frank concludes: 
Having examined the three modes of approach to 
and analysis of the problems of economic develop-
ment and cultural change separately, we can briefly 
evaluate them conjointly. What first forces itself 
into view is the wide and deep similarity in the 
extent of the three modes' empirical inaccuracy, 
theoretical inadequacy, and ineffectiveness of 
policy. Yet this similarity should not surprise 
us. It is no more than the reflection of their 
fundamental similarity in points of departure, both 
ideologically and analytically. Thus, the first 
mode is ideal-typical in that it sets up the sup-
posedly typical characteristics of development. 
The second mode concerns itself with how these 
typical characteristics of the first mode are 
supposedly diffused from the developed countries 
to the underdeveloped ones. Finally, the third 
mode, and herein lies its pioneering service, tells 
us how the typical characteristics that are identi-
fied in the first and diffused according to the 
second mode are to be acculturated by the under-
developed countries if they wish to develop. This, 
in a nutshell, is the sum total of this received 
theory and analysis of economic development and 
cultural change. 
The direction in which to look for an alternative 
theory of economic development and change that is 
more adequate for the underdeveloped countries is 
suggested by the common shortcomings of the three-
part approach of received theory reviewed here. 
Firstly, where this approach is empirically wrong 
about the past and present reality of the under-
developed part of the world, the developed part of 
the world, and the world as a whole; an adequate 
alternative theory will have to come to terms with 
( 
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the history and contemporary reality of development 
and underdevelopment. Secondly, where the approach 
is theoretically inadequate because it cannot 
identify the determinant social whole, because it 
takes account neither of the history of the under-
developed part nor of its relations with the 
developed part, and least of all of the world as a 
whole, and because it does not conform to the struc-
ture of that world's social system; an alternative 
theory must reflect the structure and development of 
the system which has given rise to, now maintains, 
and still increases both structural development and 
structural underdevelopment as simultaneous and 
mutually produced manifestations of the same histori-
cal process. Thirdly, where the development policy 
of this approach is ever more politically conserva-
tive and counsels accepting the structural status quo 
with folded hands while waiting for others' gifts 
with open hands, an alternative policy for economic 
development and cultural change will have to be 
politically ever more revolutionary and help the 
peoples of the underdeveloped countries to take the 
destruction of this structure and the development of 
another system, into their own hands. If the 
developed countries cannot diffuse development, 
development theory, or development policy to the 
underdeveloped countries, then the people of these 
countries will have to develop them by themselves. 
These three modes of approach are the emperor's 
clothes, which have served to hide his naked 
imperialism. Rather than fashioning the emperor a 
new suit, these people will have to dethrone him 
and clothe themselves.27 
In summary the issues raised in this dissertation go 
beyond the ability of any one graduate student to encompass 
in a concluding chapter. It is far more difficult to 
criticize an existing perspective than suggest a systematic 
replacement. Besides a perspective, a paradigm generally 
27Frank, "Sociology of Development and Underdevelop-
ment of Sociology,"~- cit., pp. 71-73. 
( . 
results from the work of many men over a long period of 
time. 28 
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The critics this dissertation has cited do not provide 
an alternative theory capable of any sort of prediction for 
the probable reason that no such theory is possible. For 
example, we have no systematic theory examining urban dif-
ferences in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Differences be-
tween the continents are not typically considered in 
theories of rural change. We are nowhere near a general 
theory of social change strong enough to account for urban 
growth, labor migration and political activity simul-
taneously. American sociology has no literature to speak of 
on or from third world socialist countries. This lack in-
cludes a shameful lack of knowledge about the world's 
largest country, China. Nor does any literature describe 
or explain how Vietnamese peasants can build a political 
movement which incurred two million known war dead and sus-
tain it in the face of the terror and firepower of the 
world's most powerful military force. Thus, not only do we 
lack adequate theories, but we have no information about 
many relevant phenomena. 
The rate at which theoretical cliches change is also 
28The above critiques do not include critiques by 
Douglas R. Pullman, "Social Change in Economic Development 
Theory," The Canadian Review of Sociolo and Anthro olo 
3 (February, 1966 , pp. 9-22, and Rhodes,~- cit. 
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reflective of the absence of any coordinated theories. 
Attempts to describe what is going on have variously been 
called "labor commitment," "industrialization," "moderni-
zation," "development" and "developmental change." Con-
comitantly, countries which used to be called "colonial 
possession" or 11 underdeveloped 11 are now called "pre-
industrial," "less-developed, 11 "modernizing," and "de-
veloping." The optimism of such concepts is itself a bias 
since the economic development of non-industrial countries 
is an empirical condition, not a theoretical assumption. 
Good evidence exists that economic development is not pro-
gressing very rapidly if it is progressing at all. 
A growing literature exists on imperialism. 29 It has 
arisen recently and continues to grow rapidly. Tendencies 
to rhetoric aside, it is the only integrated theory of 
economic development that has attracted widespread belief. 
As Frank's comments indicate it is even more harsh on the 
conventional view than other critics. Proponents of the 
29For example see A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Under-
development in Latin America, New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1967; Peter Worsley, The Third World, Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1964; Harry Magdoff, The Age of 
Imperialism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969; Carl 
Oglesby and Richard Shaull, Containment and Change, New 
York: MacMillan Co., 1967; Pierre Jabe, The Pillage of the 
Third World, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968; and 
Gabriel Kalko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy, 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. 
( 
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conventional view tend to ignore imperialism as a theory 
instead of debating its merits. This is a silence which 
will probably become uncomfortable. 
Predicting futures is always difficult. However, 
enough criticism of the conventional view has been made to 
see several directions. An empirical sorting out seems to 
be underway. That is, over time we find a better specifi-
cation of the conditions under which the conventional view 
holds and those conditions where it does not hold. For 
example, it is probably the case that kinship ties may re-
tard or aid capital accumulation. We have examples of each 
possibility. The problem now is to understand the condi-
tions under which these possibilities occur and then seek 
an explanation for these conditions. Achievement and 
ascription may be used as another example. As properties of 
social structure they vary by geographical areas depending 
on local historical and cultural conditions. This is an 
empirical question. We cannot continue to assume that 
achievement characterizes industrial countries and ascrip-
tion characterizes non-industrial countries since real 
doubt exists that this commonly asserted assumption is in 
fact true. Rather, we have to empirically determine what is 
emphasized in what circumstances. Then an explanation can 
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be found for these circumstances. 30 No short cuts exist. 
A balance between induction and deduction has to be main-
tained. When it does not exist the quality of knowledge 
deteriorates. An empirical sorting out on key theoretical 
issues is now necessary since the theorists responsible for 
the conventional view were not good enough at theory 
building to account for the existence of real events. 
A close interdependence between "parts" of society 
should not be over-stressed, especially technology. Only a 
small number of people have access to any one portion of 
scientific or technological knowledge. The rest of the 
population may maintain unusual ideas about that knowledge. 
We lack accurate measurements of how fast different parts 
of society actually change in relation to each other. The 
evidence on family patterns and "industrialization," as 
reviewed in Chapter Two, implies that family patterns to a 
noticeable degree, are independent of technological levels 
within the society. Religious beliefs also change quite 
slowly and the change appears to be more related to the 
number and kinds of people who believe them, rather than a 
change in the content of the belief. It is true that all 
society is inter-related. However, we have enough empirical 
30Examples of what this writer means are the work of 
M. G. Smith and Sahlins, cited earlier in the dissertation. 
\ 
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evidence to doubt that changes in one sector are quickly 
responded to by changes in another. Nor do we have an 
accurate understanding of ranges of disagreement on specific 
issues. To what degree do the ranges of opinion expressed 
by rubber workers on the questions asked them correspond to 
ranges we would get if we sampled from industrial popula-
tions? Not only do parts of a society have a measure of 
independence from each other but within parts there may be 
variations also. Achievement and ascription are dif-
ferentially emphasized for different social groups within 
the same society, regardless of what the general orienta-
tion of that society is. For example, it is probably the 
case that women everywhere are trained to have less of an 
achievement orientation in general. 
Concomitant with the above is the need to get outside 
of the United States if anything more than a sociology of 
America is going to be built by American sociologists. In 
a country of two hundred million people there are only a 
handful of sociologists to begin with and of these few only 
a thumbnail's worth go overseas. This writer assumes we 
realize that an adequate knowledge of social structure pre-
supposes knowledge about other societies. A closer co-
operation is required with both foreign scholars and alien 
disciplines such as anthropology. A course in comparative 
sociology should be required of graduate students. Only 
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until we build an awareness of other possibilities will we 
have a decent knowledge of our own society. This awareness 
must be accompanied by a cleansing of cultural chauvinism 
that permeates the conventional view's descriptions of 
"traditional" and "modern." It must also be accompanied by 
a better understanding of international reiations and what 
it means to be an American in a poor country. Until we 
have a desire to collect hard-to-get information, and an 
awareness of our own social position, we are not going to 
get much beyond an "air-conditioned" sociology. 
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APPENDIX 
This Appendix presents forty-two cross tabulations. 
The row variables, 1, 2, 4, 7, 20 and 23, are variables 
typically taken as representing "modernization," 
11 industrializatiop 11 and "urbanization." The column 
variables are described in Chapter Five and presumably tap 
achievement emphases. 
Modernization Variables 
1. Education 
0 . no english 5. grade 9 
1. grade 1-2 6. grade 10-11 
2 . grade 3-4 7. grade 12 
3. grade 5-6 8. vocational training, uncom. 
4. grade 7-8 9. vocational training, compl. 
2 . Pay rate by hour 
0. 0-8 cents 5. 29-33 cents 
1. 9-14 cents 6. 34-43 cents 
2. 15-20 cents 7. 44-48 cents 
3. 21-25 cents 8 . 49-58 cents 
4 . 26-28 cents 9. 59 cents and up 
4 . How long, how many years in all, you work for company 
business? 
0. less than one year 6 . 6 years 
1. 1 year 7. 7 years 
2. 2 years 8. 8 years 
3. 3 years 9 . 9 years 
4. 4 years X. 10 to 15 years 
5. 5 years Y. more than 15 years 
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7. Seibel's wage-labor index originally had a range of 0 
to 42, but for purposes of analysis it has been col-
lapsed into five categories with as close an approxi-
mation to equal row marginals as possible. Pre-
sumably, the higher the score the higher the commit-
ment to wage-labor. 
20. You be countryman, half-half, or kwi? 
0. I am country man 
1. half-half 
2 . I am kwi man 
23. You work or live in Monrovia? 
0. never see 5. four years 
1. visited 6. five years 
2. one year or less 7. six years 
3 . two years 8 • seven years 
4 . three years 9. eight years or more 
Achievement Variables 
34. Two men, both do same work. One man older, plenty 
family. Other man young no got family, no got chil-
dren. Both work for you, for same work, how you pay. 
You give older man, younger man more or both same? 
O. older man get more 
1. younger man get more 
2. both get same 
36. Two men. Who should we respect more? One man town 
chief he work plenty hard other man clan chief, but 
he lazy. Who should we respect more? 
0. lazy clan chief 
1. strong town chief 
2. both 
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37. Man with small money got two sons, both want money for 
school business. Big son is dull, but small son is 
plenty clever. Who should man give money to? 
0. older boy who dull 
1. small boy who clever 
2. both 
38. If you got small money and both your best friend and a 
family man want money for same business, who you give 
money to? 
0. family man 
1. friend 
2. both 
52. Two men. Who should we have more respect for, one man 
he clan chief work plenty hard, other man he town chief 
but he lazy man. 
0. hard working clan chief 
1. lazy town chief 
2. both 
56. You got small money and both your best friend and a 
family man come to you need money, friend he work plenty 
hard family man he too much lazy. Who you give money 
to? 
0. lazy family man 
1. strong friend 
2. both 
67. Man with small money got boy and girl. Both want money 
for school business, girl plenty smart, boy he not 
clever. Who man give money to, smart girl or dumb 
boy? 
0. dumb boy 
1. smart girl 
2. both 
Var 1 
Column 
Total 
TABLE 31. EDUCATION BY AGE-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
265 
32.8 
59.0 
33 
34.4 
7.3 
36 
32.4 
8.0 
61 
45.2 
13.6 
27 
39.1 
6 . 0 
10 
29.4 
2.2 
9 
45.0 
2.0 
5 
25.0 
1.1 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
3 
75 . 0 
0 . 7 
449 
34.5 
Var 34 
1 
90 
11.1 
72.6 
11 
11.5 
8.9 
13 
11.7 
10.5 
4 
3.0 
3.2 
4 
5.8 
3.2 
1 
2.9 
0.8 
1 
5.0 
0.8 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
124 
9.5 
2 
454 
56.1 
62.4 
52 
54.2 
7.1 
62 
55.9 
8.5 
70 
51. 9 
9.6 
38 
55.1 
5.2 
23 
67.6 
3.2 
10 
50.0 
1.4 
15 
75.0 
2.1 
3 
100 . 0 
0.4 
1 
25.0 
0.1 
728 
56.0 
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Row 
Total 
809 
62.2 
96 
7.4 
111 
8.5 
135 
10.4 
69 
5.3 
34 
2.6 
20 
1.5 
20 
1.5 
3 
0.2 
4 
0.3 
1301 
100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 29.30835 with 18 Df Significance= 0.044. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 34 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.01. Significance= 0.178. 
Gamma= -.03. 
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TABLE 32. EDUCATION BY POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 36 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 1 0 112 589 105 806 
13.9 73.1 13.0 62.2 
65.1 60.9 67.3 
1 13 71 13 97 
13.4 73.2 13.4 7.5 
7.6 7.3 8.3 
2 12 85 14 111 
10.8 76.6 12.6 8.6 
7.0 8.8 9.0 
3 12 106 14 132 
9.1 80.3 10.6 10.2 
7.0 11.0 9.0 
4 10 58 3 71 
14.1 81. 7 4.2 5.5 
5.8 6.0 1. 9 
5 6 24 2 32 
18.8 75.0 6.2 2.5 
3.5 2.5 1.3 
6 4 15 1 20 
20.0 75.0 5.0 1.5 
2.3 1.6 0.6 
7 2 14 3 19 
10.5 73.7 15.8 1.5 
1.2 1.4 1.9 
8 0 3 0 3 
0.0 100 . 0 0.0 0.2 
o.o 0 . 3 0.0 
1 2 1 4 
25.0 50.0 25.0 0.3 
0.6 0.2 0.6 
Column 172 967 156 1295 
Total 13.3 74.7 12.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 14.32370 with 18 Df Significance = 0.707. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 36 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.01. Significance= 0.175. 
Gamma= -.03. 
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TABLE 33. EDUCATION BY AGE-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct Var 37 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 1 0 30 560 234 824 
3.6 68.0 28.4 62.6 
69.8 62.8 61.3 
1 4 56 37 97 
4.1 57.7 38.1 7.4 
9.3 6.3 9.7 
2 3 70 37 110 
2.7 63.6 33.6 8.4 
7.0 7.8 9.7 
3 3 98 34 135 
2.2 72.6 25.2 10.3 
7.0 11.0 8.9 
4 2 47 22 71 
2.8 66.2 31. 0 5.4 
4.7 5.3 5.8 
5 0 25 9 34 
0.0 73.5 26.5 2.6 
o. o 2.8 2.4 
6 1 18 1 20 
5. O_ 90.0 5.0 1.5 
2.3 2.0 0.3 
7 0 12 7 19 
0.0 63.2 36.8 1. 4 
0.0 1.3 1.8 
8 0 2 1 3 
0.0 66.7 33.3 0.2 
0.0 0.2 0 . 3 
9 0 4 0 4 
0.0 100.0 o.o 0.3 
0.0 0.4 0.0 
Column 43 892 382 1317 
Total 3.3 67.7 29.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 17.94028 with 18 Df Significance = 0.459. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 37 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .oo. Significance= 0.330. 
Gamma= • 01. 
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TABLE 34. EDUCATION BY FRIEND-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct Var 38 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 1 0 302 194 313 809 
37.3 24.0 38.7 62.9 
65.2 59.0 63.4 
1 32 27 33 92 
34.8 29.3 35.9 7.2 
6.9 8.2 6.7 
2 36 27 43 106 
34.0 25.5 40.6 8.2 
7.8 8.2 8.7 
3 45 41 45 131 
34.4 31.3 34.4 10.2 
9.7 12.5 9.1 
4 22 18 30 70 
31.4 25.7 42.9 5.4 
4.8 5.5 6.1 
5 10 10 13 33 
30.3 30.3 39.4 2.6 
2.2 3.0 2.6 
6 9 4 6 19 
47.4 21.1 31. 6 1.5 
1.9 1.2 1. 2 
7 6 7 7 20 
30.0 35.0 35.0 1. 6 
1.3 2.1 1. 4 
8 0 1 2 3 
0.0 33.3 66 . 7 0.2 
o.o 0.3 0.4 
9 1 0 2 3 
33.3 0.0 66 . 7 0 . 2 
0.2 o.o 0.4 
Column 463 329 494 1286 
Total 36.0 25.6 38.4 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 11.06277 with 18 Df Significance = 0.891. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = . oo with Var 01 dependent . 
= . 00 with Var 38 dependent • 
Kendall's Tau B = . 01. Significance= 0.200. 
Gamma= .02. 
295 
TABLE 35. EDUCATION BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Var 1 
Column 
Total 
Count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
363 
82.1 
56.5 
47 
87.0 
7.3 
62 
82.7 
9.6 
78 
87.6 
12.1 
38 
84.4 
5.9 
19 
79.2 
3.0 
18 
100.0 
2.8 
14 
93.3 
2.2 
2 
66.7 
0.3 
2 
66.7 
0.3 
643 
83.7 
Var 52 
1 
31 
7.0 
66.0 
2 
3.7 
4.3 
5 
6.7 
10.6 
4 
4.5 
8.5 
3 
6.7 
6.4 
1 
4.2 
2.1 
0 
o.o 
o.o 
1 
6.7 
2.1 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
47 
6.1 
2 
48 
10.9 
61.5 
5 
9.3 
6.4 
8 
10.7 
10.3 
7 
7.9 
9.0 
4 
8.9 
5.1 
4 
16.7 
5.1 
0 
o.o 
o.o 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
1 
33.3 
1.3 
1 
33.3 
1. 3 
78 
10.2 
Row 
Total 
442 
57.6 
54 
7.0 
75 
9.8 
89 
11.6 
45 
5.9 
24 
3.1 
18 
2.3 
15 
2.0 
3 
0.4 
3 
0.4 
768 
100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 12.88013 with 18 Df. Significance= 0.798. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 52 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.04. Significance= 0.031. 
Gamma= -.10. 
TABLE 36. EDUCATION BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE 
Var 1 
Column 
Total 
Count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
0 
80 
32.0 
73.4 
4 
16.7 
3.7 
9 
22.5 
8.3 
5 
18.5 
4.6 
7 
36.8 
6.4 
1 
20.0 
0.9 
1 
16.7 
0.9 
2 
18.2 
1.8 
109 
2 8. 5 
Var 56 
1 
125 
50.0 
63.1 
13 
54.2 
6.6 
23 
57.5 
11.6 
16 
59.3 
8.1 
8 
42.1 
4.0 
2 
40.0 
1.0 
5 
83.3 
2.5 
6 
54.5 
3.0 
198 
51.8 
2 
45 
18.0 
60.0 
7 
29.2 
9.3 
8 
20.0 
10.7 
6 
22.2 
8.0 
4 
21.1 
5.3 
2 
40.0 
2.7 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
3 
27 . 3 
4.0 
75 
19.6 
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Row 
Total 
250 
65.4 
24 
6.3 
40 
10.5 
27 
7.1 
19 
5.0 
5 
1.3 
6 
1. 6 
11 
2.9 
382 
100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 11.48812 with 14 Df. Significance= 0.647. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 01 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 56 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .08. 
Gamma= .14. 
Significance= 0.007. 
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TABLE 37. EDUCATION BY SEX-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 67 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 1 0 33 132 87 252 
13.1 52.4 34.5 65.6 
68.8 65.3 64.9 
1 1 11 11 23 
4.3 47.8 47.8 6.0 
2.1 5.4 8.2 
2 2 24 14 40 
5.0 60.0 35.0 10.4 
4.2 11.9 10.4 
3 6 16 8 30 
20.0 53.3 26.7 7.8 
12.5 7.9 6.0 
4 2 10 6 18 
11.1 55.6 33.3 4.7 
4.2 5.0 4.5 
5 1 0 3 4 
25.0 0.0 75.0 1.0 
2.1 0.0 2.2 
6 1 5 0 6 
16.7 83.3 o.o 1.6 
2.1 2.5 o.o 
7 2 4 4 10 
20.0 40.0 40.0 2.6 
4.2 2.0 3.0 
9 0 0 1 1 
o.o o.o 100.0 0.3 
0.0 0.0 0.7 
Column 48 202 134 384 
Total 12.5 52.6 34.9 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 17.12407 with 16 Df. Significance = 0.377. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = . 00 with Var 01 dependent . 
= .02 with Var 67 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = . 00. Significance= 0.486. 
Gamma= . 00. 
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TABLE 38. PAY RATE BY AGE-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 34 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 2 0 293 108 551 952 
30.8 11.3 57.9 73.2 
65.3 87.1 75.7 
1 81 9 103 193 
42.0 4.7 53.4 14.8 
18.0 7.3 14.1 
2 36 5 37 78 
46.2 6.4 47.4 6.0 
8.0 4.0 5.1 
3 13 1 20 34 
38.2 2.9 58.8 2.6 
2.9 0.8 2.7 
4 2 0 4 6 
33.3 o.o 66.7 0.5 
0.4 0.0 0.5 
5 8 0 7 15 
53.3 0.0 46.7 1.2 
1.8 0.0 1.0 
6 12 1 3 16 
75.0 6.2 18.8 1. 2 
2.7 0.8 0.4 
7 0 0 1 1 
0.0 0.0 100.0 0.1 
0.0 0.0 0.1 
8 2 0 0 2 
100.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
0.4 0.0 0.0 
9 2 0 2 4 
50.0 0.0 50.0 0.3 
0.4 0.0 0.3 
Column 449 124 728 1301 
Total 34.5 9.5 56.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 43.41075 with 18 Df Significance = 0.000. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent. 
= .02 with Var 34 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.09. Significance= 0.000. 
Gamma= -.18. 
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TABLE 39. PAY RATE BY POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 36 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 2 0 123 705 121 949 
13.0 74.3 12.8 73.3 
71.5 72.9 77.6 
1 22 153 19 194 
11. 3 78.9 9 . 8 15.0 
12 . 8 15.8 12.2 
2 14 53 9 76 
18.4 69.7 11.8 5.9 
8.1 5.5 5.8 
3 5 26 3 34 
14.7 76.5 8.8 2.6 
2.9 2.7 1.9 
4 3 1 6 
33 . 3 50.0 16.7 0.5 
1.2 0.3 0 . 6 
5 3 8 3 14 
21. 4 57.1 21.4 1.1 
1. 7 0.8 1.9 
6 3 12 0 15 
20.0 80.0 o.o 1. 2 
1.7 1.2 0.0 
7 0 1 0 1 
0.0 100.0 0.0 0.1 
0.0 0.1 0.0 
8 0 2 0 2 
0.0 100.0 0.0 0.2 
0.0 0.2 0.0 
9 0 4 0 4 
0.0 100.0 o.o 0.3 
0.0 0.4 0.0 
Column 172 967 156 1295 
Total 13.3 74.7 12.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 13.88737 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.736. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = . 00 with Var 02 dependent. 
= . 00 with Var 36 dependent • 
Kendall's Tau B = -.03. Significance= 0.027. 
Gamma= -.08. 
Var 2 
Column 
Total 
TABLE 40. PAY RATE BY AGE-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
34 
3.5 
79.1 
2 
1.0 
4.7 
7 
9.2 
16.3 
0 
0. 0 
0. 0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
o.o 
0 
o.o 
o.o 
0 
0.0 
o.o 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
43 
3.3 
Var 37 
1 
654 
67.6 
73.3 
135 
68.5 
15.1 
52 
68.4 
5.8 
25 
73.5 
2.8 
2 
33.3 
0.2 
9 
64.3 
1.0 
9 
56.3 
1.0 
1 
100.0 
0.1 
2 
100.0 
0.2 
3 
75.0 
0.3 
892 
67.7 
2 
279 
28.9 
73.0 
60 
30.5 
15.7 
17 
22.4 
4.5 
9 
26.5 
2.4 
4 
66.7 
1.0 
5 
35.7 
1.3 
7 
43.8 
1.8 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
1 
25.0 
0.3 
382 
29.0 
300 
Row 
Total 
967 
73.4 
197 
15.0 
76 
5.8 
34 
2.6 
6 
0.5 
14 
1.1 
16 
1.2 
1 
0.1 
2 
0.2 
4 
0.3 
1317 
100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 22.67651 with 18 Df. Significance= 0.203. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 37 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .00. 
Gamma = . 02. 
Significance= 0.295. 
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TABLE 41. PAY RATE BY FRIEND-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct Var 38 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 2 0 342 242 357 941 
36.3 25.7 37.9 73.2 
73.9 73.6 72.3 
1 72 46 74 1 92 
37.5 24.0 38.5 14.9 
15.6 14.0 15.0 
2 25 22 29 76 
32.9 28.9 38.2 5.9 
5.4 6.7 5.9 
3 10 13 12 35 
28.6 37.1 34.3 2.7 
2.2 4 . 0 2.4 
4 2 1 3 
33 . 3 16.7 50.0 0. 5 
0.4 0.3 0.6 
5 5 3 5 1 3 
38.5 23.1 38.5 1 . 0 
1 1.1 0.9 1.0 6 5 1 10 16 
31.3 6.2 62.5 1. 2 
1.1 0.3 2.0 
7 0 0 1 1 
0.0 0.0 100.0 0.1 
0.0 0.0 0 . 2 
8 0 0 2 2 
0.0 o.o 100.0 0 . 2 
0.0 o.o 0.4 
9 2 1 1 4 
50.0 25.0 25.0 0.3 
0.4 0.3 0 . 2 
Column 463 329 494 1286 
Total 36.0 25.6 38.4 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 14.00406 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.728. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = . 00 with Var 02 dependent . 
= . 00 with Var 38 dependent . 
Kendall's Tau B = .01. Significance= 0.160. 
Gamma= . 03. 
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TABLE 42. PAY RATE BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Var 2 
Column 
Total 
Count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
9 
0 
448 
82.8 
69.7 
120 
85.1 
18.7 
47 
88.7 
7.3 
14 
87.5 
2.2 
2 
100.0 
0.3 
3 
75.0 
0.5 
5 
71. 4 
0.8 
1 
100.0 
0.2 
3 
100.0 
0.5 
643 
83.7 
Var 52 
1 
39 
7.2 
83.0 
5 
3.5 
10.6 
2 
3.8 
4.3 
1 
6.2 
2.1 
0 
o.o 
o.o 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
o.o 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
47 
6.1 
2 
54 
10.0 
69.2 
16 
11.3 
20.5 
4 
7.5 
5.1 
1 
6.2 
1.3 
0 
0.0 
o.o 
1 
25.0 
1.3 
2 
28.6 
2.6 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
78 
10.2 
Row 
Total 
541 
70.4 
141 
18.4 
53 
6.9 
16 
2.1 
2 
0.3 
4 
0.5 
7 
0.9 
1 
0.1 
3 
0.4 
768 
100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 9.33708 with 16 Df. Significance= 0.898. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 52 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.03. Significance= 0.089. 
Gamma= -.09. 
TABLE 43. PAY RATE BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE 
Var 2 
Column 
Total 
Count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct 
0 
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
9 
0 
77 
30.4 
70.6 
19 
22.4 
17.4 
7 
29.2 
6.4 
2 
25.0 
1.8 
3 
75.0 
2.8 
1 
20.0 
0.9 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
109 
28.5 
Var 56 
1 
123 
48.6 
62.1 
52 
61.2 
26.3 
11 
45.8 
5.6 
5 
62.5 
2.5 
1 
25.0 
0.5 
3 
60.0 
1.5 
3 
100.0 
1.5 
198 
51.8 
2 
53 
20.9 
70.7 
14 
16.5 
18.7 
6 
25.0 
8.0 
1 
12.5 
1.3 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
1 
20.0 
1.3 
0 
0.0 
o.o 
75 
19.6 
303 
Row 
Total 
253 
66.2 
85 
22.3 
24 
6.3 
8 
2.1 
4 
1.0 
5 
1.3 
3 
0.8 
382 
100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 12.33890 with 12 Df. Significance= 0.418. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 02 dependent. 
= .01 with Var 56 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .00. 
Gamma= .01. 
Significance= 0.400. 
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TABLE 44. PAY RATE BY SEX-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 67 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 2 0 30 134 93 257 
11. 7 52.1 36.2 66.9 
62.5 66.3 69.4 
1 11 47 26 84 
13.1 56.0 31.0 21. 9 
22.9 23.3 19.4 
2 5 13 7 25 
20.0 52.0 28 . 0 6.5 
10.4 6.4 5.2 
3 0 3 3 6 
0.0 50.0 50.0 1. 6 
o.o 1.5 2.2 
5 1 2 1 4 
25.0 50.0 25.0 1.0 
2.1 1.0 0.7 
6 1 1 3 5 
20 . 0 20.0 60.0 1.3 
2 . 1 0.5 2.2 
9 0 2 1 3 
0.0 66 . 7 33 . 3 0.8 
0.0 1 . 0 0 . 7 
Column 48 202 134 384 
Total 12.5 52.6 34.9 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 6.71407 with 12 Df. Significance = 0.875. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = . oo with Var 02 dependent . 
= . 01 with Var 67 dependent . 
Kendall's Tau B = -.03. Significance= 0.132. 
Gamma= -.07. 
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TABLE 45. YEARS WORKED BY AGE-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 34 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 0 17 3 27 47 
36.2 6.4 57.4 3.6 
3.8 2.4 3.7 
1 20 8 41 69 
29.0 11.6 59.4 5.3 
4.5 6.5 5.6 
2 32 15 44 91 
35.2 16.5 48.4 7.0 
7.1 12.1 6.0 
3 35 11 66 112 
31.3 9.8 58.9 8.6 
7.8 8.9 9.1 
4 34 6 51 91 
37.4 6.6 56.0 7.0 
7.6 4.8 7.0 
5 42 12 61 115 
36.5 10.4 53.0 8.8 
9.4 9.7 8.4 
6 30 5 35 70 
42.9 7.1 50.0 5.4 
6.7 4.0 4.8 
7 29 9 38 76 
38.2 11.8 so.a 5.8 
6.5 7.3 5.2 
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TABLE 45 Continued 
Count 
Row Pct Var 34 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 8 31 8 47 86 
36.0 9.3 54.7 6.6 
6.9 6.5 6.5 
9 43 19 57 119 
36.1 16.0 47.9 9.1 
9.6 15.3 7.8 
10 75 14 112 201 
37.3 7.0 55.7 15.4 
16.7 11. 3 15.4 
11 61 14 149 224 
27.2 6.2 66.5 17.2 
13.6 11.3 20.5 
Column 449 124 728 1301 
Total 34.5 9.5 56.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 31. 64587 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.083. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = • 01 with Var 04 dependent • 
= . 00 with Var 34 dependent . 
Kendall's Tau B = • 03. Significance= 0.030. 
Gamma= . 0 4. 
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TABLE 46. YEARS WORKED BY POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 36 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 0 10 34 4 48 
20.8 70.8 8.3 3.7 
5.8 3.5 2.6 
1 6 51 8 65 
9.2 78.5 12.3 5.0 
3.5 5.3 5.1 
2 10 69 11 90 
11.1 76.7 12.2 6.9 
5.8 7.1 7.1 
3 19 84 8 111 
17.1 75.7 7.2 8.6 
11.0 8.7 5.1 
4 10 68 10 88 
11. 4 77.3 11.4 6.8 
5.8 7.0 6.4 
5 13 90 11 114 
11.4 78.9 9.6 8.8 
7.6 9.3 7.1 
6 13 48 14 75 
17.3 64.0 18.7 5.8 
7.6 5.0 9.0 
7 11 55 11 77 
14.3 71. 4 14.3 5.9 
6.4 5.7 7.1 
Page 1 of 2 
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TABLE 46 Continued 
Count 
Row Pct Var 36 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 8 9 64 13 86 
10.5 74.4 15.1 6.6 
5.2 6.6 8.3 
9 23 84 14 121 
19.0 69.4 11. 6 9.3 
13.4 8.7 9.0 
10 22 152 24 198 
11.1 76.8 12.1 15.3 
12.8 15.7 15.4 
11 26 168 28 222 
11. 7 75.7 12.6 17.1 
15.1 17.4 17.9 
Column 172 967 156 1295 
Total 13.3 74.7 12.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 20.14369 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.574. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = . 00 with Var 04 dependent • 
= . 00 with Var 36 dependent • 
Kendall's Tau B = . 02. Significance= 0.093. 
Gamma= .04. 
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TABLE 47. YEARS WORKED BY AGE-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct Var 37 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 0 3 29 16 48 
6.2 60.4 33.3 3.6 
7.0 3.3 4.2 
1 2 49 16 67 
3.0 73.1 23.9 5.1 
4.7 5.5 4.2 
2 4 64 22 90 
4.4 71.1 24.4 6.8 
9.3 7.2 5.8 
3 4 72 34 110 
3.6 65.5 30.9 8.4 
9.3 8.1 8.9 
4 4 62 25 91 
4.4 68.1 27.5 6.9 
9.3 7.0 6.5 
5 5 75 37 117 
4.3 64.1 31.6 8.9 
11.6 8.4 9.7 
6 3 49 24 76 
3.9 64.5 31.6 5.8 
7.0 5.5 6.3 
7 4 57 19 80 
5.0 71.3 23.8 6.1 
9.3 6.4 5.0 
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TABLE 47 Continued 
Count 
Row Pct Var 37 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 8 1 64 20 85 
1.2 75.3 23.5 6.5 
2.3 7.2 5.2 
9 3 86 33 122 
2.5 70.5 27.0 9.3 
7.0 9.6 8.6 
10 5 136 63 204 
2.5 66.7 30.9 15.5 
11. 6 15.2 16.5 
11 5 149 73 227 
2.2 65.6 32.2 17.2 
11. 6 16.7 19.1 
Column 43 892 382 1317 
Total 3.3 67.7 29.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 13.38522 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.921. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = • 00 with Var 04 dependent • 
= . 00 with Var 37 dependent . 
Kendall's Tau B = . 03. Significance= 0.040 . 
Gamma= .05. 
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TABLE 48. YEARS WORKED BY FRIEND-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct Var 38 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 0 20 7 22 49 
40.8 14.3 44.9 3.8 
4.3 2.1 4.5 
1 18 22 28 68 
26.5 32.4 41.2 5.3 
3.9 6.7 5.7 
2 30 21 35 86 
34.9 24.4 40.7 6.7 
6.5 6.4 7.1 
3 35 28 42 105 
33.3 26.7 40.0 8.2 
7.6 8.5 8.5 
4 29 17 44 90 
32.2 18.9 48.9 7.0 
6.3 5.2 8.9 
5 44 27 44 115 
38.3 23.5 38.3 8.9 
9.5 8.2 8.9 
6 25 23 25 73 
34.2 31.5 34.2 5.7 
5.4 7.0 5.1 
7 29 24 26 79 
36.7 30.4 32.9 6.1 
6.3 7.3 5.3 
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TABLE 48 Continued 
Count 
Row Pct Var 38 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 8 30 20 33 83 
36.1 24.1 39.8 6.5 
6.5 6.1 6.7 
9 36 40 42 118 
30.5 33.9 35.6 9.2 
7.8 12.2 8.5 
10 89 44 65 198 
44.9 22.2 32.8 15.4 
19.2 13.4 13.2 
11 78 56 88 222 
35.1 25.2 39.6 17.3 
\ 
I 
16.8 17.0 17.8 
Column 463 329 494 1286 
Total 36.0 25.6 38.4 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 26.05069 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.249. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = • 01 with Var 04 dependent • 
= . 03 with Var 38 dependent . 
Kendall's Tau B = -.03. Significance= 0.030. 
Gamma= -.04. 
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TABLE 49. YEARS WORKED BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 52 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 0 19 0 0 19 
100.0 0.0 o.o 2.5 
3.0 o.o o.o 
1 28 4 3 35 
80.0 11.4 8.6 4.6 
4.4 8.5 3.8 
2 32 2 6 40 
80.0 5.0 15.0 5.2 
5.0 4.3 7.7 
3 53 5 3 61 
86.9 8.2 4.9 7.9 
8.2 10.6 3.8 
4 41 2 7 50 
82.0 4 . 0 14.0 6.5 
6.4 4.3 9.0 
5 69 4 6 79 
87.3 5.1 7.6 10.3 
10.7 8.5 7.7 
6 35 1 4 40 
87.5 2.5 10.0 5.2 
5.4 2.1 5.1 
7 46 2 3 51 
90.2 3.9 5.9 6.6 
7.2 4.3 3.8 
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TABLE 49 Continued 
Count 
Row Pct Var 52 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 8 41 3 6 50 
82.0 6.0 12.0 6.5 
6.4 6.4 7.7 
9 28 2 4 34 
82.4 5.9 11. 8 4.4 
4.4 4.3 5.1 
10 111 12 15 138 
80.4 8.7 10.9 18.0 
17.3 25.5 19.2 
11 140 10 21 171 
81.9 5.8 12.3 22.3 
' 
21.8 21.3 26.9 
\ 
Column 643 47 78 768 
Total 83.7 6.1 10.2 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 15.94171 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.818. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 04 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 52 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = . 03. Significance= 0.049. 
Gamma= .08. 
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TABLE 50. YEARS WORKED BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 56 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 0 3 7 0 10 
30.0 70.0 0.0 2.6 
2.8 3 . 5 o.o 
1 8 15 6 29 
27.6 51.7 20.7 7.6 
7.3 7.6 8.0 
2 10 10 6 26 
38.5 38.5 23.1 6.8 
9.2 5.1 8.0 
3 14 19 6 39 
35.9 48.7 15.4 10.2 
12.8 9.6 8.0 
4 9 17 3 29 
31 . 0 58.6 10.3 7.6 
8.3 8.6 4.0 
5 14 18 12 44 
31.8 40.9 27.3 11. 5 
12.8 9.1 16.0 
6 4 19 6 29 
13.8 65.5 20.7 7.6 
3.7 9.6 8.0 
7 9 15 4 28 
32.1 53.6 14.3 7.3 
8.3 7.6 5.3 
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TABLE 50 Continued 
Count 
Row Pct Var 56 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 8 9 16 7 32 
28.1 50.0 21.9 8.4 
8.3 8.1 9.3 
9 5 6 4 15 
33 . 3 40.0 26.7 3.9 
4.6 3.0 5 . 3 
10 16 37 14 67 
23.9 55.2 20.9 17.5 
14.7 18.7 18.7 
11 8 19 7 34 
23.5 55.9 20.6 8.9 
7.3 9.6 9 . 3 
Column 109 198 75 382 
Total 28.5 51.8 19.6 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 15.80729 with 22 Df. Significance = 0.825. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 04 dependent. 
= .oo with Var 56 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .05. Significance= 0.045. 
Gamma= .07. 
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TABLE 51. YEARS WORKED BY SEX-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 67 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 0 3 7 1 11 
27 . 3 63.6 9.1 2.9 
6.2 3.5 0.7 
1 6 14 10 30 
20.0 46.7 33.3 7.8 
12.5 6.9 7.5 
2 4 16 7 27 
14 . 8 59.3 25.9 7.0 
8.3 7.9 5.2 
3 4 21 13 38 
10.5 55.3 34.2 9.9 
8.3 10.4 9.7 
4 4 15 13 32 
12.5 46.9 40.6 8.3 
8 . 3 7.4 9.7 
5 7 20 17 44 
15.9 45.5 38.6 11.5 
14.6 9.9 12.7 
6 1 14 12 27 
3.7 51.9 44.4 7.0 
2.1 6.9 9.0 
7 2 14 12 28 
7.1 so.a 42.9 7.3 
4.2 6.9 9.0 
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TABLE 51 Continued 
Coun t 
Row Pct Var 67 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 4 8 2 19 10 31 
6.5 61.3 32.3 8.1 
4.2 9.4 7.5 
9 3 8 5 16 
18.8 so.a 31.3 4.2 
6.2 4.0 3.7 
10 8 37 22 67 
11. 9 55.2 32.8 17.4 
16.7 18.3 16.4 
11 4 17 12 33 
12.1 51.5 36.4 8.6 
8.3 8.4 9.0 
Column 48 202 134 384 
Total 12.5 52.6 34.9 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 14.27973 with 22 Df. Significance = 0. 891. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = . 00 with Var 04 dependent . 
= . 00 with Var 67 dependent • 
Kendall's Tau B = . 04. Significance= 0.103 . 
Gamma= .05. 
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TABLE 52. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY AGE-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 34 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 7 0 76 27 123 226 
33.6 11.9 54.4 17.4 
16.9 21.8 16.9 
1 102 31 150 283 
36.0 11.0 53.0 21.8 
22.7 25.0 20.6 
2 81 26 175 282 
28.7 9.2 62.1 21.7 
18.0 21. 0 24.0 
3 74 22 133 229 
32.3 9.6 58.1 17.6 
16.5 17.7 18.3 
4 116 18 147 281 
41.3 6.4 52.3 21. 6 
25.8 14.5 20.2 
Column 449 124 728 1301 
Total 34.5 9.5 56.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 15.18942 with 8 Df. Significance= 0.055. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .03 with Var 07 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 34 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.01. Significance= 0.257. 
Gamma= -.01. 
320 
TABLE 53. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY POLITICAL PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 36 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 7 0 31 161 29 221 
14.0 72.9 13.1 17.1 
18.0 16.6 18.6 
1 42 211 32 285 
14.7 74.0 11.2 22.0 
24.4 21.8 20.5 
2 29 219 31 279 
10.4 78.5 11.1 21.5 
16.9 22.6 19.9 
3 27 173 28 228 
11.8 75.9 12.3 17.6 
15.7 17.9 17.9 
4 43 203 36 282 
15.2 72.0 12.8 21.8 
25.0 21.0 23.1 
Column 172 967 156 1295 
Total 13.3 74.7 12.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 5.15643 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.740. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 07 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 36 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = . oo. Significance= 0.450 • 
Gamma= . 00. 
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TABLE 54. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY AGE-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct Var 37 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 7 0 9 148 68 225 
4.0 65.8 30.2 17.1 
20.9 16.6 17.8 
1 14 202 75 291 
4.8 69.4 25.8 22.1 
32.6 22.6 19.6 
2 9 190 88 287 
3.1 66.2 30.7 21.8 
20,9 21.3 23.0 
3 7 162 62 231 
3.0 70.1 26.8 17.5 
16.3 18.2 16.2 
4 4 190 89 283 
1.4 67.1 31.4 21. 5 
9.3 21.3 23.3 
Column 43 892 382 1317 
Total 3.3 67.7 29.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 8.47693 with 8 Df. Significance= 0.388. 
Lamda (Asymmetric)= .01 with Var 07 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 37 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .02. 
Gamma= .04. 
Significance= 0.073. 
-... 
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TABLE 55. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY FRIEND-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct Var 38 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 7 0 75 45 101 221 
33.9 20.4 45.7 17.2 
16.2 13.7 20.4 
1 103 75 103 281 
36.7 26.7 36.7 21.9 
22.2 22.8 20.9 
2 107 81 92 280 
38.2 28.9 32.9 21.8 
23.1 24.6 18.6 
3 88 63 75 226 
38.9 27.9 33.2 17.6 
19.0 19.1 15.2 
4 90 65 123 278 
32.4 23.4 44.2 21. 6 
19.4 19.8 24.9 
Column 463 329 494 1286 
Total 36.0 25.6 38.4 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 16.53969 with 8 Df. Significance= 0.035. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .02 with Var 07 dependent. 
= .03 with Var 38 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.00. Significance= 0.477. 
Gamma= -.00. 
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TABLE 56. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct var 52 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 7 0 86 5 10 101 
85.1 5.0 9.9 13.2 
13.4 10.6 12.8 
1 134 6 10 150 
89.3 4.0 6.7 19.5 
20.8 12.8 12.8 
2 144 16 18 178 
80.9 9.0 10.1 23.2 
22.4 34.0 23.1 
3 129 10 18 157 
82.2 6.4 11. 5 20.4 
20.1 21.3 23.1 
4 150 10 22 182 
82.4 5.5 12.1 23.7 
23.3 21.3 28.2 
Column 643 47 78 768 
Total 83.7 6.1 10.2 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 7.43260 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.490. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 07 dependent. 
= .oo with Var 52 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = . 04. Significance= 0.032 • 
Gamma= . 09. 
··~· -
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TABLE 57. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 56 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 7 0 23 27 12 62 
37.1 43.5 19.4 16.2 
21.1 13.6 16.0 
1 28 41 14 83 
33.7 49.4 16.9 21. 7 
25.7 20.7 18.7 
2 20 44 19 83 
24.1 53.0 22.9 21.7 
18.3 22.2 25.3 
3 17 37 12 66 
25.8 56.1 18.2 17.3 
15.6 18.7 16.0 
4 21 49 18 88 
23.9 55.7 20.5 23.0 
19.3 24.7 24.0 
Column 109 198 75 382 
Total 28.5 51. 8 19.6 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 6.09679 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.636. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .02 with Var 07 dependent. 
= .oo with Var 56 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .06. Significance = 0.022. 
Gamma= . 0 9. 
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TABLE 58. WAGE LABOR INDEX BY SEX-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 67 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 7 0 11 36 21 68 
16.2 52.9 30.9 17.7 
22.9 17.8 15.7 
1 8 38 36 82 
9.8 46.3 43.9 21.4 
16.7 18.8 26.9 
2 10 42 30 82 
12.2 51.2 36.6 21.4 
20.8 20.8 22.4 
3 12 31 23 66 
18.2 47.0 34.8 17.2 
25.0 15.3 17.2 
4 7 55 24 86 
8 . 1 64.0 27.9 22.4 
14.6 27.2 17.9 
Column 48 202 134 384 
Total 12.5 52.6 34.9 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 10.88577 with 8 Df. Significance = 0.2083. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .05 with Var 07 dependent. 
= .oo with Var 67 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.02. Significance= 0.235. 
Gamma= 0.03. 
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TABLE 59. SELF-CONCEPTION BY AGE-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 34 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 20 0 261 78 438 777 
33.6 10.0 56.4 60.0 
58.4 62.9 60.6 
1 89 19 129 237 
37.6 8.0 54.4 18.3 
19.9 15.3 17.8 
2 97 27 156 280 
34.6 9.6 55.7 21.6 
21.7 21.8 21. 6 
Column 447 124 723 1294 
Total 34.5 9.6 55.9 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 1.72622 with 4 Df. Significance= 0.785. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 34 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.01. Significance= 0.241. 
Gamma= -.02. 
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TABLE 60. SELF-CONCEPTION BY POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 36 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 20 0 101 584 96 781 
12.9 74.8 12.3 60.7 
59.4 60.7 61.9 
1 39 161 33 233 
16.7 69.1 14.2 18.1 
22.9 16.7 21.3 
2 30 217 26 273 
11. 0 79.5 9.5 21. 2 
17.6 22.6 16.8 
Column 170 962 155 1287 
Total 13.2 74.7 12.0 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 7.42448 with 4 Df. Significance= 0.115. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 36 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.00. Significance= 0.296. 
Gamma= -.02. 
( 
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TABLE 61. SELF-CONCEPTION BY AGE-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct Var 37 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 20 0 25 546 224 795 
3.1 68.7 28.2 60.7 
58.1 61.3 59.6 
1 10 144 82 236 
4.2 61.0 34.7 18.0 
23.3 16.2 21. 8 
2 8 200 70 278 
2.9 71.9 25.2 21. 2 
18.6 22.5 18.6 
Column 43 890 376 1309 
Total 3.3 68.0 28.7 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 7.49965 with 4 Df. Significance= 0.111. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 37 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.00. Significance= 0.452. 
Gamma= -.00. 
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TABLE 62. SELF-CONCEPTION BY FRIEND-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct var 38 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 20 0 303 189 283 775 
39.1 24.4 36.5 60.6 
65.4 57.8 57.9 
1 69 66 99 234 
29.5 28.2 42.3 18.3 
14.9 20.2 20.2 
2 91 72 107 270 
33.7 26.7 39.6 21.1 
19.7 22.0 21.9 
Column 463 327 489 1279 
Total 36.2 25.6 38.2 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 8.11222 with 4 Df. Significance= 0.0876. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent. 
= .02 with Var 38 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .05. 
Gamma= .08. 
Significance= 0.002. 
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TABLE 63. SELF-CONCEPTION BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 52 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 20 0 395 31 56 482 
82.0 6.4 11.6 62.9 
61.6 66.0 71.8 
1 122 9 13 144 
84.7 6.2 9.0 18.8 
19.0 19.1 16.7 
2 124 7 9 140 
88.6 5.0 6.4 18.3 
19.3 14.9 11. 5 
Column 641 47 78 766 
Total 83.7 6.1 10.2 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 4.05922 with 4 Df. Significance= 0.398. 
Lamda (Asymmetric)= .00 with Var 20 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 52 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.06. Significance= 0.003. 
Gamma= -.17. 
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TABLE 64. SELF-CONCEPTION BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 56 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 20 0 83 ' 117 40 240 
34.6 48.8 16.7 62.8 
76.1 59.1 53.3 
1 13 38 19 70 
18.6 54.3 27.1 18.3 
11.9 19.2 25.3 
2 13 43 16 72 
18.1 59.7 22.2 18.8 
11.9 21.7 21.3 
Column 109 198 75 382 
Total 28.5 51. 8 19.6 100.0 
I I 
Raw Chi Square= 13.00151 with 4 Df. Significance = 0.0113. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .oo with Var 20 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 56 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .14. Significance= 0.000. 
Gamma= .25. 
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TABLE 65. SELF-CONCEPTION BY SEX-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 67 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 20 0 27 124 89 240 
11.2 51. 7 37.1 62.5 
56.3 61.4 66.4 
1 11 40 23 74 
14.9 54.1 31.1 19.3 
22.9 19.8 17.2 
2 10 38 22 70 
14.3 54.3 31.4 18.2 
20.8 18.8 16.4 
Column 48 202 134 384 
Total 12.5 52.6 34.9 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 1.79580 with 4 Df. Significance= 0.773. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 20 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 67 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.05. Significance= 0.040. 
Gamma= -.10. 
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TABLE 66. URBAN YEARS BY AGE-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 34 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 23 0 162 60 277 499 
32.5 12.0 55.5 38.4 
36.1 48.8 38.2 
1 148 30 260 438 
33.8 6.8 59.4 33.7 
33.0 24.4 35.8 
2 50 9 77 136 
36.8 6.6 56.6 10.5 
11.1 7.3 10.6 
3 51 18 66 135 
37.8 13.3 48.9 10.4 
11.4 14.6 9.1 
4 13 3 18 34 
38.2 8.8 52.9 2.6 
2.9 2.4 2.5 
5 8 0 8 16 
so.a o.o so.a 1.2 
1.8 0.0 1.1 
I i 6 4 2 5 1 1 36.4 18.2 45.5 0.8 
0.9 1.6 0.7 
7 5 0 6 11 
45.5 0.0 54.5 0.8 
1.1 0.0 0.8 
8 0 0 1 1 
0.0 o.o 100.0 0.1 
0.0 o.o 0.1 
9 8 1 8 17 
47.1 5.9 47.1 1.3 
1.8 0.8 1.1 
Column 449 123 726 1298 
Total 34.6 9.5 55.9 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 20.82578 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.288. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 23 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 34 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.03. Significance= 0.046. 
Gamma= -.04. 
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TABLE 67. URBAN YEARS BY POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 36 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 23 0 73 376 51 500 
14.6 75.2 10.2 38.7 
42.7 38.9 33.1 
1 53 32 3 60 436 
12.2 74.1 13.8 33.8 
31.0 33.4 39.0 
2 14 106 12 132 
10.6 80.3 9.1 10.2 
8.2 11. 0 7.8 
3 21 94 22 137 
15.3 68.6 16.1 10.6 
12.3 9.7 14.3 
4 5 22 4 31 
16. 1 71.0 12.9 2.4 
2.9 2.3 2.6 
5 0 14 1 15 
o.o 93.3 6.7 1.2 
0.0 1. 4 0.6 
6 3 6 1 10 
30.0 60.0 10.0 0.8 
1.8 0.6 0.6 
7 2 9 1 12 
16.7 75.0 8.3 0.9 
1.2 0.9 0.6 
8 0 1 0 1 
0.0 100.0 o.o 0.1 
o.o 0.1 0.0 
9 0 15 2 17 
o.o 88.2 11.8 1. 3 
0.0 1.6 1.3 
Column 171 966 154 1291 
Total 13.2 74.8 11.9 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 17.81396 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.468. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = . 01 with Var 23 dependent • 
= .00 with Var 36 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = . 03. Significance= 0.038 • 
Gamma= .06. 
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TABLE 68. URBAN YEARS BY AGE-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct Var 37 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 23 0 17 359 129 505 
3.4 71.1 25.5 38.4 
39.5 40.3 33.9 
1 12 293 138 443 
2.7 66.1 31.2 33.7 
27.9 32.9 36.3 
2 7 89 41 1 3 7 
5.1 65.0 29.9 10.4 
16.3 10.0 10.8 
3 4 86 48 138 
2.9 62.3 34.8 10.5 
9.3 9.7 12.6 
4 1 23 10 34 
2.9 67.6 29.4 2.6 
2.3 2.6 2.6 
5 2 12 3 17 
11.8 70.6 17.6 1.3 
4.7 1.3 0.8 
6 0 8 3 11 
o.o 72.7 27.3 0.8 
o.o 0 . 9 0.8 
7 0 8 3 11 
o.o 72.7 27.3 0.8 
0 . 0 0.9 0.8 
8 0 0 1 1 
0.0 o.o 100.0 0.1 
0.0 0.0 0.3 
9 0 13 4 17 
0.0 76.5 23.5 1.3 
o.o 1.5 1.1 
Column 43 891 380 1314 
Total 3.3 67.8 28.9 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 16.83546 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.534. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = . 01 with Var 23 dependent • 
= . oo with Var 37 dependent • 
Kendall's Tau B = . 04. Significance= 0.012. 
Gamma= .07. 
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TABLE 69. URBAN YEARS BY FRIEND-FAMILY 
Count 
Row Pct Var 38 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 23 0 214 106 167 487 
43.9 21.8 34.3 38.0 
46.2 32.6 33.8 
1 141 121 175 437 
32.3 27.7 40.0 34.1 
30.5 37.2 35.4 
2 35 44 57 136 
25.7 32.4 41.9 10.6 
7.6 13.5 11. 5 
3 35 34 62 131 
26.7 26.0 47.3 10.2 
7.6 10.5 12.6 
4 12 6 17 35 
34.3 17.1 48.6 2.7 
2.6 1.8 3.4 
5 6 4 6 16 
37.5 25.0 37.5 1.2 
1. 3 1.2 1.2 
6 7 3 1 11 
63.6 27.3 9.1 0.9 
1.5 0.9 0.2 
7 8 1 3 12 
66.7 8.3 25.0 0.9 
1. 7 0.3 0.6 
8 0 0 1 1 
o.o 0.0 100 . 0 0.1 
0.0 0.0 0.2 
9 5 6 5 16 
31.3 37.5 31.3 1.2 
1.1 1.8 1.0 
Column 463 325 494 1282 
Total 36.1 25.4 38.5 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 43,52475 with 18 Df. Significance = 0.000. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .02 with Var 23 dependent. 
= .07 with Var 38 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = . 08. Significance= 0.000 . 
Gamma= .12. 
( 
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TABLE 70. URBAN YEARS BY SECOND POLITICAL-PERFORMANCE 
Var 23 
Column 
Total 
Count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
271 
86.0 
42.1 
235 
81.6 
36.5 
59 
84.3 
9.2 
28 
80.0 
4.4 
16 
80.0 
2.5 
11 
78.6 
1.7 
7 
87.5 
1.1 
7 
87.5 
1.1 
1 
100.0 
0.2 
8 
88.9 
1.2 
643 
83.7 
Var 52 
1 
20 
6.3 
42.6 
21 
7.3 
44.7 
2 
2.9 
4.3 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
2 
14.3 
4.3 
0.0 
0.0 
1 
12.5 
2.1 
0 
0.0 
o.o 
1 
11.1 
2.1 
47 
6.1 
2 
24 
7.6 
30.8 
32 
11.1 
41.0 
9 
12.9 
11. 5 
7 
20.0 
9.0 
4 
20.0 
5.1 
1 
7.1 
1.3 
1 
12.5 
1.3 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
o.o 
78 
10.2 
Row 
Total 
315 
41.0 
288 
37.5 
70 
9.1 
35 
4.6 
20 
2.6 
14 
1.8 
8 
1.0 
8 
1.0 
1 
0.1 
9 
1. 2 
768 
100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 18.81517 with 18 Df. Significance=0.403. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .01 with Var 23 dependent. 
= .00 with Var 52 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .04. Significance= 0.038. 
Gamma= .09. 
r 
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TABLE 71. URBAN YEARS BY FRIEND-FAMILY-PERFORMANCE 
Var 23 
Column 
Total 
Count 
Row Pct 
Col Pct 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
9 
0 
13 
46.4 
11. 9 
56 
25.5 
51.4 
18 
31.0 
16.5 
8 
30.8 
7.3 
4 
22.2 
3.7 
2 
18.2 
1.8 
4 
57.1 
3.7 
42.9 
2.8 
1 
14.3 
0.9 
109 
28.5 
Var 56 
l 
12 
42.9 
6.1 
118 
53.6 
59.6 
29 
50.0 
14.6 
12 
46.2 
6.1 
9 
50.0 
4.5 
6 
54.5 
3.0 
2 
28.6 
1.0 
57.1 
2.0 
6 
85.7 
3.0 
198 
51.8 
2 
3 
10.7 
4.0 
46 
20.9 
61.3 
11 
19.0 
14.7 
6 
23.1 
8.0 
5 
27.8 
6.7 
3 
27.3 
4.0 
1 
14.3 
1.3 
0 
o.o 
0.0 
0 
0.0 
o.o 
75 
19.6 
Row 
Total 
28 
7.3 
220 
57.6 
58 
15.2 
26 
6.8 
18 
4.7 
11 
2.9 
7 
1.8 
7 
1.8 
7 
1.8 
382 
100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 16.11143 with 16 Df. Significance= 0.445. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 23 dependent. 
= .01 with Var 56 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = .01. 
Gamma= .02. 
Significance= 0.304. 
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TABLE 72. URBAN YEARS BY SEX-PERFORMANCE 
Count 
Row Pct Var 67 Row 
Col Pct 0 1 2 Total 
Var 23 0 3 19 8 30 
10.0 63.3 26.7 7.8 
6.2 9.4 6.0 
1 29 103 85 217 
13.4 47.5 39.2 56.5 
60.4 51.0 63.4 
2 8 37 16 61 
13 . 1 60.7 26.2 15.9 
16.7 18.3 11.9 
3 1 15 10 26 
3.8 57.7 38.5 6.8 
2.1 7.4 7.5 
4 1 12 4 17 
5.9 70.6 23.5 4.4 
2.1 5.9 3.0 
5 2 5 5 12 
16.7 41.7 41.7 3.1 
4.2 2.5 3.7 
6 1 2 4 7 
14.3 28.6 57.1 1.8 
2.1 1.0 3.0 
7 2 3 2 7 
28.6 42.9 28.6 1.8 
4.2 1.5 1.5 
9 1 6 0 7 
14 . 3 85.7 0.0 1 . 8 
2.1 3.0 0.0 
Column 48 202 134 384 
Total 12.5 52.6 34.9 100.0 
Raw Chi Square= 17.82645 with 16 Df. Significance = 0.334. 
Lamda (Asymmetric) = .00 with Var 23 dependent. 
= .01 with Var 67 dependent. 
Kendall's Tau B = -.02. Significance= 0.192. 
Gamma= -.04. 
( 
t . Typed by Joann Brady 
